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Kentucky Perpetuities Law
Restated and Reformed
By JESSE DUKEMINmI, JR.*
Formwoiw
Anyone who has tried to explain the Rule against Perpetuities
to laymen finds it very like trying to picture Marianne Moore's
imaginary garden with real toads in it. Full of illusion and
deception, it is the abode of such fantastical characters as the
fertile octogenarian, the unborn widow, the precocious toddler,
the slothful executor-all imaginary beings with power to bring
the Rule down hard on the head of any trespasser. This extra-
ordinary power in imaginary hands is the result of one of the
most arbitrary rules known to the common law: the rule that
any possibility that a gift might vest too remotely, however fan-
tastic, defeats the gift. Many reasonable dispositions have been
mischievously struck down by such "impossible" possibilities.
In the last decade, several states have done away with the
remote possibilities test entirely or in substantial part. As befits a
state which has been a leader in sloughing off common law
archaisms,' Kentucky has now joined the reform movement. At
its regular session last spring the General Assembly passed the
1960 Perpetuities Act,' adopting the common law Rule against
Perpetuities as modified by an actual events test and further pro-
viding for reformation of invalid interests by cy pres. The act
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., Harvard; LL.B., Yale.
1 Among other things abolished are the destructibility of contingent remaind-
ers, the Rule in Shelley's Case, the fee tail, the indefinite failure of issue construc-
tion, the inalienability of contingent interests, possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry, the Rule in Wild's Case, the testamentary branch of worthier title, most of
the technical requirements inhibiting the running of restrictive covenants, and
probably the tenancy by the entirety.
2 Kentucky has also been one of the first states to adopt the Uniform Com-
mercial Code; and, by odd coincidence, the same states which have adopted
the Code have, generally speaking, adopted the wait-and-see reform of perpetuities,
and in the same order.
3 Ky. Acts 1960, c. 167, compiled as Kentucky Revised Statutes §§ 381.215-
381.223. The Kentucky Revised Statutes are hereinafter cited as KRS.
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also abolishes two common law anachronisms, the determinable
fee and the possibility of reverter, converting them respectively
into a fee simple subject to a right of entry and a right of entry.
It then terminates after thirty years rights of entry, which tradi-
tionally have been exempt from the perpetuity rule. Except
with respect to rights of entry, the effect of the act is to limit the
destructive force of the Rule and save many reasonable family
dispositions previously held void under the remote possibilities
test.
The genesis of this act was a study by the author of all the
perpetuities cases decided in Kentucky, including examination
of the briefs and records on appeal. This study showed con-
vincingly the need for perpetuities reform. Among other things,
it revealed some striking departures from orthodox doctrine: in
the meaning of vest, in the consequences of violating the Rule,
in refusing to apply the rule of convenience and the doctrine of
severed shares to save class gifts. These departures resulted in
27% of the cases being wrongly decided and another 22% being
of doubtful correctness under the orthodox interpretation of the
Rule. In these cases tradition and innovation are so fused that,
to the court at least, they exist in identity with one another.
In addition to doctrinal confusion, the study disclosed some
exceedingly harsh results for the parties concerned. In more
than half of the three dozen cases holding interests void, the
court knew at the time of decision that the interest would in fact
vest within the period. Nonetheless, the Rule required the interest
be struck down because some remote event might have happened,
although in fact it did not. Usually the draftsman had overlooked
a "fertile octogenarian" or put in an age or time condition of
more than 21 years. To make matters worse, the court added to
the carnage by vigorously applying infectious invalidity.
The results of this study, which are set forth herein in Part I
and in the Appendix, showed the operation of the Rule to be
unpredictable and to be unfair to the intended beneficiaries.
The author then undertook to draft appropriate remedial legisla-
tion. Two alternative drafts were prepared and circulated among
various members of the bar, one containing changes in presump-
tions of law or fact to cure specific anomalies, the other adopting
wait-and-see and cy pres with the Vermont statute serving as a
[Vol. 49,
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model. Both contained identical provisions terminating rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter. The first alternative draft ran
into many objections-mainly to its complexity-and proved
unsaleable. The second was agreed upon as the fairest and
simplest solution, but the demand for simplicity required its
further reduction from five pages to three.
The changes made were purposely conservative. Perpetuities
law, like most of property law, is judge-made, and detailed and
complex legislative changes in property law have not often been
notable successes. It was our purpose, in limiting the act to
essential reforms, to leave the courts in their traditional position
as the main source of perpetuities law.
Anyone who has attempted perpetuities reform knows how
very difficult it is to get legislative action on so incomprehensible
a subject. The recent reforms in New York were preceded by
twenty-five years of constant agitation. Great credit is thus due
the able sponsors of the Kentucky reform bill who pushed the
legislation through with clear explanations, persuasive arguments
and-perhaps most important-perseverance. They were Senators
Cabell D. Francis and James C. Ware, and Representatives
Richard P. Moloney and Thomas Jefferson Hill, all prominent
members of the bar.
Part I of this article is a restatement of Kentucky perpetuities
law prior to July 1, 1960, the effective date of the new act.
Except as modified by this act, the old law remains in force.
Part I is primarily designed to provide the practicing lawyer
with a simplified statement of the Rule, with citations to and
analyses of Kentucky cases. It purports to be comprehensive in
that every perpetuities case decided by the Court of Appeals is
cited, and many of them are discussed. It does not pretend to
cover all the complexities of the subject, however. For that the
reader is referred to the many excellent treatises4 (with the
warning that Kentucky law differs in several important particulars
46 American Law of Property, part 24, by Leach and Tudor (Casner ed.
1952); Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. by Roland Gray, 1942);
5 Powell on Real Property 111 759-790 (1956); 4 Restatement of the Law of
Property cbs. 26-28 (1944); Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1201-
1480,,(2d ed. 1956). These works are hereinafter cited respectively as "Am. L.
Prop.", "Gray", "Powell", "Restatement of Property", and "Simes & Smith".
Citations to Part 24 of Am. L. Prop. also refer to identical sections in Leach &
Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities (1957). A delightful, short treatment of the
Rule is Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938).
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from that stated in the texts). In view of the abstract terminology
in this area the discussion is illustrated by brief hypothetical
cases.
5
Parts II and III deal with the 1960 Perpetuities Act. The rea-
sons for, and the purposes of, the act are set forth, as well as how
the act will apply in all the commonly recurring situations. By
way of further illustration the act is applied to every perpetuities
dase decided in Kentucky in the Appendix, Tables 4-8. As will be
seen, the act is of easy application in every one of these cases, and
had it been in force, would have wholly saved at least two-thirds
of the invalid dispositions. Parts II and III were submitted in a
somewhat abbreviated form to the Senate Judiciary Committee
and the House Rules Committee in support of the act. A draft
of the act and explanation were also submitted informally to the
Court of Appeals.
Part IV contains a presentation of the unique Kentucky law
of direct restraints on alienation. This law has often been con-
fused with perpetuities, and the purpose of stating it here is to
show it as a distinct body of doctrine. It is hoped this discussion
will serve the needs of lawyers, judges and students having
problems involving this peculiar Kentucky law, which has never
been adequately treated by legal writers.
In view of the length of this article a table of contents has
been included for easy reference.
PART I
KENTUCKY PERPETUITIES LAW RESTATED
1. ThE MEANING OF KRS 881.220, PROHIBTING SUSPENSION OF
THE PowER OF ALIENATION ( REPEALED JULY 1, 1960)
In the Senate debate on the 1960 Perpetuities Act the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator George
Overbey, characterized Kentucky perpetuities law as "disorgan-
ized confusion." A more apt description would be bard to come
by. The confusion has many roots, butwithout doubt the tap root
5'A method borrowed from Professor Leach.
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and cause of its "disorganization" is the 1852 statute commonly
referred to as Kentucky's perpetuities statute. With the reviser's
headnote, it reads:
KRS 381.220. Restraints on alienation; duration of; ex-
ceptions. The absolute power of alienation shall not be
suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of a life or lives
in being at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years
and ten months thereafter; ...
In interpreting this statute the Court of Appeals has spoken
ambivalently, and many of the cases are in sharp disagreement as
to its meaning.
By its express words the statute enacts a rule prohibiting
suspension of the power of alienation, which must be clearly
distinguished from the rule against remote vesting. The rule
against remote vesting (the common law Rule against Per-
petuities) is concerned solely with contingent interests which
may remain contingent beyond lives in being plus 21 years. The
policy underlying it is that all contingent interests, assignable
and non-assignable, impair marketability. The rule prohibiting
suspension of the power of alienation proceeds upon a different
policy assumption. It assumes that legally unassignable interests
make property unmarketable and should be struck down if they
remain unassignable for more than the permitted period. Since
all vested and contingent future interests are assignable or
releasable if the holders thereof are ascertainable, only interests
given to unborn or unascertainable persons (unassignable in-
terests) suspend the power of alienation. In short, the rule
against remote vesting applies to all contingent interests; the
rule against suspension of the power of alienation applies only
to interests unassignable because the taker is unborn or unas-
certainable.
The rule against remoteness of vesting is the more inclusive.
Any interest which will violate the suspension rule will necessarily
violate the rule against remoteness, but the converse is not true.
Thus:
Case 1 (Contingent remainder after term of years). T
devises property "to A for 99 years, then in fee to Trinity
Church if it is then in existence." The power of alienation
is never suspended since A, Trinity Church and T's heir
KENTucKy LAw JouRNA[
(the reversioner) may join together and convey a fee simple.
Under the suspension rule all interests are valid.' How-
ever, the gift to Trinity Church is contingent on its being
in existence after 99 years, and this violates the rule against
remote vesting. (If the gift over had been to A's issue
whenever born living 99 years from date, the gift over
would be to unascertained persons and would have violated
both rules.)
Case 2 (Shifting executory interest). 0 deeds land "to
the Fort Spring Turnpike Co., but if it ceases to use the land
as a toll house, then to X." The contingent interest in X
may be conveyed, and thus does not suspend the power of
alienation.2 However, it is contingent on an event that may
happen too remotely and is void under the rule against
remote vesting.
Whether the 1852 Revisers intended by this statute simply to
enact the common law Rule against Perpetuities, whatever it was
(or turned out to be), or intended to enact a rule against
suspension of the power of alienation is doubtful. The statute
was modeled upon section 15 of the New York Revised Statutes
of 1830. At the time the New York Revisers worked it was not
clear whether the common law Rule was against remote vesting
or suspension of the power of alienation or both. The New York
Revisers added three sections to the New York statutes: one for-
bidding suspension of the power of alienation beyond the period
set by law (section 15); another requiring a contingent remainder
after a term of years to "vest in interest" within the period (sec-
tion 20); and a third providing that an executory interest might
be limited on a fee if such executory interest were certain to become
possessory within the period (section 24). These three sections,
covering all known types of future interests held void for
perpetuity under decisions prior to 1830, indicated the Revisers
were attempting to restate the common law as it then existed.
In Kentucky, however, section 20 (which would invalidate the
gift to the Church in Case 1) and section 24 (which would in-
validate the gift to X in Case 2) were not adopted. Since these
sections covering known types of perpetuities were omitted, it is
arguable that the Kentucky Revisers were not endeavoring to
' Street v. Cave Hill Investment Co., 191 Ky. 442, 230 S.W. 536 (1921).
Counsel failed to argue the gift to the church vested too remotely.2 Patterson v. Patterson, 135 Ky. 839, 122 S.W. 169 (1909). Court held the
statute did not enact the rule against remote vesting.
[Vol. 49,
1]E'cgy PmEurrlms LAW
restate the common law but were framing a new rule against
unassignable interests to supplant the common law.
Unfortunately the New York and Kentucky Revisers worked
in this field before the time of John Chipman Gray, whose great
treatise on the Rule against Perpetuities was first published in
1886. Gray insisted the Rule was against remote vesting alone
and assignable contingent interests subject to it. Ultimately this
view prevailed in England and in practically every court in this
country, and today it is generally accepted that the common law
Rule against Perpetuities is a rule against remote vesting. The
states which had adopted statutes prohibiting suspension of the
power of alienation were left with the problem of determining
whether their statutes were declaratory of the common law, as
Gray had later interpreted it, or were additions to or replacements
of that law.
In more than one hundred years and one hundred cases this
problem has never been finally resolved in Kentucky. At one
time or another the Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute
as forbidding (a) interests which vest too remotely, (b) interests
which suspend the power of alienation, and (c) direct restraints
on alienation.3 The reviser of statutes, by his heading supplied in
1894 and adhered to since, assumes it incorporates rule (c). 4
The express words of the statute enact rule (b). Yet the court has
in recent years favored the view that it embodies rule (a).
In 1956 the court, noting the confusion in interpretation, stated:
The proper view is that the statute, as embodying the rule
against perpetuities, is concerned with the remote vesting
of estates rather than restraints on alienation of vested
estates despite the language of the statute .... However, it
is unnecessary to decide that the statute may not be applied
to restraints on alienation.5
Three years later, in 1959, the court again dealt with the
"unfortunate confusion" caused by the statute. Admitting that
3 See Roberts, "Kentucky's Statute Against Perpetuities," 16 Ky. L.J. 97(1928). For Professor Roberts' comments on subsequent cases see 21 Ky. L.J.
219, 233-36 (1933); 26 Ky. L.J. 269, 281-83 (1938); 42 Ky. L.J. 3, 19-26 (1953).
4 Nothing could be less justified historically. The reviser has confused the
rule against suspension of the power of alienation with the rule against direct
restraints on alienation, with which it has no direct historical connection. See pp.
82-86 infra.5 Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W. 2d 905, 907-08 (Ky. 1956).
1960]
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in recent cases the statute had been construed as prohibiting
remote vesting, the court nonetheless concluded that "the com-
mon law rule against suspension of the power of alienation has
existed in the common law of this state regardless of the
troublesome statute."" Surely here is an odd twist: to read the
express language out of the statute, then bring the express lan-
guage back in as a common law rule. Although there is an
authoritative ring to this statement of the court, it cannot be
taken at face value. Quite clearly the court did not mean to refer
to the rule against suspension of the power of alienation at all,
but to the rule against direct restraints on alienation, with which
it has frequently been confused and which is discussed in Part
IV of this article.
Modem cases support the view that the statute simply
restates the common law Rule against Perpetuities in the mistaken
language of another era. But in any event one thing is clear.
The common law rule against remote vesting was in force prior
to the statute7 and has been repeatedly declared to be in force
since the statute.8 The statute did not change that rule, except
possibly to extend the 21 year period to 21 years and ten months.
Why the 1852 Revisers added "and ten months" to the com-
mon law period is unknown. An historian might find some con-
nection with the 1807 act prohibiting reading or treating as
authority in Kentucky courts any English post-revolutionary
cases.9 This chauvinistic piece of legislation would have pre-
vented anyone from considering as authority Cadell v. Palmer,10
an 1833 English case which finally settled the period of the Rule.
Before this case it was not clear that the perpetuity period
included only actual periods of gestation after 21 years rather
than nine or ten months in gross. Cadell v. Palmer decided that
6 Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1959).
7 See cases cited note 11 infra.8Page v. Frazer's Ex'rs, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 205 (1878); U.S.F. & G. Co. v.
Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 120 S.W. 328 (1909); Cammack v. Allen, 199
Ky. 268, 250 S.W. 963 (1923); Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky.
1958); Robertson v. Simmons, supra note 6.9 Ky. Acts 1807, c. 7. This was a compromise bill offered by Henry Clay.
The original bill prohibited reading English cases of any date. It is not without
irony that the Great Compromiser became one of the first victims of his own
patriotic version of book burning. Less than three months after the act was
approved Clay attempted to read in court from an 1802 opinion of Lord Ellen-
borough summarizing cases before 1776, which were not available in their
original reports. The chief justice stopped him and ruled: "The book must not be
used at all in court." Hickman v. Boffman, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 356, 373 (1808).101 CI. & Fin. 372 (1833).
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only actual periods of gestation could be allowed. The Revisers,
in fixing the period at "lives in being at the creation of the estate,
and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter," may not have
considered Cadell v. Palmer as authority.1 Indeed, if they ad-
hered to the statute, they may not have even read it. Whether
"and ten months" meant a period of actual gestation or a further
period in gross has never been decided by the Court of Appeals
and, since the statute has been repealed, probably never will be.
2. WHAT THE COMMON LAW RuLE AGAiNST PmmE.rUTis Is
The classic statement of the Rule, formulated by John Chip-
man Gray, reads:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.' 2
Gray's recipe for a good interest was nothing more than a state-
ment of the ingredients of decision as they existed at his time.
It was a marvelously (over) simplified synthesis of numerous
holdings, mainly by English judges. It is important to keep this
in mind, for just as Gray turned to existing cases for the law of
his time, so we must turn to Kentucky cases to find what is the
common law Rule against Perpetuities applied in this state.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals subscribes to Gray's words
as a proper statement of the Rule, but when the cases are ex-
amined it will be found that the court uses the word "vest"
in a different way. "Vest" is the key word, and how it is used
by the court is so important to understanding the Rule in
Kentucky its meaning will have to be treated in detail. Before
turning to the meaning of vest, however, two other aspects of
the Rule require brief discussion: "lives in being" and "remote
possibilities."
'1 The Kentucky cases fixing the period were ambiguous. Between 1807 and
1852, when the 1807 act was repealed, the Court referred to the period as
follows: 'iffe, or lives in being, and twenty-one years and a few months,"
Moore's Trustees v. Howe's Heirs, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 199, 201 (1826); "a
life in being and twenty-one years and nine months," Brashear v. Macey, 26 Ky.
(3 J.M.) 89 91 (1829); "a life in being and 21 years," Luke v. Marshall, 28
Ky. (5 JJ.M.) 353, 355 (1831); "a life or lives in being and twenty one years,
and the period of gestation," Birney v. Richardson, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 424, 427
(1837); "a life in being and twenty one years thereafter," Atty. Gen. v. Wallace's
Devisees, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 611, 616 (1847).




Lives in being. Who is a 'life in being"? This is usually the
first question students ask when they meet the Rule. The answer
is that it can be any person alive (or in the womb) at the
creation of the interest, so long as his death or some event which
will necessarily happen or fail to happen within his life will insure
vesting or failure of the interest within 21 years of his death.
The lives in being "may be any lives which play a part in the
ultimate disposition of the property."13 They need not be given
any beneficial interest in the property nor be referred to in the
instrument, but the causal connection which insures vesting
must be express or implied. Thus:
Case 8 (Causal connection express). T devises property
in trust "to pay income to my issue per stirpes from time
to time living until 21 years after the death of X, Y, and Z,
at which time corpus is to be distributed among my issue
per stirpes then living." X, Y, and Z are the measuring lives.
The causal connection is express; their deaths will cause the
21 year period to begin running, at the end of which the
gift of corpus vests. Whether they are T's issue and have
a beneficial interest in the income or are persons unrelated
to T is irrelevant. The gift is good. If X, Y, and Z had not
been referred to by name, but were the only members of a
class of measuring lives in being at T's death and such class
were closed at T's death, (e.g., "after the death of the last
survivor of my issue living at my death"), X, Y, and Z
would likewise serve as measuring lives. 14 The members
of a class may serve as measuring lives if the class is closed
at the beginning of the perpetuity period.
Case 4 (Causal connection implied). T devises property
"to my wife for life, remainder to my grandchildren when-
ever born." Vs children, though not mentioned in the
instrument nor given any beneficial interest, are the meas-
uring lives by implication. All I's children are in being at
his death, and the remainder to his grandchildren is bound
to vest on the death of his last surviving child. If the trans-
fer were by deed, however, the grantor could have a child
after the date of the deed, who could produce a grandchild
long after all persons in being are dead. This grandchild
would share in the gift and the remainder is void.15 When
13 Bach v. Pace, 805 S.W. 2d 528, 529 (Ky. 1957). See 5 Powell ff 766.
14 Cray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945); Clay v. Anderson, 203
Ky. 384, 262 S.W. 604 (1924); Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 377(1924); Gillespie v. Winston's Trustees, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S.W. 517 (1916).
15 Bach v. Pace, supra note 13.
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the class of children is not closed, the children cannot be
used as measuring lives because the death of those children
in being will not necessarily cause the remainder to vest.
Where there are no lives causally connected with the vesting
or failure of the interest, then no lives in being can be used. The
interest is void if it will not necessarily vest or fail within 21 years.
In Farmers National Bank v. McKenney,"' the draftsman
called upon the court to supply the measuring lives. He attempted
to set up a testamentary trust to pay income to testator's three
half-sisters for life, and on the death of each to pay her share of
the income to "her heirs, ff any, as long as the law allows."
What measuring lives is the law to allow, is the court to supply?
After remarking that for "such a formidable task we are given
little help by counsel for the trustee (who, incidentally, appears
to have drawn this will),'1 7 the Court of Appeals held the entire
trust void for uncertainty. Although in this case the court
declined to fill in what period "the law allows," it implied that if
there had been a gift of the corpus or some clear evidence of
testator's intention it would have done so. In other jurisdictions
courts have held that this wording means for the lives of the
primary beneficiaries (the three half-sisters above) and 21 years
thereafter,' or, where there are no primary beneficiaries, for 21
years.19
The remote possibilities test. The word "must" before "vest"
in the Rule incorporates the "remote possibilities" test. Under
this test any possibility at the date of creation of the interest that
the interest might vest beyond the period invalidates the interest.
It is this test, which has brought so many draftsmen grief, that is
done away with prospectively by the 1960 act. The following
cases illustrate the operation of this test in its extreme, but
orthodox, form. In all these cases the gifts are essentially
innocent and the violation one of a technical premise rather than
of policy.
Case 5 (The fertile octogenarian). T devises property
"to my sister A for life, remainder to A's children for their
16264 S.W. 2d 881 (Ky. 1954).
'7 Id. at 881.
1 sFitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Re Vaux, [1939] Ch. 465; 6 Am.
L. Prop. § 24.13; Simes & Smith § 1227.
1) Re Hooper, [1932] 1 Ch. 38.
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lives, remainder in fee to A's grandchildren." A is 80 years
old at T's death. Because the law conclusively presumes A
to be capable of bearing further children, the remainder
in fee might not vest until the death of after-born children,
which is too remote. The remainder in fee is void.20
Case 6 (The unborn widow). T devises property "to my
son for life, then to my son's widow for life, then to my
son's issue per stirpes living at the death of his widow."
The gift to the son's issue is void. It will not vest until the
death of the son's widow, and she may not be a person
now in being. If the son is presently married, his wife may
die or be divorced, and he may then take as a second wife
a woman not now alive who might survive him and be his
widow. The chance of this happening may be very slight
indeed, but the chance invalidates the gift.21
Case 7 (Administrative contingencies). T devises prop-
erty to A "upon probate of my will," "when my estate is
settled," "after payment of debts," or upon some similar
event related to administration. Courts have often struck
down these gifts on the theory the event was a condition
precedent which might not happen within lives in being
and 21 years.22 No case has been found in Kentucky where
such an unflinching application of the Rule has been made. 23
Case 8 (Other remote contingencies). T devises property
to his issue per stirpes living "when World War II ends,"
"when the gravel pits are exhausted," or upon some similar
event very likely, but not certain, to happen within 21 years.
Such devises have been held void.24 A similar type of
transfer is a lease of property to commence "when the
building is finished." This is common commercial practice,
but the lease was held void in a recent case.25
20Se twelve Kentucky cases cited in Appendix, Table 5, fact patterns 1 and
2, p. 110 infra. For the reverse case, where a gift would be void only if it were
assumed a chid of 5 could have a cbild, see Re Gaites' Will Trusts, [1949] 1 AUl
E. R. 459.21 Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928). The descrip-
tive names-"fertile octogenarian' and "unborn widow'-were concocted by Pro-
fessor Leach.22 See 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.23.23 Compare Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1944), where the
court invalidated a devise in trust for 30 years "from date of probate" upon
another theory. KRS 381.220 was amended in 1956 to cure some administrative
contingencies. Ky. Acts 1956, c. 175. The amendment, along with the rest of
the section, was repealed by the 1960 Act.24 Brownell v. Edmunds, 209 F. 2d 349 (4th Cir. 1953); In Re Wood,
[1894] C Oh. 381. See 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.21; Simes & Smith § 1228.
25 Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P. 2d 957, 66
A.L.R. 2d 718 (1958), criticized by Professor Leach at 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1318(1960). Can the principle of this case be extended to invalidate forward commit-
ment agreements and other procedures currently used in mortgage financing?
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3. Tim MEANING OF VEST: MYn AND REALITY
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in
two or more rules, and so in connection with more than one
purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in
all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the
tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded
against.-Walter Wheeler Cook.
Anyone with a fixed and unremitting addiction to an all-
embracing definition of "vest" will find Kentucky perpetuities
cases unusually refractory. They will stubbornly resist analysis.
The truth is vest has many different meanings, depending upon
the context in which the word is used. And nowhere is this more
obvious than in the Kentucky law of future interests.
The failure to distinguish between the meaning of vest for
perpetuities purposes and its meanings in other contexts can only
lead to confusion. This is a human failure and one with long
precedent in the field of future interests. The treatises are full
of definitions of vest indiscriminately applicable in all situations. 26
These definitions, however, have little place in the context of
reality. They are false coin. Their purveyors have assumed that if
an interest is vested for one purpose it is vested for all purposes.
But this is neither logically necessary nor empirically verifiable by
the cases.17 It involves a type of fallacious reasoning John Dewey
called "the fallacy of unlimited universalization." It does not take
into account that the context limits the meaning of a word. It
ignores the fact that the purposes and policies of a rule affect the
meaning of the words used in stating the rule.
The problem we are concerned with here is violation of the
Rule against Perpetuities, and meanings of "vest" derived from
its use in other contexts (problems of survivorship, acceleration,
destructibility, etc.) involving different policies have no necessary
6 e.g., Gray § 108: "Whether a remainder is vested or contingent de-
pends upon the language employed. If the conditional element is incorporated
into the description of, or into the gift to, the remainderman, then the remainder
is contingent; but if, after words giving a vested interest, a clause is added
divesting it, the remainder is vested.'
27 See Lynn and Van Doren, "Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to
Remainders and Executory Interests: Orthodox Doctrine and Modem Cases,"
27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 436 (1960); Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities
Discard Its Vest?," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 887, 888-926 (1958); Jones, "Vested and
Contingent Remainders, a Suggestion Concerning Legal Method," 8 Md. L. Rev.




application. This is to a fair degree demonstrable by a brief
comparison of perpetuities cases with cases raising the questions
of survivorship and acceleration. In Clay v. Security Trust Co.28
testator devised property in trust to pay the income to Laura for
life, and at her death, "I direct my trustee to hold the said estate
until my nephew John Ireland Macey ... arrives at the age of
thirty-five years, and direct that the income shall be paid to him
in monthly installments until the said fund is turned over to him."
John predeceased Laura before he reached the age of 35. At
Laura's death, John's executor claimed the fund. "The sole
question," said the court, "is whether the remainder interest
given to John I. Macey in the third clause of the will was a vested
or contingent remainder." This is precisely the same vague way
perpetuities issues are phrased; more accurately, the question
was whether there was a requirement that John survive to age 35.
The court held the remainder was vested with possession post-
poned; that is, there was no requirement of survival and the fund
passed to John's executor on Laura's death. Two standard rules
of construction were invoked: (a) the absence of a gift over in
the event the designated person fails to survive to the time of
distribution vests the gift; and (b) a gift of income to a person
vests a gift of principal to the same person. In numerous cases
involving similar language, where either one or both of these
constructional guides could be invoked, but where the issue was
not requirement of survival but violation of the Rule against Per-
petuities, the court has classified the interest as contingent, not
vested. 9
Classification according to context is strikingly apparent in a
comparison of perpetuities cases with cases involving acceleration
of a remainder upon renunciation of the preceding life estate.
In acceleration cases the distinction between vested and con-
tingent remainders is, according to Professor Powell, of "decisive
importance,"3 9 just as it is in perpetuities cases. Contingent
remainders do not accelerate, whereas vested remainders do.31
28 252 S.W. 2d 906 (Ky. 1952).
29 Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958); Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky.
682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1945); Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211(1903); Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901); Stevens v.
Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 835 (1900).
30 2 Powell ff 310 at p. 632.
31 Ibid.; 2 Restatement of Property § 233. But cf. Simes & Smith § 796.
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There are many acceleration cases in Kentucky. Most of them
involve interpretation of dispositive language similar to this: "to
W for life, and at her death to my children, the issue of any then
deceased child to take his parent's share." Invariably the court
has held the remainder to children is vested and accelerates. 2
The supplanting limitation is not regarded as requiring survival
to the death of the widow. On the other hand, supplanting
limitations have not been so benevolently construed in perpetui-
ties cases. There they have been held to make the preceding
gifts contingent .3
Even Gray and his followers recognized that a class gift
could be vested for many purposes when it is not vested under the
Rule against Perpetuities. Relying heavily upon eighteenth and
nineteenth century English cases, Gray simply restated the deci-
sion of English judges to treat class gifts which can increase
in membership as non-vested under the Rule, even though for
most other purposes a class gift subject to open was treated as
vested as soon as one member qualified. The decisions of Ken-
tucky judges treating all remainders subject to total as well as
partial divestment as non-vested under the Rule is but a natural
development of this limited English attempt to find definitions
appropriate to the perpetuities context. It reflects, as it should,
a strong sense of the policy against extended dead hand control
and of what practically lessens alienability. The Court of Appeals
has, with great good sense, steered remarkably clear of the fallacy
of unlimited universalization based upon feudal-oriented defini-
tions.a4
32 Farmers Bank v. Morgan, 308 Ky. 748, 215 S.W. 2d 842 (1948); Baldwin's
Coex'rs v. Curry, 272 Ky. 827, 115 S.W. 2d 333 (1938); Ruh's Ex'rs v. Rub, 270
Ky. 792, 110 S.W. 2d 1097 (1937). See Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 291 (1950).
.33 Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958); Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924); cf. Curd's Trustee v.
Curd, 163 Ky. 472, 173 S.W. 1148 (1915); Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315,
54 S.W. 835 (1900). Compare Breckinridge v. Breckinridge's Ex'rs, 264 Ky. 82,
94 S.W. 2d 283 (1936) (acceleration case) with Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky.
L.R. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901) (perpetuities case)-gift to remaindermen "if
then living," with supplanting limitation, accelerated as vested remainder in former
case, held void as contingent remainder in latter.
34 Because "vested" as used in most other contexts is an inaccurate word
to describe what interests are valid under the Rule, and because the word
"vested" conceals the important social policy underlying the Rule, Professor
Powell believes the Rule should not be formulated as a rule against remote
vesting at all, but as a rule against specific fetterings of property found socially
inconvenient. His position is cogently stated at 5 Powell ff 767 and is adopted
by 4 Restatement of Property §§ 370-382.
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From the preceding discussion it should be clear that the
word "vest" is not merely a word to be defined by a text. It is the
working tool of the court in applying the Rule against Perpetuities.
To discover its meaning requires us to see how the court works
with it.
Four meanings of vest will be examined below: "vest in posses-
sion," "indefeasibly vest in interest, "vest in interest with pos-
session postponed," and "vest in interest subject to divestment."
The meaning, "vest in interest subject to open," is discussed sub-
sequently in connection with class gifts. The question is, which of
these meanings is used in applying the Rule against Perpetuities
in Kentucky to future interests in transferees?
A. Vest in possession
An interest vests in possession when it becomes possessory.
Applied to future interests this meaning involves no substantial
difficulty. A remainder or executory interest satisfies the Rule if
it necessarily will take effect in possession and enjoyment within
the period. Both standard perpetuities doctrine and the Kentucky
cases so hold.
Case 9. T devises property in trust "to pay the income to
my issue per stirpes from time to time living until 21 years
after the death of my last surviving child or grandchild who
was alive at my death, then to pay principal to my issue
then living per stirpes." The gifts of income and principal
are valid. 35 They are bound to become possessory within
21 years of the death of a person alive at T's death, though
it will not be known who will enjoy the gifts until they
become possessory. The gift of principal does not vest prior
to possession.
Is this the only meaning of vest that satisfies the Rule? That
is, must an interest become possessory within the period, or is the
Rule satisfied if it merely "vests in interest" within the period?
According to most writers a remainder is valid if it vests in in-
terest, but an executory interest must vest in possession. The
reason given is that an executory interest did not have the "ca-
35 First Nat'l Bank v. Purcell, 244 S.W. 2d 458 (Ky. 1951); Gray v. Gray,
300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945); Emler v. Emler's Trustee, 269 Ky. 27,
106 S.W. 2d 79 (1937); Clay v. Anderson, 203 Ky. 384, 262 S.W. 604 (1924);
Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 877 (1924); Gillespie v. Winstons
Trustee, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S.W. 517 (1916).
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pacity" to vest in interest under feudal law. The Court of Appeals
has ignored this distinction and has not attempted to classify
future interests in transferees as remainders or executory interests.
Along with many courts, it has treated them all as remainders.
Because the court has ignored the distinction, and because
application of this feudal dichotomy to modem dispositions is
impossible to justify,3 6 it would not be profitable to set forth an
analysis of Kentucky cases in these terms.
In the early cases it was apparently assumed that a future
interest in a transferee must become possessory within the
period of the Rule or fail. In Moore's Trustees v. Howe's Heirs,r
Chief Justice Boyle, in a frequently cited opinion, referred to
the Rule and stated, "A man cannot, therefore, devise over an
estate to take effect after that period, and if he does so the
limitation over will be void.. ." The requirement that an interest
become possessory was said to apply to remainders as well as to
executory interests.38 This theory was applied in an extraordinary
way two years before the Civil War. The court had before it a
deed granting freedom to the children of Martha (a slave) when
each reached the age of 25. Some years after the deed was
executed Martha gave birth to a son who, upon reaching 25,
brought suit for his freedom. James Harlan, the father of Mr.
Justice Harlan I (he of "The Constitution is color blind"), argued
for the slave owner that the grant of freedom violated the Rule
against Perpetuities. The court agreed, holding the limitation
might not have "taken effect" during the period. 9 The son re-
mained a slave. If a grant of freedom can be analogized to a per
capita gift of money, the decision may be technically correct; but
the complete answer to Harlan's argument is the Rule should not
36 See Dukeminier, "Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A
Requiem for the Distinction," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 13 (1958).
3720 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 199, 201 (1827). Accord: Coleman v. Coleman,
23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 1477, 65 S.W. 832, 833 (1901); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 53
Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 269, 277-280 (1853).
38 U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 385, 120
S.W. 328, 331 (1909): "The rule in question is that an estate in remainder
cannot be created to take effect beyond the end of a life or lives in being and 21
years and 10 months thereafter.39 Ludwig v. Combs, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 128 (1858). But see Davis v. Wood,
56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 86 (1856) (James Harlan arguing for the slaves), upholding
grant of freedom to "Beck and all her offspring' when Beck reached 40, or when
she would have reached 40 had she lived. Beck died under 40, so only the
validity of the alternative contingency was at issue.
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apply to a grant of freedom at all. It is monstrous irony that a
rule invented to keep property free kept it slave.
More recent cases do not make it wholly clear that a remainder
is void if it might vest in possession beyond the period. But, as
subsequent discussion reveals, it is perilous for any draftsman to
rely on any other assumption.
B. Indefeasibly vest in interest
A remainder is indefeasibly vested in interest if all the takers
are presently ascertained and are certain to acquire permanent
possession of the property at some future time. All three of
the italicized requirements must be met.
Is a remainder which will vest in interest indefeasibly within
the period, though perhaps in possession beyond, valid? The
answer is uncertain. The only case holding such a remainder
valid is Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.40 There John
Taggart by will created a trust for his daughter Anna for life,
remainder as she by will appointed, and in default of appoint-
ment to her issue. Anna appointed to her only son Robert for
life, then to Robert's children for their lives, with remainder in
fee to Robert's grandchildren. Only Robert was in being at
testator's death, and the court held the appointment to Robert's
grandchildren void. Under Taggart's will, the corpus passed in
default of appointment to Robert, whose remainder vested inde-
feasibly at Anna's death though not in possession until the death
of Robert's children. The court held this remainder valid, al-
though it almost certainly would not vest in possession within
Robert's own life (the life in being). It should be noted, however,
that Robert, as reversioner, would be entitled to the corpus at the
death of his children if his remainder were held void. Therefore
the classification of Robert's interest as an indefeasibly vested re-
mainder, and validating it as such, was unnecessary to the
decision. He was entitled to the corpus in any event.
In addition to Ligget, there are strong dicta in two cases that
an indefeasibly vested interest (but not an interest vested subject
to defeasance) will satisfy the Rule.41 However, one cannot be
40274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720 (1938).
41 Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958); Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924).
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certain of this in view of several decisions striking down what
would commonly be classified as indefeasibly vested interests.
Two of these cases require mention here. The others will be
dealt with below under the discussion of "Vest with possession
postponed" and in the next section entitled, "Is there a rule
limiting the duration of trusts?"
The first of these is the well-known case of Letcher's Trustee v.
Letcher.42 The will of Dr. Letcher devised his extensive Ohio
River farms to his son Gibney for life, then to a bank in trust to
pay one-half the income to the children of his nephew Hugh
and one-half to the First Presbyterian Church. Upon the death
of Hugh's children the farms were to go to the Church in trust
forever, but if the Church ceased to maintain the church house
as a memorial to Dr. Letcher's wife, the farms were to go to the
Presbyterian Synod in fee. The remainder in fee to the Church
was, under orthodox classification, a remainder vested subject to
divestment in favor of another charity. But since a gift over from
one charity to another upon a remote condition is not subject to
the perpetuity rule, the gift over could be ignored and the
iemainder to the Church treated as if it were indefeasibly vested.
The court, however, holding the gifts to Church and Synod
both void, did not consider it important to determine whether
the gift to the Church was to be treated as indefeasibly vested.
It implied the gift would be void whether classified as inde-
feasibly vested in interest or vested subject to divestment. The
gift to the Church was void, the court said, because of the
"remoteness of time ...before it passes to the Session of the
Church in trust," and the gift to the Synod void because it
"postpones the vesting of the title for a remote and indefinite
period. '43 This language appears to mean that the Rule requires
vesting in possession.
The second case is Thornton v. Kirtley.4 The facts were these.
Testatrix created a fifty year trust of bank stock and other assets
for the benefit of her issue and to maintain cemetery lots. At the
end of fifty years five shares of bank stock were to be held in
42 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946).
43 Id. at 456, 458, 194 S.W. 2d at 989 (1946). The gift to the Synod could
have been invalidated as a remote gift over on a non-charitable contingency.
44 249 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky. 1952).
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further trust to maintain cemetery lots; the remaining amount
of principal was to be distributed to her issue then living. The
five share trust to commence after fifty years was, classified as
either remainder or executory interest, an indefeasibly vested
interest.45 Nonetheless, it was held void, as was the gift of the
remaining principal. The reason: "A future charitable trust must
vest or become established within the time allowed by the
perpetuity rule" [citing Letcher] .46
It is possible to distinguish Letcher and Thornton from the
Ligget case on the ground that vesting in possession is required
only of gifts to charities, but this would be a peculiar reversal of
the law's usual favoritism. Moreover, other cases dealing with
non-charities reflect this same notion that vesting in possession
is required. It is also possible that in Letcher the court regarded
tying up 500 acres of rich farmland in a church potentially forever
as against public policy; and in Thornton saw practical difficulties
in creating an interest in five shares of bank stock to spring up in
fifty years; and that the strict interpretation of vest may be based
on the peculiar facts of the cases. Analyzed in traditional terms,
however, these two cases cannot be squared with Ligget insofar
as it held an indefeasibly vested remainder satisfied the Rule.
Since these two cases are of more recent vintage, and since
classification of Robert's interest as a remainder was unnecessary
to the decision in Ligget, there is a strong argument that they,
rather than Ligget, state the law.
C. Vest in interest with possession postponed
The concept of "vested in interest with possession and enjoy-
ment postponed" originated in cases where the issue was whether
the donee had to survive to a specific age or to a specified date
to be entitled to the gift. If the donee did not have to survive,
his interest was said to be vested in interest with possession post-
poned. Taking this concept out of its original context and
applying it in perpetuities cases, without evaluating its relation
45 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.20; 4 Restatement of Property § 370, com. h, ill. 2;
Sims & Smith § 1236.
46 249 S.W. 2d at 806. But cf. Street v. Cave Hill Investment Co., 191 Ky.
422, 230 S.W. 536 (1921), upholding gift to churches after 99 years, if then in
existence; Bd. of Natl Missions v. Harrel's Trustee, 286 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1956),
upholding 40 year trust for Presbyterian Church, then over to Board of Missions.
[Vol. 49,
KENTUcKY PEruTES LAW
to perpetuities policy, cannot be justified. As a verbal device to
mitigate the harsh applications of the Rule it operates capriciously
and uncertainly. And control of enjoyment by the dead hand
beyond the perpetuity period seems clearly at war with the
purposes of the Rule.
Although the Kentucky court has had several opportunities
to save gifts by classifying them as vested with possession post-
poned, it has consistently refused to do so. In Hussey v. Sargent4 7
testator devised a sum "to be equally divided and paid to and
distributed among" the children of Frederick "when" his daughter
Emily reached 85 or when she would have reached 85 had she
lived. Emily was age two at testator's death. There are several
constructional rules, applicable where the issue is requirement
of survival to distribution, that point to a construction of vested
with possession postponed. Yet the court not only rejected that
construction; it held the gift violated the Rule "because it post-
pones the enjoyment of the income for a period of 33 years."48
In Coleman v. Coleman40 there was a devise in trust to pay
income to testator's children, and at the end of 25 years to dis-
tribute the corpus to the children then living, with the "heirs" of
any deceased child taking his share. The gift of corpus to the
children must become possessory within their own lives, if at all,
and the substitutional limitations to their heirs could easily have
been construed as vesting at the death of each child. However,
the court held the entire trust void, saying that nothing could
"vest... until 25 years after his death, as it was provided that
his estate should not be divided" until then.50
The most recent case is Curtis v. Citizens Bank. 51 There
testator set up a trust to pay part of the income to his four minor
children, accumulate the rest and distribute to each his share
of accumulated income and corpus upon his reaching age 45.
"Should any of my said children die leaving lawful issue of his
or her body," the testator further provided, "then I direct that
said issue of said deceased child shall take equally among them-
47 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903).
48Id. at 70, 75 S.W. at 215. (Emphasis added.) Accord: Re Howard's
Estate, 54 D.&C. 312 (Pa. 1943).
49 23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901).
50 Id. at 1477, 65 S.W. at 833.
51 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958). The trust provisions for testator's children are
abridged in the text.
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selves the deceased parent's share, per stirpes, at such time as
such deceased child of mine would have received any distribution
under this will had he or she lived." In line with its prior cases
rejecting rules of construction that would have vested the gift,
the court took the position that nothing vested until time for
distribution arrived. It held the gift over to issue void. Professor
Sparks, noting this case in his annual survey article, commented:
"a testamentary plan was apparently defeated by the court's
misunderstanding of the word 'vested'.... The court did not give
any satisfactory reason why the gifts to grandchildren did not
vest upon the deaths of their respective parents with only their
payment postponed." 2 Professor Sparks' analysis is of course
correct if a remainder vested in interest satisfies the Rule and if
there is a constructional preference for vested interests. However,
the court's rejection of this preference, which smuggles in policy
unexamined, 21 seems not wholly without merit.
If these cases do not entirely eliminate from perpetuities
problems the concept of vested in interest with possession post-
poned, the least that can be said is that the court has reversed the
preference for a vested construction when payment is postponed
to an age or date and violation of the Rule against Perpetuities
is claimed. Without attempting to apply standard rules of con-
struction, the court has construed gifts to "children", "heirs" and
"issue" of living persons to be paid at a specific age or date as not
vesting under the Rule until time of payment.
D. Vest in interest subject to total divestment
Distinguishing a remainder vested subject to divestment (or
vested subject to condition subsequent) from a contingent re-
nainder (or remainder subject to condition precedent) is one
of the knottiest and most unrewarding of tasks. The former con-
cept was developed by courts to avoid two legal consequences
of contingent remainders: destructibility and inalienability. In
determining what was a condition precedent and what a condition
subsequent, courts drew fine and vexatious verbal distinctions in
52 Sparks, "Future Interests," 1959 Ann. Survey of Am. Law, 35 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 401, 410 (1960).
52a See Schuyler, "Drafting, Tax and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early




language; and without regard to their purpose, these distinctions
were often carried over to other problems. Since contingent
remainders are indestructible and alienable today, the survival
of this distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent
needlessly complicates the law.
A person who has a remainder vested subject to divestment
does not have any present certainty of ever acquiring possession
or of retaining possession once acquired. In the sense that the
remainder may never become possessory, it is contingent. Pro-
fessor Freund pointed this out half a century ago:
When a testator creates life estates with remainders, he
does one of two things: he either gives property to a
designated person or persons, subject to a life provision for
some other person, or he makes a life provision and leaves it
to be determined by circumstances existing at the end of
the life where the property is to go. These two alternatives
represent the real difference between vested and contingent
remainders; "vested subject to be divested," when applied
to an estate in expectancy, is in reality contingent; and the
treating of such a remainder as vested subject to be divested
for the purpose of avoiding certain restrictions or liabilities
attached to contingent remainders, is a mere conventional
mode of construction that should not mislead or confuse
us.
5 3
For perpetuities purposes, at least, the Court of Appeals is in
apparent agreement with Professor Freund. In accordance with
its view that the Rule requires certainty of possession to be
determined within the period, the court has rejected the concept
of a remainder vested subject to divestment.5 What may be
called a remainder vested subject to divestment for some purposes
has never been held to satisfy the perpetuity rule in Kentucky.
Summary of the meaning of vest. A remainder in fee is valid if
it will vest in possession, i.e., become possessory, free of any
trust within the perpetuity period. A remainder for life is valid if it
will vest in possession within the period, either in trust or as a legal
53 Freund, "Three Suggestions Concerning Future Interests," 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 526, 527 (1920).
54 Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958); Letcher's Trustee v.
Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924); Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315,
54 S.W. 835 (1900); see also cases cited in notes 47 and 49 supra.
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estate.5 A remainder indefeasibly vested in interest, i.e., a remain-
der in fee in ascertained persons certain to become possessory at
some future date, may be vested for purposes of the Rule. The cases
on this point, however, are conflicting and the matter cannot be
regarded as settled. It is believed that a remainder vested subject
to divestment, i.e., a remainder given to ascertained persons but
not certain to become possessory, does not satisfy the Rule; but
one cannot be wholly sure of this because the court usually has
had a choice of constructions in applying this classification and
it may have been merely construing against a vested interest. The
court has also rejected rules of construction which lead to a
"vested with possession postponed" classification, and has con-
strued as contingent for perpetuity purposes gifts to become
possessory at a specified future date or upon attaining a specified
age.
In short, then, in determining the validity of a remainder
under the Rule, vest means "become possessory". In addition it
may mean "fixed in ascertained persons who have the certainty
of acquiring possession,"56 but this is not settled by any clear-cut
decision. Any other meaning one accepts at his peril.
The court's orientation has not been toward the subtleties and
refinements of the feudal concept of vesting, nor toward the
academic horsemanship inherent in it. On the contrary the court
has shown a sound grasp of policy in defining vest. In spite of
contrary dicta, the sheer weight of results indicates the essential
idea basing the decisions is that a rational policy against per-
petuities requires a rule against remote possession and enjoy-
ment.57 This is the indispensable, though largely unacknowl-
edged, premise of the perpetuities cases rejecting the vested
with possession postponed construction. It was, appropriately
enough, John Chipman Gray himself who first suggested this was
desirable policy. "It seems that in the ideal system of law," wrote
Gray, "no interests which did not vest in possession within the
allotted period would be allowed. They are within the practical
55 The requirement that a fee, but not a life estate, must vest "free of any
trust" is discussed in § 4, pp. 27-34 infra.
56 See strong dictum in Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33, 35 (Ky.
1958) (most recent case).
57 Two recent writers suggest other courts are also "groping toward a
possessory test of validity." Lynn & Van Doren, supra note 27, at 461.
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reason of a Rule against Remoteness." 58 More recently Professors
Simes and Schuyler have come to the same conclusion. 9 If, as it
seems, this is the policy that moves the court, the law would be
greatly clarified by a clear-cut decision to that effect. A decision
that remainders must vest in possession within the period would
settle the vexing question of whether an indefeasibly vested
remainder satisfies the Rule and would, for the most part, take
care of trusts that may last too long.
4. Is THMrE A RULE LnrvIG TE DuRATION OF TRUSTS?
One repeatedly finds in Kentucky cases references to "the
Kentucky law of perpetuities which limits the duration of a
trust."0 Under the common law a trust does not have to conform
to the perpetuity period and may extend beyond it. The Rule
against Perpetuities is concerned only with the time interests
vest, not with trust duration. The question arises, then, whether
the Kentucky court is laying down a rule requiring trusts to
conform to the perpetuity period or whether the court is merely
saying the perpetuity rule indirectly limits the duration of a trust.
The cases which raise this question can be telescoped into
two fact situations:
Case 10. T devises property in trust for 25 years "to pay
the income to my children, and at the end of 25 years to
distribute the corpus to my children then living, with the
children of any deceased child taking his share." The gift
of corpus will indefeasibly vest in interest at the death of
all T's children (lives in being), but it may not become
possessory until beyond the period. The gift of corpus has
been held void under the Rule because it might not be
distributed within the period.61
58 Cray § 972.
51) Simes, Public Policy and The Dead Hand 80-82 (1955) (with reserva-
lions); Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?", 56
Mich. L. Rev. 683, 887 (1958).
60 Board of Nat'l Missions v. Harrel's Trustee, 286 S.W. 2d 905, 907 (Ky.
1956) (Stanley, J.). See Tyler v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280,
164 S.W. 939 (1914); Sandfords Adm'r v. Sandford, 230 Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d
83 (1929); Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 377 (1924); Clay v.
Anderson, 203 Ky. 384, 262 S.W. 604 (1924); Farmers Natl Bank v. McKenney,
264 S.W. 2d 881 (Ky. 1954). See also cases cited infra notes 61 and 62.
61 Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 835 (1900); Coleman v.
Coleman, 23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 1477, 65 S.W. 832, 833 (1901) ("The testator,
John Coleman, evidently intended that his children should not be vested with a
fee simple title in his estate until 25 years after his death, as it was provided
(footnote continued on next page)
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Case 11. T devises property in trust "to pay income to A
for life, then to A's children for their lives, then to the First
Presbyterian Church forever". The church has a remainder
indefeasibly vested in interest, but it will not become pos-
sessory until A's children (including any after-born ones)
are dead. The gift to the church has been held void be-
cause it suspends the power of alienation and does not vest
within the period of the Rule.62
The Restatement of Property takes the position that when
"these cases are examined carefully it appears that the Kentucky
law on trust duration is in no way different from the common
law."63 Exactly how these cases are "examined carefully" to make
them fit the common law is not revealed and remains in pectore
doctorum. It is plain the cases do one of two things. They either
directly limit the duration of trusts or they require remainders to
vest in possession within the period and thus indirectly limit the
duration of trusts. If the Restatement denies the first interpreta-
tion (which it does, and correctly so in the author's opinion), the
Restatement must affirm the second interpretation (which it
does not, and in this the author believes it is wrong). Fitting the
cases into both the Restatement's position on trust duration and
its position on the meaning of vest is impossible.
The chief reporter for the Restatement, Professor Richard R.
Powell, takes a somewhat different position in his recent treatise.
He explains away several decisions that say the duration of a trust
is limited by pointing out the results could have been reached on
orthodox grounds. "Despite these explanations applicable to
many cases," he continues, "there are cases not thus explicable,
which hold trusts invalid because of their duration. These results
(footnote continued from preceding page)
that his estate should not be divided among them until the end of the period
named.") Cf. Thornton v. Kirtley, 249 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky. 1952); Ford v. Yost,
299 Ky. 682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1944); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 25 Ky.
L.R. 1827, 78 S.W. 896 (1904). Contra: 4 Restatement of Property § 386, com.j. ill. 7.62 Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946)
(semble). Contra: 4 Restatement of Property § 378, ill. 1.
63 4 Restatement of Property, App. B, ff 48. No change was made in the
1948 Supplement to the Restatement which was published after Letcher's case
came down. Inexplicably, Letcher's case is cited by the 1948 Supplement, p. 546,
as a case "allowing a trust to continue for the lives of persons not in being when
the creating instrument spoke." The case held the trust entirely void; it could
not even begin, much less continue. See also 6 Am. L. Prop. § 25.87, where
Letcher's case is cited as holding that a remainder is void if it will not vest within
the period. The author does not note that under his meaning of "vest", the
remainder held void is vested.
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are difficult to reconcile with the language in other Kentucky
opinions." 4 Professor Powell's analysis goes deeper into the cases
than any other, but in the end it is not satisfactory because he
makes no attempt to discover what the court means by the words
it uses. He assumes the court means by "vest" and "suspension
of the power of alienation" what he himself would mean, but
there is good reason to believe the court is using language in a
different way.
The fundamental question is what does the court mean
by its statement that the perpetuity rule limits the duration of a
trust. In answering this question it will clarify matters to note
first what the court does not mean.
The court is not applying a rule limiting the indestructibility
of private trusts. According to the treatises there may be a rule
prohibiting any private trust from remaining indestructible be-
yond lives in being plus 21 yearsY5 The rule is violated when
there is a possibility the trust will remain indestructible beyond
the period; the consequence is that the trust becomes destructible
by the beneficiaries. Violation of this rule does not invalidate the
trust or any interest therein.
The application of this rule can be illustrated with reference
to Case 11. The trust there cannot be terminated during A's
lifetime because all parties who have a beneficial interest in the,
trust are not ascertained. Hence the trust is indestructible during
this period. At A's death, however, all beneficiaries are known,
and within 21 years all will reach the age of consent. A's children
and the church ordinarily may terminate the trust when the
children become sui juris; 0 therefore the trust cannot remain
indestructible beyond lives in being plus 21 years, and the rule
is not violated. If A's children and the church could not terminate
the trust, however, either because of an express provision in the
trust or because continuance is necessary to carry out a material
purpose of the testator,67 the trust may remain indestructible
beyond lives in being and 21 years. Under the rule limiting the
045 Powell ff 816, p. 785.
65 Simes & Smith §§ 1891-93; 1 Scott, Trusts (2d ed. 1956) § 62.10. The
case authority for any such rule is quite slim.
06 Keith v. First Nat'l Bank 256 Ky. 88, 75 S.W. 2d 747 (1934); 3 Scott,
Trusts § 337.
67 First Nat'l Bank v. Purcell, 244 S.W. 2d 458 (Ky. 1951); Miller's Ex'rs v.
Mille's Heirs, 172 Ky. 519, 189 S.W. 417 (1916).
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indestructibility of private trusts, the trust is not invalidated but
the provision for indestructibility is, and the trust may be
terminated after A's death when his children become sui juris.
In two cases the court may have applied this rule, since it
merely struck down the provision for holding in trust and did not
invalidate any of the interests therein.68 However, in at least five
cases the court has gone further and declared the entire devise
in trust void, even though some of the interests therein were (or
would become within the perpetuities period) vested in interest.09
This clearly is not the application of a rule making valid trusts
destructible at the will of the beneficiaries.
The court is not applying a rule directly invalidating any trust
which may last beyond the perpetuity period. As stated, under
the common law there is no direct limitation on the duration of
a trust. "The fact that the Kentucky courts do not regard the
statutory rule against perpetuities as actually regulating the dura-
tion of private trusts, as such," says the Restatement, "is indicated
by several holdings and is conclusively established by one de-
cision70 allowing a trust to continue for the lives of persons not in
being when the creating instrument spoke."71 If the duration of
trusts were directly limited then a secondary life estate in unborn
persons in trust would be void, but such a life estate has been held
valid in several cases, regardless of whether it is in trust or not.72
It vests in possession within the perpetuity period, even though
it may last too long. In Farmers National Bank v. McKenney"
the court pointed out that the length of duration of the inter-
mediate life estates is important only for determining when
the remainder in fee will "vest".
68 Ford v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945)i Carter's Trustee v.
Gettys, 138 Ky. 842, 129 S.W. 308 (1910). Compare Johnson s Trustee v. Johnson,
25 Ky. L.R. 2119, 79 S.W. 293 (1904), striking age limitation from will.
69 See cases cited notes 61 and 62 supra.
70 Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720
(1938) (Restatement footnote).
714 Restatement of Property, App. B., 11 48. Accord: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 25.87;
Simes & Smith § 1414; Matews, "Comments on 1956 Kentucky Legislation: The
Per'netuities Amendment," 45 Ky. L.J. 111, 128-26 (1956).7 2 Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., note 70 supra, life estate in
trust; Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954), legal life estate;
Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928), legal life estate; cf.
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas" Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 120 S.W. 328
(1909); Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1957).
73 264 S.W. 2d 881, 882 (Ky. 1954).
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The court is not applying the technical rule against suspension
of the power of alienation. The idea that trust duration is limited
is directly traceable to the perpetuities statute which was, prior
to 1960, phrased as a rule prohibiting suspension of the power of
alienation. The court has often said a trust suspends the power
of alienation, but it is not using those words in their technical
sense. Technically the power of alienation is suspended only
when there are not persons in being who can convey an absolute
fee. If the beneficiaries of a trust can individually or jointly
convey an absolute fee in possession, the power of alienation is
not suspended. In Kentucky all interests in trust are alienable,
absent an express restraint. Hence the only type of interest that
suspends the power is one where the ultimate takers are unknown.
Since remainders vested in interest are by definition in ascertained
persons, such vested remainders75 can never cause suspension of
the power of alienation. In Case 10 the power of alienation is
suspended during the lives of T's children; in Case 11 during A's
life. Neither period is in excess of the rule, and therefore the
gifts should have been good under the rule against suspension
of the power of alienation.
It does not matter that the interests are in trust. The trustee
cannot prevent alienation or termination of the trust if all the
beneficiaries are ascertained, sui juris, and demand it. If the trust
cannot be terminated, either because it is expressly so provided
in the instrument or because a court finds a material purpose of
the settlor would be frustrated by termination, it is arguable
that the power of alienation is suspended. However, an express
restraint on alienation for more than the perpetuity period will
be struck down under the doctrine prohibiting unreasonable
restraints, and thus no valid express restraint could suspend the
power of alienation too long. If the prohibition is not express,
but the court implies termination would frustrate settlor's purpose,
the interests in trust are not invalid. Only the implied provision
against termination is struck down; or, to put it another way, the
court will not imply indestructibility for more than the perpetuity
period. This rule limiting indestructibility of trusts has been
discussed earlier in this section.
74 5 Powell 767; 4 Restatement of Property § 870, com. i.75 Except a vested remainder in a class subject to open.
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Upon close examination it becomes clear that when the court
says a trust suspends the power of alienation it is not referring to
any technical suspension. For remainders vested in interest, so
often held void, do not technically suspend the power of aliena-
tion. Professor Powell, referring to unique New York statutes
making beneficial interests in trust inalienable, accuses the court
of "unjustified talking of New Yorkese." 76 Far from talking an
alien tongue, however, the Court of Appeals seems to be talking
plain Kentucky horse sense.
The court is giving a practical meaning to what suspends the
power of alienation, implementing a policy against remote dis-
tribution. While vested remainders in trust do not technically
suspend the power of alienation of specific property they do
lessen the alienability and free enjoyment of a quantum of wealth.
Even if the owners of the remainder are ascertained so that the
trust can be terminated or the property sold (if the trustee has
no power of sale), there are many practical impediments to
termination or sale. The life tenant and remaindermen must all
agree that termination or sale is desirable, and they must agree
how to apportion the proceeds among their respective interests.
Agreement on sale, termination and valuation is hard to achieve.
Thus, the probability of alienation is considerably lessened and
the control of the dead hand extended in a practical way by the
creation of a trust.
It is suspension of the power of alienation in the practical,
rather than the technical, sense that seems to have concerned
the court. This is confirmed by the cases holding an option to
purchase suspends the power of alienation.77 An option does not
suspend the power technically, as the owner and optionee may at
any time join together and convey a fee. Nonetheless it does
lessen marketability of property in a practical way.
Like the option cases, the cases on trust duration reveal an
understanding of the need of making property alienable, and at
the same time they reveal a practical concern for the dead hand's
continuing control of wealth even though the specific property
is alienable. This doubly acute perception is apparent from the
76 5 Powell ff 816 at p. 786.7 7 Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1959); Maddox v. Keeler,
296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. 2d 568 (1944); Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160
S.W. 2d 654 (1942).
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beginning.78 A trust prevents uncontrolled possession and enjoy-
ment of the property by the beneficiaries alone, and in that sense
it suspends the power of free alienation of a quantum of wealth.
One can go through all the Kentucky trust cases and substitute
"suspension of possession and enjoyment free of trust" for "suspen-
sion of the power of alienation" wherever it appears. In almost
every case it will make perfect sense. No other meaning ascribed
to the latter phrase serves so well. If this analysis be correct then
to say perpetuities law limits the duration of a trust does not mean
it directly limits it as such, for secondary life estates in unborn
persons which can extend a trust beyond lives in being have been
upheld. Rather, the real significance of trust duration is, as the
court noted in the McKenney case, that it determines when the
remainder in fee vests for purposes of the perpetuity rule. Thus,
to say the duration of a trust is limited is but to say the remainder
in fee must vest in possession free of any trust within the per-
petuity period. In this indirect way perpetuity law limits trust
duration.
Coupled with the doctrine of infectious invalidity, this proposi-
tion-and only this proposition-will explain the results in every
perpetuities case in Kentucky. It is consistent with the court's
rejection of constructional rules pointing to a "vested with pos-
session postponed" classification and with the rejection of the
vested subject to divestment concept in perpetuities cases. The
same policy mainspring underlying the meaning of "vest"-a
policy against remote distribution and possession-is visible here.
There are no cases holding squarely to the contrary.
There is, however, obiter dictum in the cases that perpetuity
law is not concerned with remoteness of possession. If this
dictum be accepted it is impossible to reconcile the holdings of
many cases with the statute prohibiting suspension of the power
of alienation or with the orthodox interpretation of the Rule
against Perpetuities or with any rule directly limiting the duration
of trusts. Acceptance of this dictum prevents the cases from
78Se Carter's Trustee v. Gettys, 138 Ky. 842, 846, 129 S.W. 308, 309
(1910) ("There is no practical difference between a devise restraining in express
terms alienation beyond the time allowed by the statute, and a devise of property
in trust by which the power of alienation is taken away from the beneficiaries for
a similar length of time."); Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 685, 186 S.W. 2d 896, 898
(1944) ("Technical alienability or the power of a trustee to sell and convey the
particular property for investment is not enough to escape the statute, for the
proceeds wear the same fetters of restraint.")
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falling into any consistent pattern of rationalization. It therefore
seems that the court may have discovered a simpler order within
apparent complexity, while adhering to traditional language
patterns. In such ways the law moves to sounder ground.
The above analysis, reconciling case holdings and sloughing
off dicta, appears to this author to be the most satisfactory. But
in truth the real explanation of this continuing conflict between
holding and dictum, between what the court does and what it
says, noted earlier in discussing the meaning of vest, is a mystery
as puzzling as the one Henry James cunningly wove into the
figure in his celebrated carpet.
5. GMTS TO CLASSES
Under the Rule against Perpetuities a class gift cannot be
partly valid and partly void. It must be valid for all members
of the class or it is valid for none. If the interest of any member
can possibly vest too remotely, the entire class gift is bad. This
means that (a) every member of the class must be ascertained
(the class must close), (b) the precise share of each member
must be determined, and (c), if vesting in possession is required,
each member's interest must vest in possession and enjoyment
within the period. Case 12 illustrates a common class gift which
is void under these principles.
Case 12. T devises property "to A for life, then to A's
children for life, remainder to A's grandchildren in fee."
The remainder to A's grandchildren is void because every
member of the class will not be ascertained until the death
of A's children, some of whom might not be in being at T's
death.79 If at T's death A has a grandchild, X, alive, X's gift
is vested in interest subject to open up and let in afterborn
grandchildren, but it is not vested for purposes of the Rule.
Class closing rule. Some gifts to a class may be saved through
the operation of a rule which closes the class prior to the time
it closes physiologically. Under the "rule of convenience" adhered
to in most states the class will close when any member of the
class is entitled to immediate possession and enjoyment. This rule
79 Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1957); Maher v. Maher, 139 F.
Supp. 294 (E.D. Ky. 1956); Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954);
West v. Ashby, 217 Ky. 250, 289 S.W. 228 (1926); Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939 (1914); Lindner v. Ehrich, 147 Ky. 85,
143 S.W. 778 (1912).
[Vol. 49,
KEmuc y PERPzrutrms LAw
is not followed in Kentucky when the gift is to children of a
"near-relative." In that case the class will not close until it
becomes physically impossible for any more members of the
class to be born. Thus:
Case 18. 0 deeds land "to my daughter A for life, then
to my grandchildren in fee." At the time of the transfer 0
has one grandchild, G, alive. Under the rule of convenience
G can demand possession of his share at A's death, closing
the class and forcing distribution among the grandchildren
then living. The gift thus would be valid. In Kentucky,
however, the class is kept open until O's children (including
any after-born) are dead. Holding the class open for lives
possibly not in being causes the gift to grandchildren to
be void. 0
The theory of the Court of Appeals is that when there is a gift
to children of a "near-relative" the donor intends all the children,
whenever born, to share in the gift. Carrying out this intention
is more important than the convenience of early distribution in
fixed shares. Refusing to close the class, however, sometimes
causes gifts to children of a near-relative to fail in Kentucky when
they would be perfectly valid elsewhere.
It does not necessarily follow from the closing of the class
within the perpetuity period that the gift is valid. Every member
of the class may be ascertained but his exact share may not be;
and this too is required. In other words, the ultimate number of
takers in the class must be fixed so that it neither increases nor
decreases. Thus:
Case 14. T devises property "to A for life, remainder in
fee to such of A's children as reach 25." The class will close
physiologically at A's death (a life in being), but the exact
share each child of A will take cannot be determined until
all of A's children have passed 25 or died under that age.
Because a child might reach 25 more than 21 years after
A's death, the gift is void.81
The doctrine of severed shares. Quite frequently testators
attempt to tie up property for two generations with remainder in
fee to the third generation, as in Case 12. If the will is phrased
80 Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1957); Laughlin v. Elliott, 202 Ky.
433, 259 S.W. 1031 (1924).
81 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357
1924). Compare Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 25 Ky. L.R. 2119, 79 S.W. 293
1904).
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slightly differently from that set forth in Case 12, the devise may
be valid at common law. The will must provide that upon the
death of each of A's children (rather than upon the death of all
of A's children), the share of such child dying shall vest in his
issue. If it does, the issue of the children in being at testator's
death can prove that their interests will vest in absolutely fixed
shares at the death of their parent, a life in being. Their interests
are valid. The issue of A's yet-unborn children cannot offer such
proof, since their parents are not lives in being, and their interests
are void. This is known as the doctrine of severed shares or the
doctrine of Cattlin v. Brown. 2 Thus:
Case 15. T devises property in trust to pay the income
"to A for life, then to A's children for life, and as each child
of A dies to distribute the share of corpus on which he had
been receiving the income to that child's issue." A has child
B, born before T's death, and child C, born after T's death.
The gift to B's issue is valid because it must certainly vest
in possession in fixed shares within the period. The gift to
C's issue is void.
This rule has been expressly rejected in Kentucky. In U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee,8 3 where the instru-
ment read the same as in Case 15, the first life tenant (A) had
five children alive when testator died. None were subsequently
born to her. It was argued that the doctrine of severed shares
saved the gift to A's grandchildren, but the court held to apply
this rule and validate the gift to some grandchildren while holding
it bad as to others would not carry out the testator's intent. This
is hard to justify on the facts of the case for the evidence was
very strong that testator assumed A would have no more
children, and at the time of decision A was dead and it was
certain all A's grandchildren would take their shares within lives
in being. If the court would not apply the doctrine of severed
shares in this case, it is difficult to see any case in which it would. 4
82 From the English case of Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372 (Ch. 1855). See
6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.29; Simes & Smith § 1267; 4 Restatement of Property § 389.
83 134 Ky. 374, 121 S.W. 328 (1909). For further litigation of this trust
see U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Miller, 124 S.W. 341 (Ky. 1910); U.S.F. & G.
Co. v. Carter, 158 Ky. 737, 166 S.W. 238 (1914).
s4 Compare Maher v. Maher, note 79 supra; Thomas v. Utterback, note 79
supra; Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720(footnote continued on next page)
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Separability. The orthodox view is that a class gift cannot be
separated into good and bad parts, and the good part upheld.
Yet in a few cases the ocurt has separated the valid part and
allowed it to stand. In Sandford's Administrator v. Sandford85
there was a devise in trust "for the benefit of my brothers and
sisters, my nephews and nieces, and their heirs so long as any of
them are in existence," then to the X charity. The court held
the trust was valid for the lives of the brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces in being at testator's death, and at their
death the corpus should be distributed to the "then" heirs of
testator. It should be noted that the court did not close the class
of takers at testator's death but only the measuring lives of the
trust. In effect it accelerated the final distribution date from the
time "the family as stated should become extinct" to the death
of persons in being. This saved the gift for after born as well as
living persons who became entitled to the income within the valid
period, and invalidated it with respect to those who would
become entitled to income beyond that period. Changing the
measuring lives of a trust, and then ordering distribution to the
heirs of testator ascertained at the termination of the trust, comes
very close to being an exercise of cy pres.
In a case six years later,86 testator devised land to A and B
"and their heirs for life." Without giving any reason the court
held "the phrase 'and their heirs' is effectually deleted by the
statute against perpetuities." Apparently the court assumed
"heirs" meant lineal descendants and not A's and B's heirs at law
ascertained at death. By severing off the lineal descendants as
members of the class of life tenants, the court saved the gift for
A and B. This case differs from Sandfords case in that here the
court closed the class of takers rather than the measuring lives
of the life estate.
In two other cases of the same era the court saved gifts by
construing them as gifts to a class which would close at the death
(footnote continued from preceding page)
(1988). In these cases the gift was to A's grandchildren per stirpes. The Restate-
ment of Property § 389, corn. c, says the doctrine of severed shares applies to
such a gift, but it was not argued.85 280 Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d 83 (1929). But cf. Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96,
190 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945).86 Renaker v. Tanner, 260 Ky. 281, 83 S.W. 2d 54 (1935).
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of persons in being. 7 Although the court validated the gifts by
construction, in both cases the court went on to say by dictum
that the whole gift would not fail even had the gift included
persons who might be born too remotely. The good part would
be separable from the bad.
These four cases liberally separating class gifts into good and
bad parts seem to represent an era in perpetuities development
(1929-39) and not consistent policy. More often the court has
construed instruments in favor of invalidity and applied the Rule
remorselessly. Witness the rejection of standard devices for
saving gifts: the doctrine of severed shares, the class closing rule,
the vested with possession postponed construction; the frequent
application of infectious invalidity; and the tendency to equate
"vesting" and "possession". On balance, the Court of Appeals
has not been liberal with putative transgressors. It has been
unusually strict.
Separating class gifts into good and bad parts is one of the
ways the court has dealt with limitations violating the Rule. The
other ways are discussed in the next section. And, as will be
seen, nothing is so unpredictable as how the court will deal with
an invalid limitation. The four cases above are not altogether
reliable precedents.
6. CONSEQUENCES OF VioLATiNG Thm RuL.
Once it has been determined that an interest will not neces-
sarily vest in time and is void, the question arises what the
consequences will be. If no interest in the property (i.e., neither
income nor remainder interest) will necessarily vest within the
period, the entire transfer of course is void. The more usual case,
however, is where there is only partial invalidity, where only one
of several interests is void. This problem has long plagued the
court, and it has come to so many different and conflicting con-
clusions, it is impossible to give any definitive answer as to what
the consequences are. There are several rules which might be
applicable, and practically every case must be litigated to the
87 Tuttle v. Steele, 281 Ky. 218, 135 S.W. 2d 436 (1939); Tillman v.
Blackburn, 276 Ky. 550, 124 S.W. 2d 755 (1939); cf. Emler v. Emler's Trustee,
269 Ky. 28, 106 S.W. 2d 79 (1937). But see Thornton v. Kirtley, 249 S.W. 2d
803 (Ky. 1952); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 25 Ky. L.R. 1827, 78 S.W. 896(1904).
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Court of Appeals to determine the most appropriate one on the
particular facts. The rules are as follows:
(a) Preceding estates stand; invalid interest passes by in-
testacy. The general rule set forth in the treatises is that the
invalid limitation is stricken from the instrument, and the prior
valid estates take effect just as if the invalid limitation were not
in the instrument. 8 If the preceding estates are life estates, they
remain standing. Striking out the remainder leaves a reversion
in the transferor which, if the instrument is a will, passes to the
testator's heirs by intestacy and not to the residuary devisees8 9
Thus:
Case 16. T devises property "to A for life, remainder to
A's children for their lives, remainder in fee to A's grand-
children." The invalid gift to A's grandchildren passes by
intestacy to T's heirs.90
88 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.47; Gray § 248; 5 Powell II 789; Simes & Smith § 1262.
80 KRS 394.500.
0 Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1957); Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky.
698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928). In Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky.
1954), noted 43 Ky. L.J. 559 (1955); Renaker v. Tanner, 260 Ky. 281, 83 S.W.
2d 54 (1935); and Laughlin v. Elliott, 202 Ky. 433, 259 S.W. 1031 (1924), the(footnote continued on next page)
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Case 17. T devises property "to A for life, remainder to
A's children, but if any child of A dies at any time without
issue him surviving, his share shall go to X." A has no
children at T's death. The gift over to X on failure of issue
is too remote. It is stricken out and A's children have a
remainder in fee simple absolute.91
The rule may be otherwise if the defeasible fee would only vest
in interest within the period, and not necessarily in possession.
In that case the defeasible fee itself may be void for vesting in
possession too remotely. 92
(b) Preceding estates stand; invalid interest passes to the last
person(s) entitled to the income. A second rule for dealing with
invalid remainders after life estates, directly opposed to rule (a),
has been applied in some cases. Under this rule the invalid
interest passes to the takers of the last valid life estate rather
than to the transferor or his heirs. Applied to Case 16, the re-
mainder in fee would pass to A's children.
In Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.94 the court took
notice of this line of cases which is opposed to the orthodox rule.
It attempted to reconcile them by pointing out that, "It has merely
happened that the one who took the last valid life estate was
also the one who would take the property under our statute of
descent and distribution. Such taker would take it under the
statute of descent and distribution and not because he happened
to be the holder of the last valid life estate." 5 The court's
(footnote continued from preceding page)
preceding life estates stood, but the court declined to say what happened to the
invalid remainder.
Compare Sandford's Adm'r v. Sandford, note 85 supra, where the court
ordered the property to be distributed, when life estates terminated, to "the then
heirs and next of kin of the testator."
91 Holoway v. Crumbaugh, 275 Ky. 377, 121 S.W. 2d 924 (1938); Beall v.
Wilson, 146 Ky. 646, 143 S.W. 55 (1912); Brumley v. Brumley, 28 Ky. L.R. 231,
89 S.W. 182 (1905).9 2 Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946).
Compare Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958), and Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924), with 6 Am.
L. Prop. § 24.47, case 72.
93 Maher v. Maher, 139 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ky. 1956), noted 9 Okla. L. Rev.
440 (1956); Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky. 180, 82 S.W. 2d 297 (1935); Curd's
Trustee v. Curd, 163 Ky. 472, 173 S.W. 1148 (1915); Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939 (1914); Lindner v. Ehrich, 147 Ky. 85,
143 S.W. 778 (1912); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky.
374, 121 S.W. 328 (1909); Moores Trustees v. Howe's Heirs, 20 Ky. (4 T. B.
Mon.) 199 (1827) (dictum).
94274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720 (1938).
95 Id. at 396, 118 S.W. 2d at 725.
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attempted reconciliation does not stand close inspection for in the
Barnes, Curd and Lindner cases"" the life tenants and the testa-
tor's heirs were not the same persons. The testator had other heirs
besides the life tenants. The instruments all read essentially the
same as in Case 16, and T's heirs were A, B and C and not merely
A alone. The cases held the invalid remainder passed to A's
children. Obviously that result could not have been reached
through application of rule (a) alone. 7
(c) Infectious invalidity; preceding valid estates fall with in-
valid remainder. The rule of infectious invalidity98 is exactly what
its name implies. The invalidity of the remainder infects the valid
preceding estates and causes them to fall. It is an exception to
general rule (a). It is applied where the invalid gift is thought to
be an essential part of testator's scheme, and if it fails the testator
would prefer the entire devise to fail. Applying it to Case 16
above, the life estates in A and A's children would be struck
down with the invalid gift in fee.
The Court of Appeals has applied the principle of infectious
invalidity in numerous cases. The leading case is Taylor v.
Dooley.09 There testator devised one-half of his property in trust
for his daughter Elizabeth for life, then to Elizabeth's children
for their lives, remainder in fee to Elizabeth's grandchildren
(same as Case 16). The other half he devised outright to his son
Edwin. Elizabeth and Edwin were his only children and heirs.
The court pointed out that testator's basic scheme was to treat
his children equally, and the general rule (a) would result in
inequality. If the remainder which testator attempted to devise
to Elizabeth's grandchildren passed to testator's heirs Edwin
would wind up with three-fourths of the property-his half and
half of that devised to Elizabeth's line. Since this would clearly
violate testator's intention the court struck down the valid life
estates to Elizabeth and her children and the devise in another
clause to Edwin, resulting in intestacy. The court then mitigated
this wholesale destruction by ordering Elizabeth's intestate share
013 Note 93 supra.
97 The results might have been reached through the application of KRS
891.140 (advancement statute), but the opinions do not state what amounts were
devised to the other children.
08 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.48; 5 Powell fI 789; Simes & Smith § 1262.
9 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1957). And see Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924).
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to be held in trust for her life in accordance with the provisions
of the will."1U
The result is sound if it is assumed the court had only two
choices: passing the invalid interest to testator's heirs or using
the principle of infectious invalidity. A third choice, strikingly
appropriate in this case, is the use of rule (b) above. One year
before Taylor v. Dooley, in a case involving precisely the same
problem (where the general rule (a) would have resulted in in-
equality and the preceding life tenants were the parents of the
void remaindermen), Federal Judge Swinford held the invalid
remainder passed to the preceding life tenants. 10' If this had been
done in Taylor v. Dooley, Elizabeth's children would have taken
the remainder'in fee. This would be more closely in accord with
testator's intention than the sweeping invalidation that took place
(even as partially restored by the application of the trust pro-
vision to Elizabeth's intestate share).
The principle of infectious invalidity has been used in other
cases, and in all of them its use is extremely difficult to justify
on the facts. In the recent Curtis case'02 testator left property
worth over $400,000 in trust for his four minor children. The
trustee was directed to pay each $100 a month and was given
discretionary power to pay hospital, medical and emergency
expenses, to pay for a college education for each, and to purchase
a home for each child upon marriage. The trustee was further
directed to distribute to each child one-third of his share of the
corpus and accumulated income at age 40, one-third at age 45
and one-third at age 50. In case any child failed to live to
distribution, there was a gift over to his surviving issue, such
issue to take at the time the parent would have taken had he
lived. The gift over to grandchildren was held void, and then
with one brief sentence-"the general scheme of the testator
would be frustrated by attempting to uphold the trust as to his
children"-the court struck down the gifts to the children as well.
100 This required judicial insertion in the will of the words set off in brackets
in the following quotation. Article 6 of the will read: "I direct that all property
which passes or may pass to my daughter Elizabeth D. Flynn under the terms of
this will [or by intestacy] shall pass to Lewis B. Flynn, Jr. as trustee for said
Elizabeth D. Flynn for and during her natural life." (Record, p. 8)
101 Maher v. Maher, note 93 supra.
102 Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958). The facts stated in




Surely this is a harsh way to deal with a carefully thought out
estate plan. The testator's scheme was clear enough. His children
were in the custody of his divorced wife, who had remarried, and
the will gives every evidence that testator (a self-made man)
wanted to keep the corpus out of the control of his ex-wife and
out of the hands of his children until they reached middle age.
His provisions with respect to income were not as liberal as they
might have been, but they did not leave the children entirely
destitute ($100 a month each, medical and college expenses paid
and a house upon marriage). The court gave no reason why
this scheme was frustrated by the failure of the gift over. If the
general rule had been applied, giving the invalid interest to
testator's children by intestacy, they would have held all interests
in the trust. They could have terminated the trust when they all
became of age unless termination would frustrate a material
purpose of the testator. If the court was disturbed by the partial
accumulation of income after majority the proper course would
have been to allow termination of the trust at majority or to
strike down the accumulation provisions. There seems to be no
reason at all for infectious invalidity to kill off the entire trust.
A result similar to that reached in Curtis has been reached in
other cases.10 3 As in Curtis, the consequence was testator's chil-
dren received the property immediately free of trust, which
testator did not intend, but at least his intent was carried out to
the extent that some or all of his intended beneficiaries did receive
the property. The same thing cannot be said of Letcher's Trustee
v. Letcher,10 4 where the intended beneficiaries were wholly de-
prived of the property. There testator gave his nephew Hugh's
children a life estate, with remainder in trust for a church. The
court, holding the remainder void, struck down the gift to Hugh's
children as well, resulting in the property passing to testator's
daughter-in-law.
The constructional rule of infectious invalidity is a wise one
if limited to circumstances where the testator's intent would
clearly be frustrated by upholding the valid gifts. The Kentucky
103 West v. Ashby, 217 Ky. 250, 289 S.W. 2d 228 (1926); Fidelity Trust Co.
v. Lloyd, 25 Ky. L.R 1827 78 S.W. 896 (1904); Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L.R.
1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901); Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 835
(1900); Thornton v. Kirtley, 249 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky. 1952). In the last case the
invalid limitation also infected a subsequent gift as well as the preceding estates.
104 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946).
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court has not so limited it. The court has given it broad applica-
tion, sometimes seemingly treating it as a rule of law. Under the
1960 Perpetuities Act the rule of infectious invalidity is severely
limited, if not totally abolished, with respect to instruments
effective after July 1, 1960. KRS 381.216 now provides that the
court shall reform the invalid interest "to approximate most
closely the intention of the creator of the interest." Reforming
the invalid interest is a much narrower power than destroying
the entire limitation under the rule of infectious invalidity.
(d) Reform of invalid interest by cy pres. The doctrine of cy
pres applied to private trusts had a short, happy life in Kentucky
just after the turn of the century. In two cases the court reformed
the invalid gift, though in quite different ways. In Hussey v.
Sargent,10 5 the court had before it the will of a New Hampshire
testator devising his property in trust to pay out income to support
his grandchildren, accumulate excess, and pay over accumulated
income and corpus to his grandchildren when his granddaughter
Emily reached 35, or if dead when she would have reached 85
had she lived. Emily was two years old at testator's death. The
court treated the two contingencies as one and held the gift of
corpus might vest too remotely. But since the law of New
Hampshire controlled, and cy pres was applied there, the court
did not strike down the gift. Instead, it reduced the distribution
date to 21 years after testator's death.
The next year, in Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson,10 the court
had before it a Kentucky testatrix's will containing a devise similar
to that in Hussey. The will devised property in trust to pay
income to testatrix's son for life, then to the son's children until
the youngest child reached 25, then to divide corpus among them.
The court ordered the age limitation struck from the will and the
property distributed among the children at the son's death; "the
period of distribution fixed by the testatrix being void, the will
will be construed as if no such conditions were contained in it."07
The case is also explicable on the ground that the children had
105 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903). Cf. Sandford's Adm'r v. Sandford, 230
Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d 83 (1929), cutting out unborn persons as measuring lives
of a trust.106 25 Ky. L.R. 2119, 79 S.W. 293 (1904).
107 Id. at 2121, 79 S.W. at 295.
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vested interests with payment postponed, and only the provision
for holding in trust violated the Rule.
With respect to instruments effective after July 1, 1960, cy
pres is the required method of dealing with void interests.
7. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO POWERS OF APPOINTmENT
In applying the Rule against Perpetuities to powers of ap-
pointment it is necessary to separate powers into two groups:
(a) general powers presently exercisable; and (b) general testa-
mentary powers and all special powers. General powers presently
exercisable are treated as absolute ownership for purposes of the
Rule. Nothing stands between the donee and absolute ownership
except a piece of paper that can be signed at any time; hence the
property is not tied up. All that the Rule requires of a general
inter vivos power is that it become exercisable within the period.
When it becomes exercisable the property becomes marketable
and the policy of the Rule is not offended. Since the donee of a
general power presently exercisable is treated as owner, the
validity of an interest created by exercise of the power is de-
termined on the same basis as if he owned the property in fee.
The period runs from the exercise of the power.108
An unconditional power to revoke in one person is treated
like a general power presently exercisable when the holder can
exercise the power to revoke for his own exclusive benefit.109 The
period runs from the termination of the power.
General testamentary powers and special powers are treated
differently from a general power presently exercisable. A person
holding one of these powers does not have an absolute and
unlimited present right to alienate the property, and consequently
he is not treated as owner. In applying the Rule to these powers
two questions arise: (a) Is the power itself valid? (b) Are the
interests created by the exercise of the power valid? These
questions are discussed below.
(a) The initial validity of general testamentary powers and
special powers. For a general testamentary or a special power to
108 6 Am. L. Prop. §§ 24.30, 24.31, 24.33; 5 Powell flfl 786, 787.




be valid it must not be possible for it to be exercised beyond
the perpetuity period. If it can possibly be exercised beyond the
period it is void ab initio.110 A testamentary or special power
cannot be given to an unborn person unless its exercise is limited
to the perpetuity period.
A power may be void for a reason other than offending the
Rule against Perpetuities, such as improper delegation. The Ken-
tucky court has held that a person who holds a general testa-
mentary power cannot create a further power in another person,
unless there is express authorization in the instrument."' If there
is express authorization, the further power is treated as an
extension of the original power. And, like the original power, it
is void if it can be exercised beyond the perpetuities period
measured from the effective date of the original instrument.
(b) The validity of interests created by exercise of a general
testamentary power or a special power. The donee of a testa-
mentary or special power is regarded as the "agent" of the donor
with power to fill in blanks in the donor's will. Any interest
created by exercise of such power must vest within 21 years of
some life in being at the date the power was created." 2 The
exercise of the power is read back into the original instrument,
taking into consideration facts existing on the date of exercise.
This is known as the "second look" doctrine (a variation of
"wait-and-see"). What this means is that we wait and see how
the donee actually appoints the property and then determine if
the appointive interests will certainly vest within the period
(computed from date of creation of the power). Thus:
Case 18. T devises property "to A for life, remainder as
A appoints by will." A appoints "to B for life, remainder in
fee to B's children." If B was in being at T's death the
remainder in fee appointed to B's children is valid since it
110 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.32; 5 Powell 9 786; Simes & Smith § 1273.
ll DeCharette v. DeCharette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S.W. 2d 1018 (1936). Few
powers of appointment have led to so much litigation as this one held by the
free-spending mother of the Marquise DeCharette. See DeCharette v. St.
Matthews Bank, 214*Ky. 400, 283 S.W. 410 (1926), creditors of donee attack
and lose; DeCharette's Guardian v. Bank of Shelbyville, 218 Ky. 691, 291 S.W.
1054 (1927), creditors win consolation prizes; St. Matthews Bank v. DeCharette,259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W. 2d 471 (1935), creditors attack again at death and lose;
aodfroy v. DeCharette, 260 Ky. 147, 84 S.W. 2d 66 (195), loyal allies in donee's
long battle with creditors win just reward.
112 6 Am. L. Prop. §§ 24.34, 24.35; 5 Powell II 788; Simes & Smith § 1274.
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will vest at the death of B, a life in being. If B was not in
being at T's death the remainder in fee is void.
The "second look" doctrine is applied in Kentucky as in most
jurisdictions.113 An appointment may, however, be valid under
this doctrine and still run afoul of another rule peculiar to Ken-
tucky. This latter rule is that a donee of a special testamentary
power can appoint only in fee, unless he is expressly authorized
to appoint a life estate with remainder over." 4 If he is so
authorized, however, the second look doctrine applies in deter-
mining the validity of the remainder.115
If a donee makes an invalid appointment, what are the con-
sequences? If the power was a general one, the doctrine of
capture may apply where it is found the donee intended to blend
the appointive assets with his own assets; the appointive assets
then pass to the donee's estate. Otherwise the property passes in
default of appointment to the takers in default, and if none to the
donor or his heirs. 1 ' Any remainder in default of appointment
is, like an appointive interest, subject to the Rule against Per-
petuities." 7 A remainder in default which will become possessory
within the perpetuity period is valid,"8 and the court has also
held a remainder in default which will vest indefeasibly in
interest within the period is valid." 9 It is not clear whether the
court would apply the "second look" doctrine in determining the
validity of gifts in default of appointment, as the court has never
had an occasion to do so. Under the 1960 act, however, wait-and-
see is applied to gifts in default of appointment as well as to the
appointive interests.
The 1960 Perpetuities Act applies "to appointments made after
July 1, 1960, including appointments by inter vivos instrument or
will under powers created before July 1, 1960.""20 The adoption
of wait-and-see does not substantially change the old law on
113 Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720
(1938); DeCharette v. DeCharette, note 111 supra.
114 Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co., 123 Ky. 775, 97 S.W. 421
(1906).
115 Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky. 180, 82 S.W. 2d 297 (1935); Goodloe's Trustee
v. Goodloe, 292 Ky. 494, 166 S.W. 2d 836 (1942).
110 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.47, cases 74 and 75.
"7 Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928).
118 Goodloe's Trustee v. Goodloe, note 115 supra.
1'9 Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., note 113 supra. But see discus-
sion of this case at pp. 20-22 supra.
120 KRS 381.223.
KENTucKy LAW JouRNAL
validity of exercise of powers, inasmuch as the validity of interests
created by exercise of the power was judged by a similar principle
-"second look." The statute leaves in full force the practice of
reading back into the original instrument the exercise of the
power, and of requiring the measuring lives to be in being at the
date of creation of the power.
8. APPLICATION OF Tim RuLE TO OPTIONS
Options incident to a lease. An option in a lease enabling the
lessee to purchase the fee or to renew the lease is not subject to
the Rule against Perpetuities.' 21 Such options are commercially
useful and tend to increase the marketability and development of
land. Hence they are not within the policy of the Rule.
Options to expand the scope of an easement. An option to
extend the scope of an easement upon future payment of money
is, like an option in a lessee, not subject to the Rule against
Perpetuities. This was decided in Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Company'22 where the gas company was granted an ease-
ment to lay pipelines with the right to lay additional lines upon
payment of $2.85 per lineal rod. The court, citing the Restatement
of Property, held this was a grant of a "present interest" not sub-
ject to the Rule. But as the chief reporter for the Restatement
has subsequently pointed out, avoiding the Rule by calling the
option a present interest is specious reasoning. The proper basis
for the decision, in Professor Powell's opinion, is that these options
have "social advantages which outweigh the policy basing the
rule against perpetuities."23
Options to purchase not contained in a lease. An option to
purchase in gross (that is, not conferred on a lessee) creates in
the optionee an equitable future interest subject to the Rule. If
it is possible for the option to be exercised beyond the period,
it is void.124 The reason for application of the Rule to options in
gross is that they fetter alienability of the property, especially
when the optionee may purchase at a price fixed in the instru-
12 1 Vokins v. McGaughey, 206 Ky. 42, 266 S.W. 907 (1924); 6 Am. L. Prop.
§ 24.57; 5 Powell f1 771; Simes & Smith § 1244.
122 314 S.W. 2d 193 (Ky. 1958). Accord, Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v.
Carman, 314 S.W. 2d 684 (Ky. 1958).
123 5 Powell II 771 at p. 601.
124 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.56; 5 Powell 11 771; Simes & Smith § 1244.
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ment rather than at the offeror's price or the market price at
time of sale.
The option may take the form of a pre-emptive option (giving
the optionee the power to buy if the owner desires to sell) or an
ordinary option (giving the optionee the power to buy whether or
not the owner desires to sell). The Kentucky court has held
both come within the Rule, and has invalidated both pre-emptive
options 2 5 and ordinary options 12 if unlimited as to time. If the
option is personal or can be exercised only within the life of the
optionee or optionor it is of course valid under the Rule.2 7
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish an option from a right
of entry for condition broken which is not within the Rule
against Perpetuities. In two cases where the court was required
to make this distinction, it came to opposite conclusions. In
Bates v. Bates,128 one T. G. Bates conveyed one-half acre to school
trustees for $15 in 1908, the deed providing," T. G. Bates is to have
the land at the same price when it ceases to be public property
as school house property." The land ceased to be used for school
purposes in 1947, after Bates' death. Bates' heirs sued to enforce
the provision, claiming Bates had a reversionary interest. The
court held Bates had an option, which if personal ceased at his
death and if unlimited as to time violated the Rule. Under either
construction, the heirs could not enforce it. The decision is sound
if an analogy is drawn to a pre-emptive option to repurchase at
the price paid. Yet it is not easy to explain why Bates should lose
if the deed provides he has to pay $15 to retake the land and
should win if the deed provides he can retake it free. In the latter
case he would have a right of entry, exempt from the Rule.
In the same year in which the court decided Bates, it decided
Trosper v. Shoemaker.' 9 The facts were these. Shoemaker sold
land to Trosper with a "restrictive covenant" providing in part:
"In the event the said second party fails to buy his petroleum
125 Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 182, 160 S.W. 2d 654 (1942), pre-
emptive option to buy at owners own price; Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177
S.W. 2d 568 (1944), noted 83 Ky. L.J. 118 (1945), pre-emptive option to buy at$1000. For arguments that the Rule should not apply to pre-emptive options to
purchase at owner's price or at market price, see 6 Am. L. Prop. § 26.66, 26.67.
1203 Cf. Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1959).
127 Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W. 2d 918 (1950); Bates v.
Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W. 2d 943 (1950). But it may be invalid as a
restraint on alienation; see Robertson v. Simmons, note 126 supra.
128 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W. 2d 943 (1950).
120 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W. 2d 176 (1950).
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products from the said first party, to-wit: E. S. Shoemaker, then
said first party is given the right to repay the consideration herein
mentioned, to-wit: $3,000, and take possession of said property."
There were further provisions that this "covenant" was binding
on the heirs and assigns of both parties and "ran with the land".12
It is plain the quoted provision did not create a covenant (though
other provisions might have). The remedies for breach of a
covenant are damages or an injunction. The remedy here was
forfeiture upon repayment of the purchase price. The court held
this was a "conditional reversionary right" which did not violate
the Rule. It is difficult, however, to distinguish this case from
Bates. Both involved deeds restricting the use of land and pro-
viding for forfeiture upon cessation of the specified use and repay-
ment of the purchase price. It is believed the decision, in uphold-
ing this provision, is unsound. The exemption of the right of
entry is an historical anomaly, which cannot be justified in policy,
and should not be extended to include interests which can
reasonably be classified as options because they require the pay-
ment of money to retake the premises. 131
Fortunately the distinction between an option and a right of
entry is somewhat minimized by the 1960 Perpetuities Act.
Under KRS 381.216 unlimited options to purchase are valid for
21 years and void thereafter. Under KRS 881.219 rights of entry
are terminated after 30 years. Hence under either classification
the interest will ultimately be terminated.
9. GIFTS TO CHAMTY
A gift of property to one charity with a gift over to another
charity is not within the Rule against Perpetuities. 3 2 Thus a gift
in trust to pay the income to the First Presbyterian Church so
long as it exists, then to the Mercy Hospital is wholly valid, even
though the gift to the Mercy Hospital may not become possessory
for centuries. The rationalization for this exemption is as follows.
130 The court recently held the burden of a covenant to purchase petroleum
products runs with the land, the benefit is assignable, and the covenant is a
property interest for which compensation is payable upon exercise of eminent
domain. Folger v. Commonwealth, 330 S.W. 2d 106 (Ky. 1959), noted 48 Ky.
L.J. 585 (1960). These questions are in much dispute elsewhere.
131 See 4 Restatement of Property § 394, comments a and c.
1L32 Board of Nat'1 Missions v. Harrel's Trustee, 286 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1956).
See generally 6 Am. L. Prop. H 24.37, 24.42; 5 Powell f 770; 4 Restatement of
Property §§ 396-398; Simes & Smith §§ 1278-1287.
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The policy in favor of supporting charities is stronger than the
policy against perpetual fettering of property.1 3 It allows a
perpetual trust for charity.134 Since a charitable trust may be
perpetual, it does not matter that the income may shift from one
charity to another.
This exemption does not apply where the gift to charity
follows a gift to an individual. If, in the example in the preceding
paragraph, the income were to be paid to the testator's descend-
ants per stirpes so long as there are any in existence (rather than
to the Church), the gift over to Mercy Hospital would be void
because it would vest too remotely.15 Nor does the exemption
apply where there is a gift over from a charity to an individual
other than the transferor or his heirs. The gift over is required
to vest within the perpetuity period or fail.
10. TRUSTS FOR EMPLOYES
In 1956, KRS 381.220 was amended to exempt trusts for
employes from the Rule against Perpetuities. The amendment
provided:
A trust created by an employer as part of a stock bonus
plan, pension plan, disability or death benefit plan or profit-
sharing plan, for the exclusive benefit of some or all of his
employes, to which contributions are made by such em-
ployer or employes, or both, for the purposes of distributing
to such employes the earnings or the principal, or both
earnings and principal, of the fund so held in trust, shall
not be deemed to be invalid as violating the rule against
perpetuities or invalid as a suspension of the power of
alienation of title to property; but such a trust may continue
for such time as may be necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses for which it may be created.
It was feared that such trusts would be found to be non-
charitable and subject to the Rule, though there was no previous
authority to that effect. Similar statutes allowing permanent
trusts for employes have been passed in more than half the states.
133 But see Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984
(19414 A trust to maintain cemetery lots is treated as a charitable trust. Epperson
v. Clintonville Cemetery Co., 303 Ky. 852, 199 S.W. 2d 628 (1947).
135 Smith v. Fowler, 801 Ky. 96, 190 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945); Sandford's
Adm'r v. Sandford, 230 Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d 83 (1929).
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The 1956 amendment was incorporated in the 1960 Perpetuities
Act and is now KRS 881.217. The language was not changed
except for omission of the words "or invalid as a suspension of
the power of alienation of title to property." Dean Matthews
criticized the inclusion of these words in the 1956 amendment
on the ground they might revive the rule against suspension of
the power of alienation which the court had previously inter-
preted out of KRS 381.220.136 In any case their deletion was
required when that statute was repealed.
11. TRUSTS FOR ACCUMULATION
Strictly speaking, the Rule against Perpetuities is not concerned
with trusts for accumulation. It is concerned only with the
vesting of interests. There has developed, nonetheless, an ana-
logous rule against accumulations, which is measured by the
same period (lives in being plus 21 years) and is sometimes
thought of as part of the Rule against Perpetuities. 137 Under the
rule against accumulations, directions to accumulate income
must be confined to lives in being and 21 years. If not so con-
fined the direction to accumulate is void.' 38 There are no Ken-
tucky cases applying this rule and passing upon the effect of an
invalid direction to accumulate.1 39
136 Matthews, "Comments on 1956 Kentucky Legislation: The Perpetuities
Amendment," 45 Ky. L.J. 111, 128-126 (1956).
137 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.65; 5 Powell 1111 831, 837, 838; Simes & Smith §§1464-65.138 Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 835 (1900) (dictum).
There was a direction to accumulate income not necessary for support until
testator's children reached 21, and then pay it over to them. There was no
direction to accumulate income beyond this period. (Record on appeal, p. 2).
'39 Cf. Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958); Hussey v
Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903). For possible effects of wait-and-see
on the rule against accumulations, see Cohen, "The Rule Against Accumulations




REFORMS OF THE 1960 PERPETUITIES ACT
1. Wny RFx mOt?
There is widespread agreement today that some reform of the
Rule against Perpetuities is necessary. This current wave of
dissatisfaction originated in many sources, but the main force
was Professor Barton Leach's hard-hitting attack on the Rule
published in 1952.1 Professor Leach, indicting the Rule as "a
technicality-ridden legal nightmare," set forth a detailed bill of
particulars. His criticisms centered on the requirement of abso-
lute certainty that the interest will vest in due time; on the harsh
consequences of violating the Rule; on the subjection of com-
mercial options to the Rule; and on the exemption of possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry. Following Mr. Leach's article
came a rash of articles and comments in law reviews and books,2
and studies and pamphlets published by eminent committees.3
Practically all these learned writers agreed with Mr. Leach's
criticisms (though not necessarily with his proposed reforms),
and Professor Daniel Schuyler added a further criticism of the
use of the "vested in interest" concept in applying the Rule.4
The real question is thus not whether the Rule needs reforming,
but what direction reform should take. To a large extent what
is the right reform will depend upon what one conceives to be
wrong with the Rule; the disease may suggest the cure. With this
1 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,"
65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952).
2 Among the more significant are Leach and Tudor, The Rule Against
Perpetuities, apps. I-V and passim (1957); Simes, Public Policy and the Dead
Hand 32-82 (955); Bordwell, "Perpetuities From the Point of View of the
Draughtsman," 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 429 (1956); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation:
Hail Pennsylvanial," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124 (1960); Mechem, "Further
Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation," 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 965(1959); Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The Wait and See
Doctrine," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953); Sparks, "A Decade of Transition in
Future Interests," 45 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1959); Tudor, "Absolute Certainty of
Vesting under the Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic," 34 B.U.L.
Rev. 129 (1954); Waterbury, "Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform,"
42 Minn. L. Rev. 41 (1957).
3 British Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report (The Rule against Perpetui-
ties), Cmd. No. 18 (1956); Committee on Rules Against Perpetuities, ABA See.
of Real Prop., Prob. & Trust Law, Legislators' Handbook on Perpetuities (1958).
4 Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard its Vest?," 56 Mich.
L. Rev. 683, 887 (1958). See also 5 Powell II 767; McDougal and Haber,
Property, Wealth, Land 250-51 (1948).
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in mind the draftsman of the 1960 Perpetuities Act undertook an
examination of all the Kentucky perpetuities cases, including
briefs and records on appeal, to find out in what ways the Rule
was working badly. It may be useful here to set forth these
findings and the reasons for the legislative changes. (Rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter are separately treated in Part
III of this article.)
(a) The Rule against Perpetuities is essentialy incomprehensi-
ble. The conventional Rule can be stated with Delphic simplicity,
but like the oracles of old it has a reputation for being excessively
resistant to understanding. The briefs and opinions in Kentucky
perpetuities cases indicate this reputation is well-deserved. There
have been 71 perpetuities cases since 1900, an average of more
than one a year. Of these 71 cases, 19 were wrongly decided
according to orthodox doctrine 5 and 16 are doubtful by the same
standard.6 Only 36 (51%) of the perpetuities cases were clearly
decided correctly 7-a surprising figure considering leading authori-
ties are in large agreement on how the Rule applies. In practically
all these "wrongly decided" cases the court maintained it was
applying the common law Rule. Yet it serves no purpose to
argue who is in error. That would get us into semantics. The
point is: there has been a breakdown in communications between
the learned writers and the learned judges.
Nor have lawyers in their briefs consistently demonstrated
complete or even partial familiarity with the esoteric technicalities
of the Rule. In a brief of thirty years ago the entire (and unsuc-
cessful) argument that the devise did not violate the Rule ran
as follows: "Is the time at which the fee becomes fixed so
indefinite, or remote, that it does violence to section 2360 Ken-
tucky Statutes, or to the common law rule against perpetuities?
We think not." Although there are few briefs so patently in-
adequate as that one, there are many where counsel wrongly
concedes that the gift does or does not violate the Rule; where
counsel does not see additional (and, under orthodox doctrine,
compelling) technical arguments in his favor; where the line of
5 See Appendix, Table 2, pp. 103-108 infra.
6 See Appendix, Table 3, pp. 108-109 infra.
7 See Appendix, Table 1, pp. 102-103 infra. This figure must be further dis-




argument keeps coming unglued; where the gift is so clearly
valid the argument is absurd. There are also cases where the
perpetuities issue is not raised in a prior lawsuit, and which are
re-litigated to the Court of Appeals years later when some sharp-
eyed title searcher has spotted the defect.
While it is necessary to point out the lack of understanding
of the Rule in any study of its workings, 8 it does not seem proper
to chastise severely bench and bar for their lack of expertise.
Even in the best treatises the Rule is marked by imprecise and
enigmatic concepts, unexpected contradictions of human experi-
ence, trifling linguistic distinctions, and deceptive subtleties and
refinements. There is far more complexity than is rationally
required to deal with the problems. When the technicalities are
so strange and artificial and not rationally connected to any
policy basis the non-specialist can understand, the level of pro-
fessional expertise is, in these busy times, bound to decline.
The lack of understanding by bench and bar made it clear
that any reform must simplify the law, making it more easily
understandable by the average lawyer. Four basic causes of
complexity and confusion were the statutory language prohibiting
suspension of the power of alienation, the remote possibilities
test, the unsettled and harsh law with respect to consequences
of violating the Rule, and the concept of vesting. By removing
the first three of these causes the 1960 Perpetuities Act should
simplify the law and cut down the frequency of litigation.
(b) The statutory language in KRS 381.220 prohibiting suspen-
sion of the power of alienation confused both bench and bar.
The confusion caused by this statute has already been discussed
in connection with the common law Rule against Perpetuities
and will be discussed again subsequently in connection with
restraints on alienation. Repeal was necessary to bring a begin-
ning of order. It is interesting to note that in the same year
Kentucky discarded its statute of New York parentage, New York
itself returned to the period of the common law Rule, threw out
8 This situation is not limited to Kentucky. Thus Professor Sparks comments
in "Future Interests," 1956 Ann. Survey of Am. Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 419,
429-430 (1957): "Paradoxically the year is also unique in the inexpert way in
which simple [perpetuities] problems have been handled by both courts and
counsel. . . .Cases in which only one decision is possible but which serve to
illustrate the pathetic lack of understanding of the Rule against Perpetuities by
both bench and bar are frequently before the courts."
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the "unborn widow" and administrative contingencies, and
adopted a cy pres provision for age contingencies."
(c) Under the remote possibilities test reasonable dispositions
which would in fact vest in time were frequently struck down.
Under the common law Rule, there must be no possibility that a
gift will vest too remotely. This test has defeated reasonable
dispositions by reasonable property owners, and usually merely
because the draftsman overlooked some highly remote possibility
which did not in fact happen. Since 1900 there have been 82
cases holding void future interests (excluding non-family cases
dealing with possibilities of reverter, rights of entry and options).
In 11 of these it was known at the time the case was decided that
the interest would in fact vest in time, and thus the possibility
that defeated the interest never came to pass.10 In 7 cases it was
highly probable the interest would vest in due time, but at the
time of decision there was a remote possibility that a person over
55 would produce children, which possibility defeated the gift."1
In 8 cases, it was possible the interest would vest in time, but at
the time of decision one could not say it was certain or probable.' 2
This leaves only 6 cases where it was not possible or was highly
improbable that the interests would vest in time.13
The instruments in at least three-fourths of these cases do not
show any intention to create a family dynasty or to tie up
property beyond lives in being plus 21 years. Practically all of
the invalid interests could have been saved had the draftsman
been more careful and made a slight change in language. But
the draftsman unfortunately overlooked the "fertile octogenarian"
in 13 cases, the "unborn widow" in 1, and other unlikely possibili-
ties in most of the others. These cases offer rather convincing
support for Lord Blanesburgh's observation four decades ago
that the Rule usually is "a snare, useless so far as its legitimate
purpose is concerned,"' 4 and for Professor Leach's recent attack
on the remote possibilities test as destructive of innocent and
reasonable family dispositions which actually do vest in time.
If the law sets "lives in being plus 21 years" as the permissible
9 N.Y. Laws 1960, chs. 448-452.
10 See Appendix, Table 5, patterns 1, 3, 5, 6, pp. 110-111 infra.
11 See Appendix, Table 5, patterns 2, 4, pp. 110-111 infra.
12 See Appendix, Table 6, patterns 1, 8, pp. 111-112 infra.
'3 See Appendix, Table 6, patterns 2, 4 p. 112 infra.
14 Ward v. Van der Loeff, (1924] A. C. 653, 678.
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period for tying up property it is hard to see how that policy is
offended by an interest which might, but does not in fact, tie up
the property beyond that period.
The primary justification for the remote possibilities test is the
convenience inherent in being able to determine at the outset the
validity of interests. It is not necessary to wait and see if the
interests vest in time. Indeed, the only objection to the reform
act voiced on the floor of the Senate (other than one Senator's
understandable complaint that "this is the most complex subject
ever brought up in the legislature, and I'm not going to vote for
something I don't understand") was that wait-and-see would
prove inconvenient. There are several answers to this. Inasmuch
as they have been fully set forth elsewhere,15 it is only necessary
to note them briefly here.
The first is that the assumed inconvenience of wait-and-see is
largely hypothetical. In more than one-half of the Kentucky
cases invalidating gifts it was known at the time of decision that
the gift would vest in time. No more inconvenience would have
resulted from sustaining these gifts than results from sustaining
any contingent interest that will necessarily vest or fail within
the period. In the others it is hard to say whether inconvenience
would have arisen or not. The suits were usually brought
immediately after the instruments became effective simply to
declare the rights of the parties. But it is pertinent to note that
where valid life estates were involved, no question of possession
or distribution could have arisen until the termination of the life
estates.
The real answer to the convenience argument, however, is that
mere convenience cannot justify striking down the transferor's
intention and depriving the intended beneficiaries of their gifts.
In the analogous situation where one member of a class calls
for distribution of his share before all possible members are
ascertained, the Court of Appeals has rejected the rule of con-
venience in favor of holding the class open until it is phy-
siologically closed. There the court does not regard conveni-
ence to the living as sufficient justification for depriving the
unborn. The same policy choice underlies the wait-and-see test.
15 See the books and articles by Leach, Tudor, and Waterbury, note 2, supra;
and the British Law Reform Committee Report, note 3, supra.
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If serious inconvenience does in fact result in some unusual case,
the court may, under KRS 881.216, reform the instrument to
vest the gift within the period, thereby preventing the incon-
venience while at the same time carrying out the transferor's
intent as far as possible.
Another objection sometimes voiced to wait-and-see is that it
decreases the marketability of land. Whatever may be the effect
of wait-and-see on marketability in other jurisdictions, its effect
in Kentucky will be negligible. In Kentucky all land subject
to vested or contingent future interests can be sold or mort-
gaged under court order if the court finds it in the best in-
terests of the parties."0 The petition for sale may be initiated
by the life tenant or the owners of indefeasibly vested remainders
or reversions. The power of a court to order sale for reinvestment
extends to land held in trust as well as by legal estates, and can
be exercised even though the instrument expressly provides the
land cannot be sold.'7 The future interests are transferred to the
proceeds of the sale, which are paid into court and reinvested
under court order.18 This broad power of sale makes the land
marketable, while preserving the proceeds for the intended
beneficiaries.
It has been suggested that the fantastic possibilities which have
invalidated gifts-the fertile octogenarian, the unborn widow,
administrative and age contingencies and such-could be elimi-
nated without jettisoning entirely the remote possibilities test.
This approach was considered and rejected for four reasons. (1)
It is wrong to strike down any interest which in fact vests in due
time merely because it might not have done so. It is wrong
whether the contingency on which it might not have vested be
regarded as probable, improbable or fantastic. (2) Remedying
specific defects would require a complicated statute, and even
then would not cure fantastic possibilities as yet undreamed of.
(8) Agreement could not be reached on what to do with the
fertile octogenarian, who accounted for so many invalid gifts.
There was objection to deeming men over 60 incapable of having
issue; a further stumbling block was the fact that a person of any
16 KRS 889.030-389.040.
17 See pp. 99-100 infra.




age may adopt a child who shares in any remainder given to the
adoptor's children. 19 (4) A simple statute was the only kind of
reform statute saleable in the legislature.
In our view the proper course was to lay down the soundest
rule, and leave exceptions to be carved in it as time might
require. To have kept a rule unsound in policy and carve sound
exceptions in it would have added more complications, and
brought inadequate relief.
(d) The consequences of violating the Rule were harsh and
unsettled. The question of what to do with invalid gifts has long
plagued the Court of Appeals.20 None of the solutions were satis-
factory. The general rule of passing the void interest to testator's
heirs often frustrated his scheme where he did not intend for his
heirs to share equally or at all. And where he did intend equality
among his children, the rule of infectious invalidity-applied to
achieve equality-wrecked havoc with his plan for protecting his
children from improvidence. Moreover, most invalid limitations
had to be litigated to the Court of Appeals to determine if
infectious invalidity applied.
There appears to be no policy reason why a limitation which
violates the Rule must be entirely struck down, often bringing
down other gifts with it. Most of the void gifts were merely the
product of inept drafting and could be cured by the addition or
deletion of a few words. If the question were put to the average
testator whether he would prefer the gift to be totally void or
would prefer the gift to be suitably remodelled so as to vest at an
earlier time, very likely he would say the latter.
Although giving a court cy pres power to reform invalid limita-
tions is not altogether free from objection, we came to the con-
clusion that it is better than either of the alternatives a court
presently has. It is a lesser power than the power to strike down
other interests through infectious invalidity. It is a power to
deal with the invalid interest only, leaving the valid gifts standing.
Since cy pres is not resorted to if the interest does in fact vest
in due time, on the basis of past Kentucky cases very few
instruments should require reformation.
19 Breckinridge v. Skillman's Trustee, 330 S.W. 2d 726 (Ky. 1960);
Bedinger v. GraybiU's Exr, 302 S.W. 2d 594 (Ky. 1957), noted 47 Ky. L.J. 149
(1958).
20 See pp. 38-45 supra.
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(e) Confusion surrounds the meaning of vest. As previous
discussion has revealed, it is not clear under what circumstances
a future interest is vested for purposes of the Rule against
Perpetuities.2" A class gift vested subject to partial divestment
does not satisfy the Rule nor, in Kentucky, does a remainder
which might be called for some purposes vested subject to total
divestment. Beyond that holdings and dicta are in conflict.
Since remainders vested in interest are as much within the
reasons of the Rule as contingent remainders, it is arguable that
any reform should require remainders to vest in possession within
the period.22 This argument has merit, but translating it into
legislation is another matter. We concluded that it was best to
leave the problem of the meaning of vest with the court. By
eliminating from the perpetuities field all the feudal meanings of
vest-other than indefeasibly vest23-the court has already nar-
rowed the meaning of "vest in interest" to an understandable
meaning, not too difficult to apply. Indeed, it is possible that the
court has eliminated the concept of "vest in interest" altogether
in applying the perpetuity rule.
2. KRS 381.215: ADOPTION OF THE COMMON LAW RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
KRS 381.215 (section 1 of the 1960 Perpetuities Act) reads:
No interest in real or personal property shall be good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest. It is
the purpose of this section to enact the common law rule
against perpetuities, except as hereinafter modified by KRS
381.215 to 881.223.24
The section sets forth the common law Rule against Perpetui-
ties, using the language of John Chipman Gray. Only the words,
21 See pp. 15-84 supra.
22 Professor Schuyler is the leading exponent of this idea, and has drafted
an appropriate statute. See Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities
Discard Its Vest?," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 887, 949-951 (1958).
23 An indefeasibly vested remainder is one in ascertained, fixed persons certain
to take permanent possession of the property in the future. See Curtis v. Citizens
Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958).
24 The reviser of statutes in codifying the act substituted "by KRS 381.215
to 881.223" for the phrase "by this Act." Inasmuch as it is hard to see how the
section can "hereinafter" be modified by itself, it would have been clearer if "by
KRS 381.216 to 381.223" had been substituted.
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"in real or personal property," are added to Gray's classic state-
ment of the Rule. As the Court of Appeals long ago adopted the
common law Rule by decision, the section is declaratory of
existing law, set forth in Part I of this article, except as the law is
modified by subsequent sections of the 1960 act. The only effect
of enacting this section and repealing KRS 381.220 is that the
Rule is stated to be against remoteness of vesting rather than
against "suspension of the power of alienation," which language
has caused so much trouble. The rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation, discussed in Part IV of this article,
remains unchanged.
3. KRS 381.216: THE WArr-AND-SE DocTim AiN Cy PaEs
KRS 381.216 (section 2 of the 1960 Perpetuities Act) reads:
In determining whether an interest would violate the
rule against perpetuities the period of perpetuities shall be
measured by actual rather than possible events; provided,
however, the period shall not be measured by any lives
whose continuance does not have a causal relationship to
the vesting or failure of the interest. Any interest which
would violate said rule as thus modified shall be reformed,
within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely
the intention of the creator of the interest.
The first sentence of the section adopts the wait-and-see doctrine.
The second sentence, providing for reform of invalid interests,
adopts cy pres.
A. The Wait-and-See Doctrine
The common law measured the validity of an interest by
determining at the date of the instrument whether there was any
possibility it would vest too remotely. Under this section validity
is measured by actual events. We wait and see whether the
interest actually vests in time. If it does, it is valid; if it does not,
it is void. The wait-and-see principle has been adopted in
Pennsylvania,25 Vermont," and Washington,27 and in a modified
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950). For discussions of the Pennsylvania
Act, see Pa. Comm. on Decedents' Estates Laws, Proposed Estates Act of 1947
(1046); Brgy, Intestate, Wills and Estate s of 1947, at 5251-5550 (1949);
Brgy, "A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities, 23 Temp. L.Q. 313
(1949); Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Doctrine-New Kernels fromOld Nutshells," 28 Temp. L.Q. 321 (1955); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation:
(footnote continued on next page)
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form in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts.28 It
has also been adopted by the New Hampshire court, and pos-
sibly by the Florida court.29 And in 1956 the distinguished English
Law Reform Committee unanimously recommended it for adop-
tion in the country where the Rule was born and grew upY0
In the great bulk of cases this principle will be of easy
application and will save many gifts formerly held void.3 ' These
cases will usually involve life estates, with remainder over, and
at the death of the first life tenant it will be known whether the
remainder will vest in time. In other cases it may not be obvious
who are the measuring lives or the interest may not be limited
after a life estate. The problems that might be raised by these
cases are discussed below.
Who are the measuring lives? The language, "... provided,
however, the period shall not be measured by any lives whose
continuance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or
failure of the interest," is original with the Kentucky statute. It is
not contained in any of the other statutes. Its purpose is to cure
the problem of what lives it is permissible to wait out. If wait-
and-see is taken literally it is possible to contend an interest is
valid if it actually vests within 21 years after the death of any
person who was alive when the instrument took effect. Obviously
this result would be impractical, not to say absurd. Although
probably no court would ever so hold, this provision clearly
(footnote continued from preceding page)
Hail Pennsylvania!," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124 (1960); Mechem, "Further
Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation," 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 965(1959); Phipps, "The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities," 23 Temp. L.Q.
20 (1949).
26Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 501 (1959). The Vermont statute served as a
model for KRS 381.216. It was drafted by the Harvard Legislative Research
Bureau and Professor Leach, whose memorandum interpreting it is reprinted in
Leach and Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities 224-230 (1957).27 Wash. Rev. Code §§ 11.98.010-11.98.030 (1959 Supp.) (applicable
to trusts only). For comment see 34 Wash. L. Rev. 330 (1959).2 8 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-95 (1958); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 160, § 27
(1959 supp.); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 197A (1960 supp.); Mass. Ann. Laws c.
184a, § 1 (1958). The Massachusetts statute (copied almost verbatim by the
other three states) is discussed in Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation-Massachusetts
Style," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954).
29 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A. 2d 207 (1953); Story
v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
30See British Law Reform Committee, Fourth Report (The Rule Against
Perpetuities), Cmd. No. 18 (1956), discussed in Leach, "Perpetuities Reform by
Legislation: England," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1411 (1957).
31 See Appendix, Table 5, pp. 110-111 infra.
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prevents such a result by limiting the measuring lives to lives
causally related to the vesting or failure of the interest.2
What does the requirement that the measuring life have a
"causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest" mean?
In a sense it is simply declaratory of the measuring lives at
common law, which, as the court said in Bach v. Pace,33 "may be
any lives which play a part in the ultimate disposition of the
property." However, there is this difference. At common law the
measuring lives had to have a causal relationship to vesting which
insured vesting within the period.3 4 Under wait-and-see, absolute
certainty ab initio is not required, and hence the measuring lives
are those in being at the beginning of the period whose continu-
ance might affect vesting. These are lives which "play a part in
the ultimate disposition of the property"; these are lives with
a causal relationship to vesting.
In practically all cases the measuring lives will be one or more
of the following as fits the particular facts: (a) the preceding life
tenant, (b) the taker(s) of the interest, (c) a parent of the takers
of the interest, (d) a person designated as a measuring life in the
instrument, or (e) some other person whose actions or death
can expressly or by implication cause the interest to vest or fail.
Though it seems obvious, perhaps it should be pointed out that
this section does not at all narrow the lives usable at common
law. Any gift good under the common law remote possibilities
test is valid under KRS 381.216.
Transfers upon a contingent event not related to any life.
Some gifts are made on contingencies not related to lives.
Examples are: $1,000 to A immediately upon probate of my will;
$100,000 to my testamentary trustee to hold in trust under certain
provisions; 50-year lease to X Corporation if a certain building
is built. The contingencies in these cases are, respectively,
probate of a will, appointment of a trustee, and erecting a
building. These events are not causally related to the continuance
of any life in being. In such cases the interests are valid if the
32 A provision of this sort is recommended by Waterbury, "Some Further
Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform," 42 Minn. L. Rev. 41, 66, n. 96 (1957). The
addition of this language in the Kentucky statute is approved by Leach, 'Perpetui-
ties Legislation: Hail Pennsylvanial," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124, 1146 (1960).
33 305 S.W. 2d 528, 529 (Ky. 1957).
34 See p. 12 supra.
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contingencies actually occur within 21 years. They are void if
the contingencies occur thereafter.
KRS 381.216 will save for 21 years options and other com-
mercial transactions which are limited upon contingencies unre-
lated to lives, and which were void at common law. Thus:
Case 1. 0 grants "to A, his heirs, and assigns an option
to purchase Blackacre for $5,000." Under common law the
grant created an equitable interest in A, subject to the con-
dition precedent of exercise. It was void under the Rule
against Perpetuities since it was assignable and might not
be exercised within the perpetuities period. No particular
life is causally related to its exercise, and under KIRS 381.216
the option is valid for 21 years, and void thereafter.35 (If
the option is personal to A, and not assignable, A's life is
causally related to its exercise. It was valid at common law,
and is valid under this statute.)
B. Reformation by Cy Pres
The second sentence of KRS 381.216 provides: "Any interest
which would violate said rule as thus modified shall be reformed,
within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely the
intention of the creator of the interest." It is copied from the
Vermont statute. This sentence applies to invalid private disposi-
tions the doctrine of cy pres, which has heretofore been applied
to charitable gifts only.36 Applying cy pres to private dispositions
was first suggested by former Judge James Quarles of the Chan-
cery Court in Louisville,3" who earlier had been successful in
persuading the Court of Appeals to apply cy pres in Hussey v.
Sargent.3" Professor Simes and Leach, among others, have sub-
sequently advocated it, and New Hampshire, Vermont, Washing-
ton and possibly Idaho have adopted it.39
35 But the option still may be invalid as an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion. See Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476 (1959), discussed pp. 84-86 infra.
36 See Citizens Fidelity Bank v. Bernbeirn Fdn., 805 Ky. 802, 205 S. W. 2d
1003 (1947); Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 854 (1836).
37 Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine, with Reference to the Rule Against
Perpetuities-An Advocation of its Adoption in All Jurisdictions," 38 Am. L. Rev.
683 (1904); revised and republished as Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its
Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for
Accumulation," 21 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 384 (1946). Professors Simes and Leach both
refer to the latter article as the pioneering piece, but it a ppears Quarles was on
top of the problem years before as a result of some successul lawyering.
38 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903) (applying New Hampshire law).39 Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 AUt. 900 (1891); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27,§ 501 (1959); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 11.98.010-11.98.030 (1959 supp.) (applicable




The adoption of cy pres requires the court to reform the
invalid interest only, leaving standing the preceding valid estates,
which under prior law were frequently and dubiously struck down
through the application of infectious invalidity. Exactly how an
instrument will be reformed depends on what is suitable on the
particular facts. The next section illustrates how the power may
be exercised in some common cases.
4. ILLUSTRATIONS OF How KRS 381.216 APPLIES
Remainders after life estates of persons in being. Where there
is a life estate, or a series of life estates, created in persons in
being, it is usually not necessary for a court to pass upon the
validity of the remainder until the preceding estates have expired.
No issue of possession of land, nor of who takes the trust corpus,
can arise until that time. Therefore, we wait until the expiration
of life estates of persons in being and see what the facts are at
that time. If it is then necessary, the gift is reformed to comply
with the Rule.
Case 2 (Age contingency).40 T devises property "to A
for life, remainder to A's children who reach 25." T's heirs
are A, B and C. Under former law the gift to A's children
was void, and on A's death the property passed to B, C and
A's estate in equal shares. Under KRS 381.216, the validity
of the remainder is not determined until A's death. If at
that time it is found that all of A's children were born
before Ts death or if all of them are then over 4 years old,
the remainder is certain to vest within the period. It is
valid and no reformation is required. If, however, at A's
death there is a child of A under 4 who was born after the
testator's death, the will is reformed to give the property to
such of A's children as reach 21.41 The justification is that
testator obviously would prefer earlier vesting to total in-
validity if the point could be put to him.
Remainder after successive life estates, the first of which is in
a person in being, the second possibly in a person not in being.
40 Cases 2 and 3 are borrowed from Mr. Leach's explanation of the
Vermont statute, on which KRS 381.216 was modeled. See Leach and Tudor,
The Rule Against Perpetuities 229-230 (1957).
41 Reformation by reduction of age contingency is provided for by statute in
some jurisdictions. English Law of Prop. Act (1925), § 163; Conn. Gen. Stat.
Rev. § 45-96 (1958); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 160, § 28 (1959 supp.); Md. Ann.
Code art. 16, § 197A (1960 supp.); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184a, § 2 (1958); N.Y.
Real Pron. Law § 42-b; Pers. Prop. Law § 11-a. See also Hussey v. Sargent, 116
Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903).
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Where there is a secondary life estate given to a person who may
or may not be in being at testator's death, we wait until the death
of the first life tenant to determine validity of the remainders. If
it appears at that time that the secondary life tenant was not in
being at testator's death, the remainder is reformed to approxi-
mate most closely his intention.
Case 3 (Unborn widow). T devises property in trust "to
pay the income to A for life, then to pay the income to A's
widow for life, and then to pay the principal to A's issue per
stirpes who are living at the death of the survivor of A and
his widow." Under prior law the remainder to A's issue
was void because it was possible that "A's widow" would be
a person not in being at T's death. Under KRS 381.216 the
validity of the remainder is not determined until A's death,
when it will doubtless appear that his widow was in being
at T's death and the gift to issue is valid. However, in the
extraordinary case where A's widow was not in being at
T's death, the gift to A's issue is reformed to read: "to the
issue of A per stirpes who shall be living at the death of the
survivor of A and his widow, provided that, if A leaves a
widow who was unborn at my death, the interest to A's
issue shall indefeasibly vest not later than 21 years after
A's death." Thus reformed the gift is valid no matter what
happens. If A's widow lives more than 21 years after his
death, A's issue living 21 years after his death will
take an indefeasibly vested remainder, not subject to sur-
viving beyond that time. This would approximate most
closely T's intent. (If, however, an indefeasibly vested
remainder does not satisfy the Rule and vesting in posses-
sion is required, as some Kentucky cases seem to indicate,
the reformation would require a different wording.)
Case 4 (The most common infraction of the Rule in
Kentucky).42 T has two children, a son and a daughter.
T devises one-half of his estate to his son in fee. T devises
the other one-half in trust "to pay income to D for life, then
to D's children for their lives, then to pay the principal to
D's grandchildren." Under prior law the gift to D's grand-
children was void, and the court had the choice of (a)
letting it pass to T's heirs by intestacy (resulting in the son's
family ultimately receiving three-fourths of T's property
and the daughter's only one-fourth), or (b) striking down
the entire trust and the gift to the son (resulting in total
42 See cases collected in Appendix, Table 5, fact patterns 1 and 2, p. 110
infra, and Table 6, fact pattern 3, p. 112 infra.
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intestacy but equal distribution). Obviously either course
does violence to 's intention. Under KRS 381.216, the
validity of the remainder in fee is not determined until D's
death. There are three possible states of facts that might
be existing at that time. (A) D had no children surviving
her who were born after T's death. If such is the case-and
prior Kentucky cases indicate it usually will be-the gift
to grandchildren is incapable of vesting beyond the period.
Therefore it can be declared valid. (B) All of D's surviving
children were born after T's death. Here we know the
ultimate remainder cannot vest within lives in being. The
will is thus reformed to read: "to D's grandchildren, pro-
vided that, if D is survived only by children who were
unborn at my death, the interest to D's grandchildren shall
indefeasibly vest not later than 21 years after D's death."
This means the class of takers would close 21 years after
D's death, if not before. Thus reformed, the testator's intent
is carried out to the greatest possible extent. (If vesting in
possession is required, or if D's surviving children were all
very young so that closing the class 21 years later might
exclude some grandchildren, the will might be reformed
to read: "if the trust does not terminate under the instru-
ment within 21 years after D's death, it shall then be termi-
nated and the principal distributed to D's then living chil-
dren, with the issue of any deceased child taking their par-
ent's share.") (C) Some of D's surviving children were born
before T's death, and some after. In this case we cannot de-
termine the validity of the gift to grandchildren at D's death,
since it is still possible for the interest to prove either valid or
void by actual events. We must wait until the death of D's
children in being at T's death. There should be no incon-
venience in waiting further because D's children are still
entitled to possession or income from the property. If the
last survivor of D's children turns out to be a person in
being, the remainder will actually vest in time and will be
valid. On the other hand, if all D's children in being at
T's death die, survived by a child of D not in being, it will
then be known that the remainder is incapable of vesting
within lives in being. The will is then reformed in a
manner similar to (B) above, to vest the gift within 21
years of the death of D's children in being at T's death.
Trusts measured solely by a period of years. Frequently testa-
tors set up trusts not measured by any lives in being but for a
gross period of years, such as 40. The Rule against Perpetuities
is not concerned with the duration of the trust as such. Rather
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it is concerned with the vesting of interests in the trust. If the
vesting of the interests is not causally related to any life in being,
under KRS 381.216 the trust will last for 21 years and then
terminate. If, as will more often be the case, the interests are
causally related to lives in being though the trust is for a term
of years in gross, the trust can last for the relevant lives plus 21
years, which may or may not be longer than the specified duration.
Thus:
Case 5. T devises property in trust "for 40 years to pay
income to my issue per stirpes from time to time living, and
at the end of 40 years to distribute the principal to my issue
then living per stirpes." With respect to both the income
and the principal interest, the class can increase or decrease
in membership depending upon the life, death, and genera-
tive powers of T's issue living at his death (and of T's after-
born grandchildren as well, but they are excluded as meas-
uring lives). They have a causal relationship to the vesting
of the gifts. Hence the trust will be valid for the lives of
T's issue living at his death plus 21 years thereafter, or for
40 years, whichever period is shorter. If the trust terminates
on the former event, the will is reformed to distribute the
principal to T's issue per stirpes living at the date of distri-
bution. If the trust terminates on the latter event no
reformation is required. (The same result should follow in
a discretionary as well as a mandatory trust.)
Powers of appointment. This section brings no substantial
change in the application of the Rule to interests created by
exercise of special and testamentary powers, since under prior
law it was standard practice to wait until the power was exercised
and judge the validity of interests by facts existing at that time.
Usually the power will be exercised in such a way as to bring it
within the fact pattern of Case 4. The exercise will be read back
into the original instrument creating the power, and what was
said with respect to that case will be applicable to it.
Although the application of wait-and-see to powers is not new,
the cy pres provision is. The old law that an invalid gift passed
in default of appointment will no longer be applied if the donee's
intention can be approximated more closely by reformation.
Summary. Cases 1 through 5 cover the fact pattern of every
perpetuities case decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
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which an interest has been held void.43 And, as we have seen, the
reform statute can be applied to every one of them with little
difficulty. This should dispel any notion that wait-and-see and
cy pres may be difficult to apply in run-of-the-mill cases.
That all these cases-all three dozen of them-fall into five
well-defined fact patterns is revealing. It indicates that bizarre
hypothetical cases which can be dreamed up to show the incon-
venience of wait-and-see may be, like the fertile octogenarian and
the unborn widow, theoretically possible but as a practical matter
rarely happen. Any general rule of law properly must be drawn
to fit common and reasonable dispositions, instead of being drawn
in fear of highly improbable ones. If such exceptional cases do
arise, the Court of Appeals cannot be expected to push a sound
principle to its drily logical extreme, resulting in great and serious
inconvenience in the distribution of property. The ability of the
court to reform the instrument to carry out testator's intent to
the greatest extent possible should, and was designed to, prevent
the wait-and-see doctrine from getting out of control in any such
manner.
PART HI
TERMINATION OF RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND
ABOLITION OF POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER
1. INTODUCTON
Sections 4 through 7 of the 1960 Perpetuities Act (K.RS
881.218 through 381.222) deal with rights of entry and possibili-
ties of reverter, which historically have been exempt from the
common law Rule against Perpetuities. 1 These interests are just
as objectionable as interests within the Rule, in that they tie up
property for long periods of time, potentially forever. With
passage of time and change of conditions they leave the owner
of the fee in a straight jacket.
4 3 See Appendix, Tables 5, 6, and 7, pp. 110-112 infra. The statement in the
text does not include cases on rights of entry and possibilities of reverter, which are
dealt with separately in Part III of this article.
1 Holding these interests exempt: Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138
S.W. 2d 953 (1940); Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W.
2d 990 (1936); Bowling v. Grace, 219 Ky. 496, 293 S.W. 964 (1927); Jefferson
County Bd. of Ed. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S.W. 465 (1917).
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To determine the purpose and frequency of the creation of
these interests the author, with the very valuable assistance of
two students, Mr. William Logan and Mr. Robert Zweigart,
undertook to read all the wills and deeds recorded in Fayette
County (Lexington) for the year 1957.2 There were 323 wills
probated, none of which created rights of entry or possibilities
of reverter. Out of 4333 recorded deeds only six created these
interests. The contingencies upon which the rights of entry
or possibilities of reverter were limited were:
(a) cessation of use as a public park (tvo deeds from
real estate development corporation to Fayette County)
(b) cessation within twenty years of use for educational
purposes (two deeds from U. S. Dept. of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare to University of Kentucky and county
board of education)
(c) cessation of use for church purposes (Ohio grantor
to local church)
(d) cessation of use for street purposes (individual to
city of Lexington)
In contrast to these few deeds creating forfeiture restrictions on
land use, the great majority of deeds contained or referred to
non-forfeiture restrictive covenants. There were 748 deeds con-
taining new express covenants, 1088 referring to covenants con-
tained in a prior deed, and 1642 referring to a plat which may
or may not have had restrictions recorded on its face. Only 849
deeds contained no restrictions nor reference to any restrictions
in prior deeds nor reference to a plat (but two-thirds of these
deeds did except from the general warranty "restrictions, if any,
of record").
Although this study was limited to the deeds and wills in one
county for one year, it tends to confirm what many take to be
common knowledge: that rights of entry and possibilities of
reverter are used almost exclusively for the purpose of restricting
the use of land, and even for that purpose are used infrequently
in modem times. The restrictive covenant has replaced them.
2 Mr. Dale Bryant ran the deeds in rural Wolfe County for the same year.
Out of 276 deeds he found one providing for reverter upon cessation of school
use. Ironically enough, that deed provided for reverter of the tract to "the owner
of said farm that it was taken from," which provision creates an executory
interest and is void for perpetuity. McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Ed.,
285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W. 2d 519 (1941). Mr. Bryant found no restrictive covenants
recorded in Wolfe County in 1957.
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From the functional viewpoint then, KRS 881.218 through
881.222 deal basically with forfeiture restrictions on the use of
land, though they apply in terms to conceptual interests. The
basic scheme of these sections is to reduce all types of forfeiture
restrictions on the use of land to one-the right of entry-and then
to provide for the termination of rights of entry thirty years after
date of creation (with certain exceptions). Existing rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter are subjected to the thirty year
termination rule unless they are re-recorded before July 1, 1965.
Detailed comment on these sections, and how they accomplish
the basic scheme, follows.
2. KRS 881.218: ABoLITION OF THE DETERmiNABLE FEE AND THE
PossrBir.ry OF REVERTER
KRS 881.218 reads:
The estate known at common law as the fee simple de-
terminable and the interest known as the possibility of
reverter are abolished. Words which at common law would
create a fee simple determinable shall be construed to
create a fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition
broken. In any case where a person would have a possi-
bility of reverter at common law, he shall have a right of
entry.
The purpose of this section was to abolish the anachronistic
distinction between (a) a fee simple determinable with a possi-
bility of reverter and (b) a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent with right of entry for condition broken. These two
estates with their related future interests may be illustrated by
the following cases.
Case 1. 0 deeds land "to Trinity Church so long as
used for church purposes." Trinity Church has a fee simple
determinable, and 0 has a possibility of reverter by opera-
tion of law since he did not grant an absolute fee.3 An
3 Devine v. Isham, 284 Ky. 587, 145 S.W. 2d 529 (1940); Fayette County
Bd. of Ed. v. Bryan, note 1 supra. The dispositive language in Case 1 should be
compared with a grant "for church purposes only, and for no other purpose"
which conveys a fee simple absolute. Scott County Bd. of Ed. v. Pepper, 811
S.W. 2d 189 (Ky. 1958); Williams v. Johnson, 284 Ky. 23, 148 S.W. 2d 730
(1940). It is not clear that a possibility of reverter would arise by operation of
law in Kentucky where the grantee pays valuable consideration for the property.
See Bd. of Ed. of Taylor County v. Bd. of Ed. of Campbellsville, 292 Ky. 261,
166 S.W. 2d 295 (1942).
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express clause providing that the land revert back to 0
and his heirs is technically superfluous, but a wise addition
as a practical matter to prevent litigation.
Case 2. 0 deeds land "to Trinity Church, but if the
land is ever used for other than church purposes the grantor
and his heirs may enter and terminate the estate hereby
transferred." Trinity Church has a fee simple subject to
condition subsequent. 0 has a right of entry for condition
broken (called a "power of termination" in the Restatement
of Property).
Whether the grantor creates a determinable fee with a possi-
bility of reverter or a fee simple subject to a right of entry sup-
posedly depends upon the language used. The former is said
to be created by such words as "so long as", "during", "until".
The latter is alleged to be created by words granting a fee and
then adding, "provided that", "on condition that", "but" if a
specified event happens the grantor may re-enter. It is notoriously
difficult, however, to classify instruments by resort to such
tenuous verbal distinctions. Few actual instruments fall neatly
and clearly into one, and only one, category. Where classification
leads to different legal consequences, it is necessary to litigate
any given phrasing to determine what interpretation will be put
upon it.4
The treatises set forth several differences in legal consequences
between a possibility of reverter and a right of entry. One primary
difference is that the former is more frequently held alienable.
Indeed, it has been held in some few states that the mere attempt
to alienate a right of entry destroyed it. This difference does not
prevail in Kentucky where by statute "the owner may convey any
interest in real property not in adverse possession of another."'
This statute has been interpreted as making alienable "every
conceivable interest in or claim to real estate, whether present
4Compare with Cases I and 2 a deed "to Trinity Church, but if the land
ceases to be used for church purposes it is to revert to the grantor or his heirs."
"But if" points to a right of entry; "revert' points to a possibility of reverter.
Held: grantor has right of entry-Ohm v. Clear Creek Drainage District, 153 Neb.
428, 45 N.W. 2d 117 (1950); Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E. 2d 495
(1951),. Held: grantor has possibility of reverter-Baptist Church v. Wagner, 193
Tenn. 625, 249 S.W. 2d 875 (1952); County School Bd. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676,
58 S.E. 2d 88 (1950). Held: Church has fee simple absolute-Savannah School
District v. McLeod, 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 290 P. 2d 593 (1955); Second Church
v. Le Provost, 67 Ohio App. 101, 85 N.E. 2d 1015 (1941).
5 KRS 382.010. See also KRS 381.210.
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or future, vested or contingent, 6 including possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry.7
The other primary difference between a possibility of reverter
and a right of entry is that the former becomes possessory "auto-
matically," while the exercise of the right of entry is optional.
Several consequences are alleged to flow from the automatic
nature of the possibility of reverter,8 though many of them seem
more apparent than real. The Kentucky cases do not show
evidence these two interests are treated differently except in one
situation, but in that situation the distinction between automatic
and optional termination has led to striking results. The situation
is where the holder of the determinable fee has lost actual
possession and control of the property after the terminating event
happens. For example, a school board holding a determinable
fee closes the school and boards up the windows; the neighboring
landowner then proceeds to fence in the school lot. It has been
held that the school board cannot oust the possessor, irrespective
of who he is or whether he has a valid claim of title, because the
board's title has terminated.' This result, insofar as it gives the
law's protection to someone who, without a better claim of title,
ousts a prior peaceful possessor, is unsound. Even though the
board's "title" has terminated, the board, as the last person
peacefully in possession, should be entitled to remain in possession
until the true owner appears. And, by eliminating automatic
termination, KRS 381.218 so provides.
6 Austin v. Calvert, 262 S.W. 2d 825, 826 (Ky. 1953), holding possibility of
reverter alienable. Contrary dictum in some prior cases was expressly disapproved.
7 Austin v. Calvert, note 5 supra; Webster County Bd. of Ed. v. Wynn, 303
Ky. 110, 196 S.W. 2d 983 (1946); Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. Bryan, 263
Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936); Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 209 S.W. 535
(1919); Nutter v. Russell, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 163 (1860); Ky. Coal Lands Co. v.
Mineral Dev. Co., 295 F. 255 (6th Cir. 1925); cf. Kenner v. American Contract
Co., 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 202 (1872). Similar statutes in Virginia-from which KRS
382.010 was taken-and Mississippi have been interpreted as making alienable
the possibility of reverter and right of entry. Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66
S.E, 2d 495 (1951); Hamilton v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930).
See also 1 Am. L. Prop. § 4.68; 2 Powell fI 282.8 1 Powell 9 191; Williams, "Restrictions on the Use of Land," 27 Tex.
L. Rev. 158 (1948). See also Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm. v. Barringer,
242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E. 2d 114 (1955). Contra, Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Assn.
v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P. 2d 252 (1957); Robinson v. Mansfield, 2 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 445 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1956).
9 See Dunham,, "Possibility of Reverter and Power of Termination-Fraternal
or Identical Twins, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 215 (1953).
10 Barren County Bd. of Ed. v. Jordan, 249 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1952); Webster
County Bd. of Ed. v. Gentry, 233 Ky. 35, 24 S.W. 2d 910 (1930).
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The distinction between automatic and optional termination
of the fee serves no useful purpose today. Functionally the
determinable fee with possibility of reverter and the fee simple
with right of entry are equivalents. The grantor exhibits the same
objective, describes the same persons who have a right to
possession, and refers to the same event for shifting the possessory
estate. The categorization will in most cases depend upon chance
language used. Community policy respecting these interests
should be the same regardless of the verbal form.
Abolition of this anachronism with its unfortunate contem-
porary consequences is the first step in the statutory scheme to
bring to book the right of entry and the possibility of reverter,
which are exempt from the common law Rule against Perpetuities.
Conversion of the determinable fee with possibility of reverter
into a fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition broken,
rather than the converse, was desirable because it abolished the
"automatic" nature of the reverter. An optional forfeiture is less
objectionable than an automatic one. The sounder policy requires
the fee owner be left in possession until the transferor elects to
declare a forfeiture. That this is desirable is confirmed by the
abolition of automatic reverter on breach of a land use restriction
by the New York legislature in 1958 and by the comprehensive
study supporting that legislation." Therefore the determinable
fee was done away with.'2
Effect of KRS 381.218. The effect of this section is that it is
now possible to create only two types of defeasible fees: (a) the
fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition broken; and
(b) the fee simple subject to an executory limitation. (The latter
is commonly referred to in Kentucky as the defeasible fee, but
technically the fee subject to a right of entry is also a defeasible
"N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 347; N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report, Legis.
Doe. 65(B) (1958). The New York statute abolishes both the automatic reverter
and the right of entry, substituting therefor a cause of action in equity to compel
a reconveyance of the land upon breach of the restriction. The action is subject
to any equitable defense which might be interposed to prevent enforcement of a
covenant, and forfeiture can be declared by the court only to protect a substantial
interest in enforcement of the restriction. This is a more drastic curtailment of
forfeiture restrictions on the use of land than is provided in KRS 381.218 and
381.219.
12 The fee simple determinable is sometimes called a fee simple on a special
limitation (meaning duration limited to a period shorter than normal duration),
a qualified fee (meaning qualified in duration) or a base fee (meaning inferior).




fee.) The technical difference between these fees is that the
former is subject to a power to terminate the fee in the transferor
or his heirs, while the latter is subject to automatic divestment by
an executory interest in a third party. The practical difference is
much wider, however. The fee subject to a right of entry, like
the determinable fee, is almost always used to restrict the use of
land. The fee subject to an executory limitation is rarely used to
restrict the use of land; its common use is in instruments disposing
of wealth within the family. Thus:
Case 3. T devises land "to A and his heirs, but if A dies
without issue surviving him at his death then to B and his
heirs." A has a defeasible fee, more narrowly described as a
fee subject to an executory limitation. B has an executory
interest. 3
The fee simple subject to divestment by an executory limita-
tion is not affected by KRS 381.218 or KRS 381.219. It is not used
to restrict the use of land and is not within the reasons for these
sections. It remains subject to the common law Rule against
Perpetuities as modified by KRS 881.216. However, what would
have been at common law a determinable fee followed by a sub-
sequent but non-divesting executory limitation is, for reasons sub-
sequently noted, treated under KRS 381.2i9 as a fee subject to a
right of entry.
8. KRS 381.219: TERMINATION OF RIGHTS oF ENTRY
AFTER TimTY YA s
KRS 881.219 reads:
A fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition
broken shall become a fee simple absolute if the specified
contingency does not occur within thirty years from the
effective date of the instrument creating such fee simple
subject to a right of entry. If such contingency occurs
within said thirty years the right of entry, which may be
created in a person other than the person creating the
interest or his heirs, shall become exercisable notwithstand-
ing the rule against perpetuities. This section shall not
apply to rights of entry created prior to July 1, 1960.
13 In addition to death without issue, other events on which a defeasible fee
may be limited include remarriage of testator's widow (Ramsey v. Holder, 291
S.W. 2d 556 (Ky. 1956), return of a long lost son (Commonwealth v. Pollitt,
25 Ky. L.R. 790, 76 S.W. 412 (1903)), attachment by son's creditors (Scott v.
Ratliff, 179 Ky. 267, 200 S.W. 462 (1918)).
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Rights of entry and possibilities of reverter, being exempt
from the Rule against Perpetuities, tie up property very seriously.
Title held subject to one of these interests is not marketable, and
frequently the property is not improvable because a mortage can-
not be obtained upon it. The land may remain undeveloped or
limited to uneconomic uses, and the restriction cannot be released
because of the difficulty in ascertaining who holds the right of
entry or possibility of reverter created by a long dead grantor.14
Because of their adverse effect upon the marketability of land,
KRS 381.219 terminates all rights of entry (including under that
designation what formerly would be called possibilities of re-
verter) which do not become exercisable within thirty years of
creation.
Although the exemption of the right of entry (and the now-
abolished possibility of reverter) from the Rule against Perpetui-
ties was the loophole in the law allowing forfeiture restrictions to
go on forever, it was decided that the best solution to the problem
was not to subject rights of entry to that Rule. "Lives in being"
have no functional relation to the proper duration of land use
restrictions. The common law perpetuity period evolved naturally
as a period covering ordinary dispositions of family wealth
thought reasonable. From the standpoint of certainty of land
titles, it is preferable to fix the maximum duration by a period of
years, after which it is certain from the record alone that the
right of entry is void. Other states have terminated rights of
entry after a fixed period ranging from twenty to forty years, with
thirty years being the most common period.15 Thirty years was
selected here because it is a reasonable period of time and the
minimum period of title search required by the statutes of limita-
tion in Kentucky. Any recorded right of entry created after July
1, 1960, will come to the attention of the title searcher who makes
14 The need for legislation to terminate these interests has been extensively
discussed elsewhere. See Report of the Committee on Improvement of Con-
veyancing and Recording Practices, Proc., ABA Sec. of Real Prop Prob. & Trust
Law 73 (1957), and articles cited therein; Note, 46 Ky. L.J. 605 (1958).
15 Twenty years-Rhode Island Gen. Laws §§ 84-4-19 to 21 (1956). Twenty-
one years-Fla. Stat. Ann. § 689.18 (1959). Thirty years-Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-97(1958 Revision); Maine Rev. Stat. c. 160, § 29 (1954, supp. 1959); Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 184A, § 8 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 500.20(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-




a thirty year search,16 although by going back no further he still
takes the risk that a right of entry created more than thirty years
previously, which became exercisable upon breach of condition
within thirty years of its creation, remains exercisable.'1
The second sentence of KRS 381.219 provides that the right
of entry "may be created in a person other than the person
creating the interest or his heirs." This language means where
there is a transfer of what would have been a determinable fee
at common law, followed by a non-divesting executory interest
in a third person, such executory interest shall be treated as a
right of entry and validated for thirty years.18 It was required by
the conversion of the determinable fee into a fee subject to a right
of entry and was designed to cure the anomalous situation illus-
trated by the following case:
Case 4. 0 conveys land "to Trinty Church so long as
used for church purposes, and when it ceases to be used for
church purposes the land is to revert to the owners of the
farm from which the land is taken." The Court of Appeals
has held that "the owners of the farm" have an executory
interest void under the Rule against Perpetuities. 0
There is no good reason why it should matter who reclaims the
land upon cessation of church use-the grantor, his heirs, the
owners of the farm, or any other person. Indeed, it may well be
preferable from society's viewpoint for the forfeiture interest to
be in the owners of the farm rather than the grantor's heirs, who
may be numerous and difficult to locate. This provision carries
16The Massachusetts act, on which this section was based, starts the thirty
year period running from the date the fee subject to a right of entry becomes
possessory, rather than from the date of creation. It also provides for the
alternative application of the Rule against Perpetuities. To give the title searcher
more protection from a thirty year search these provisions were rejected. See also
the model act drafted by Simes and Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing
by Legislation 214-217 (1960), rejecting these features of the Massachusetts act.
17 This risk is minimized by the requirement that a right of entry be exercised
within a reasonable time after breach. Hale v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 206 Ky. 629,
268 S.W. 304 (1925), 16 years unreasonable; Kenner v. American Contract Co.,
72 Ky. (9 Bush) 202 (1873), 3 years unreasonable; Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v.
Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916) (dictum).
18The meaning of this language, taken from the Massachusetts act, is
explained by Leach, "Terpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1349, 1364 (1954), and by Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 16, pp.
209-210.
10 McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Ed., 285 y. 769, 149 S.W. 2d 519
(1941); Duncan v. Webster County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.W. 489 (1924);
cf. Barren County Bd. of Ed. v. Jordan, 249 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1952).
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through the basic scheme of the statute-to reduce forfeiture
restrictions on land use to one interest, the right of entry, which
can be held by any person and is terminated after thirty years.
4. KRS 381.221: TERMINATION AND PRESERVATION OF PossIBILIm s
OF REvERTER AND RiGrs OF ENTRY CREATED PmoR TO JULY 1, 1960
KRS 881.221(1) reads:
Every possibility of reverter and right of entry created
prior to July 1, 1960, shall cease to be valid or enforceable
at the expiration of thirty years after the effective date of
the instrument creating it, unless before July 1, 1965, a
declaration of intention to preserve it is filed for record with
the county clerk of the county in which the real property
is located.
This section aims to clear titles of old rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter. Many of these are useless, and all of
them impair the marketability of land and prevent its develop-
ment or redevelopment under changed conditions. Such titles are
not only in churches and schools. Every courthouse in Kentucky
contains numerous deeds providing for forfeiture if liquor is ever
sold on the premises. These ancient prohibitionist deeds utterly
failed to dry up the flow of liquor in this state. Their only sub-
stantial effect today is to take the property out of the mortgage
market, make it unimprovable, and hinder the efforts of private
capital to rehabilitate a declining urban area. The undesirable
social and economic consequences of these ancient forfeiture
restrictions have been widely recognized. In 1958 the Court of
Appeals called attention to this "troublesome and growing prob-
lem in real estate law as to what steps, if any, should be taken to
clear titles . . . where an old express clause of forfeiture or
reversion is involved,"20 and suggested remedial legislation.
This section provides for termination of rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter existing as such on July 1, 1960, unless a
declaration of intention to preserve them is recorded before July
1, 1965.21 Subsection (2) of KRS 381.221 sets forth what the
20 Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W. 2d 481, 482 (Ky. 1953).
21 The original draft of KRS 881.221 was based on Mass. Ann. Laws c. 260
§ 31A (1959 supp.), but caught between the hammer of local conditions and
the anvil of the legislature the section as enacted was reduced to less than half
the length of the original. Most of the provisions deleted covered expressly minor
(footnote continued on next page)
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declaration of intention must contain. If the declaration is filed,
the interest will continue to exist unlimited in duration. Requir-
ing continuous refiling every thirty years was rejected for two
reasons: very few of these interests are expected to be re-recorded;
and requiring those which are re-recorded before 1965 to re-
record every thirty years thereafter is, without a marketable title
statute requiring continuous refiling of all claims, an unfair
burden. Whether these reasons be persuasive, they controlled the
matter.
If no declaration of intention is filed before July 1, 1965, with
respect to a right of entry or possibility of reverter existing on
July 1, 1960, and created before July 1, 1935, the interest will
then cease to be valid or enforceable (a) if the contingency
on which it was limited has not then happened, or (b) if the
interest is a right of entry and the contingency happened before
July 1, 1960, but the right remains unexercised.2 z If the con-
tingency on which the interest is limited happens between July
1, 1960, and July 1, 1965, and the right of entry is exercised or
the determinable fee automatically ends within thirty years of
the creation of the interest, no declaration need be filed since the
forfeiture interest has become possessory within thirty years of
creation. If, however, the contingency happens between 1960
and 1965 and the right of entry is exercised or the determinable
fee ends more than thirty years after creation, a declaration is
required to protect against the relation back provision in the
statute.
With respect to rights of entry or possibilities of reverter
created after July 1, 1935, if no declaration of intention is filed
before July 1, 1965, the interest will continue to be valid and
enforceable until thirty years from the date of creation have
expired.
Constitutionality of section. KRS 381.221 is the only section
of the 1960 Perpetuities Act that is retroactive in effect, and a
question of its constitutionality may be raised. It is believed that
(footnote continued from preceding page)
matters which are now covered by implication only. This section is applicable
only to rights of entry and possibilities of reverter in land. Such interests in
personal property not in trust are conceivable, but practically unheard of.
221f the interest is a possibility of reverter and the contingency happened
before July 1, 1960, the possibility of reverter automatically became a fee simple
upon breach and is not an existing possibility of reverter on July 1, 1980.
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the act is constitutional. Five states have enacted legislation
within the past decade terminating existing rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter, with two of them providing for preserva-
tion of existing interests by re-recording within a given period.23
In 1955 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Illinois Reverter
Act terminating existing interests without the privilege of preser-
vation by re-recording.24 That act was more severe in its opera-
tion than KRS 881.221.
The inclusion of the provision for re-recording within five
years should remove any question of constitutionality. There
are many decisions upholding retroactive legislation of a similar
nature where preservation by re-recording is provided. Closely
analogous are statutes requiring owners of existing mortgages to
re-record them to preserve them against bona fide purchasers and
creditors, 25 and marketable title statutes requiring re-recording
of interests which have been in existence for more than a specified
number of years.26
5. KRS 881.222: EXCEPTIONS TO THE TremTy YEAR
TERMINATION RuLE
KRS 881.222 reads:
KRS 881.219 and 881.221 shall not apply to any possi-
bility of reverter or right of entry contained in a deed, gift
or grant from the Commonwealth or any political sub-
division thereof; nor shall they apply where both the fee
simple determinable and the succeeding interest, or both
the fee simple subject to a right of entry and the right of
entry, are for public, charitable or religious purposes; nor
shall they affect any lease present or future or any easement,
23111. Rev. Stat. c. 30, § 37e (1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-2102 (1959);
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 260, § 31A (1959 supp.), preserved if re-recorded within
ten years of act; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 345, preserved if re-recorded within three
years of act or within thirty years of date of creation. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 689.18(1959), no provision for re-recording; retroactive application declared uncon-
stitutional in Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954). See also the
model act in Simes and Taylor, op. cit. supra note 16, pp. 215-216, providing for
preservation by re-recording within two years of act or within thirty years of date
of creation.24 Trustees of Schools v. Batforf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E. 2d 111 (1955).
25 Upheld in Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883); Opinion of the Justices,
101 N.H. 515, 131 A. 2d 49 (1957); Livingston v. Meyers, 6 Ill. 2d 325, 129 N.E.
2d 12 (1955).
26 Upheld in Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957),
holding owner of possibility of reverter or right of entry lost it by failure to
re-record; Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W. 2d 119 (1957).
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right of way, mortgage or trust, or any communication,
transmission, or transportation lines, or any public highway,
right to take minerals, or charge for support during the life
of a person or persons, or any restrictive covenant without
right of entry or reverter.
This section exempts from the thirty year termination rule
certain rights of entry and possibilities of reverter not within
the primary purpose of the statute, which is to clear titles of
forfeiture restrictions on land use. Such exemptions include
resulting trusts, mineral interests, easements and rights of way,
and rights of entry incident to a lease. Restrictive covenants
enforceable only by injunction or damages were exempted be-
cause an arbitrary thirty year termination date would cut off
many useful covenants increasing the marketability of the prop-
erty. They may presently be terminated by a court when they
have outlived their usefulness. 27
The first two clauses of this section exempt certain rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter which are within the statute's
ambit but which were exempted because of other overriding
considerations. Forfeiture interests held by the Commonwealth
or its political subdivisions were excluded because it was believed
the power of determining when these interests become inimical
to the public interest should rest with the public bodies holding
them. The clause exempting a gift over from one charity to
another charity carries on the present exemption of this kind of
gift from the Rule against Perpetuities.
Lastly, it should be noted that exemptions not specifically
mentioned are excluded under the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Thus minors and others under legal disability
holding an existing right of entry or possibility of reverter are
not exempt from the re-recording requirement.
27 See Note, Covenants-Termination Resulting From a Change of Conditions,
45 Ky. L.J. 292 (1957).
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PART IV
THE RULE AGAINST DIRECT RESTRAINTS
ON ALIENATION
1. TIm RULE AGAINST RESTRAINTS DIsTNUISI-mu FROM TE Ruum
AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND) THE RULE AGAINST SUSPENSION
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION
The rule against restraints on alienation is an entirely different
rule from the Rule against Perpetuities.Y Nor is it to be confused
with the rule prohibiting suspension of the power of alienation.
The rule against restraints is a rule against direct restraints;
whereas these other two rules are against indirect restraints
caused by the creation of non-vested interests (the Rule against
Perpetuities) or by the creation of interests in persons not in
being or not ascertained (the rule against suspension). Direct
restraints are created by expressly providing that the grantee or
devisee has no power to alienate the property. Commonly the
grantee is ascertained and his interest is vested, but these are
unimportant matters under this rule. The important question is
whether he is expressly restrained from conveying the property.
While it is easy to see that this rule against direct restraints
has nothing to do with the rule against remote vesting (the Rule
against Perpetuities), it is not so easy to avoid confusing it with
the rule against suspension of the power of alienation. Both rules
have the same objective-alienability-and both are phrased as
rules concerning "alienation".- This similar phrasing has invited
confusion because it has not specified alienation of what. And
in that specification lies the difference between the rules. The
rule against suspension is a rule against suspension of the power
of alienation of the specific property (land, stocks, bonds or other
resources). It is violated if, and only if,3 a fee simple title to the
specific property cannot be transferred. The rule against re-
straints, on the other hand, is a rule against inalienable interests
in property (fee, life estate, remainder, etc.).
I For comprehensive treatment of restraints on alienation see 6 Am. L. Prop.
§§ 26.1-26.132 (by Professor Schnebly); 6 Powel ffif 839-848; Simes & Smith §§
1111-1171.
2 For comparison of the two rules see Norvell, "The Power of Alienation:
Direct Restraint vs. Suspension," 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 894 (1956).
3 With a qualification respecting assets held in trust, to be noted later.
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At first blush this seems to be only a distinction in words. If
the grantee cannot convey his interest, the property itself would
appear to be inalienable. But this is not necessarily-indeed, is
very seldom-true. The reason is a direct restraint does not
suspend the power of alienation if it can be released by persons
in being. In Kentucky all direct restraints, in whatever form they
are cast, carry with them forfeiture provisions. If there is an
express provision for forfeiture this will be given effect. If there
is not one, the transferor or his heirs have a right of entry as a
matter of law. If the person who holds the right to enforce for-
feiture is ascertained, he may release his interest and a fee may
be conveyed. In such case there is no suspension of the power
of alienation. Perhaps this can best be seen by way of illustrations.
Case 1 (Disabling restraint). T devises land in fee "to A,
provided however, A cannot sell the land for 20 years."
As a matter of law T's heir, H, has a right of entry for con-
dition broken.4 A and H may join together at any time
and convey the fee. Hence there is no suspension of the
power of alienation.
Case 2 (Forfeiture restraint). T devises land in fee "to
A, but if A sells the land within 20 years, to B." A and B
can convey the fee at any time, and the power of alienation
is not suspended.
Case 3 (Forfeiture restraint). T devises land in fee "to
A, but if A sells the land within 20 years, to A's issue per
stirpes living at the time of sale." The power of alienation
is suspended since the persons holding the executory interest
over (As issue living at time of sale) cannot be ascertained
until a sale is made.5 Obviously the suspension is merely
technical, however, if A has issue living, for a purchaser
could acquire a fee from A and his present issue at any
time. Nonetheless, only in a case such as this does a direct
restraint on a legal interest even technically suspend the
power of alienation in Kentucky.
The above illustrations all deal with legal interests. Are they
equally applicable to equitable interests? With respect to a trust,
if the trustee has power to sell the trust assets the power of
alienation of the specific property is not suspended. Nonetheless,
4 Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 246 (1916).
See cases cited note 33 infra.
5 Duncan v. Webster County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.W. 489 (1924).
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in those states which have statutory rules against suspension of
the power of alienation courts have held that a quantum of
assets is made inalienable by the creation of an indestructible
trust.6 This is perhaps an illogical extension of the suspension
rule, but it is justified by policy. The trustee cannot really invest
the assets as freely as if he owned them absolutely, and he cannot
use them to purchase consumers' goods or other forms of wealth.
It is still the dead hand controlling property, albeit the control
relates to a quantum of wealth rather than to specific property.
Therefore whether a trust suspends the power of alienation
depends not upon the trustee's power to sell the trust assets but
upon the restraints put upon the equitable interests and upon
the ability of the beneficiaries to terminate the trust. If no
restraints are put on such interests, 7 and all interests are held
by persons sui juris who may terminate the trust, the power of
alienation is not suspended. If the trust cannot be terminated
because of a restraint on alienation, then such restraint has caused
the power to be suspended. (It is pertinent to note here, however,
that no restraint for more than a life in being and 21 years is
valid in Kentucky. It is "unreasonable" and void. Therefore no
valid restraint on alienation in Kentucky can suspend the power
of alienation too long.)
Failure to distinguish the rule against direct restraints from
the rule against suspension of the power of alienation can only
lead into a thicket of words prickly with ambiguity. The court
has many times been caught in that thicket. The recent case of
Robertson v. Simmons8 will suffice as an example. In that case
there was an agreement between Robertson and Stilley providing
that if either became the successful bidder at an auction of a
certain tract of land, he would sell to the other party a set portion
6 Grand Rapids Tr. Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 231, 190 N.W. 250 (1922);
Allen v. Allen, 149 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E. 626 (1896); Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal.
457 (1881). Cf. Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 685, 186 S.W. 2d 896, 898 (1944):
"Technical alienability or the power of a trustee to sell and convey the particular
property for investment is not enough to escape the statute, for the proceeds
wear the same fetters of restraint." See pp. 31-33 supra.
7 See Newsom v. Barnes, 282 Ky. 264, 138 S.W. 2d 475 (1940), holding
equitable interests alienable unless expressly restrained.
8322 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1959). Other cases where the rules have been
confused include Fox v. Burgher, 285 Ky. 470, 148 S.W. 2d 342 (1941); Hite v.
Barber, 284 Ky. 718, 145 S.W. 2d 1058 (1940); West v. Ashby, 217 Ky. 250,
289 S.W. 228 (1926); Perry v. Metcalf, 216 Ky. 775, 288 S.W. 694 (1926);
Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 140 Ky. 608, 131 S.W. 491 (1910); Robsion v. Cray,
29 Ky. L.R. 1296, 97 S.W. 347 (1906).
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of it at a fixed percentage of the purchase price. In other words,
the agreement granted an option to the unsuccessful bidder.
Stilley bid in the property at the sale and soon thereafter died.
Seven years after the sale Robertson attempted to exercise the
option. Stilley's heirs refused to sell, claiming the option was
void. The option was construed as unlimited in time, and thus
the question was raised whether the option violated the Rule
against Perpetuities, the statutory rule against suspension of the
power of alienation or the rule against unreasonable direct re-
straints. It is clear that the option does not violate the rule against
suspension, for-Robertson and Stilley being able to convey an
absolute fee to a purchaser-the power of alienation is not sus-
pended at any time. It is equally clear that the option, if un-
limited as to time as the court held it was, created an equitable
future interest in Robertson which violated the Rule against Per-
petuities. It was unnecessary to deal with the rule against direct
restraints at all. That rule could apply only if it was decided the
option was in substance, though not in form, a direct restraint.
The court reached the decision that the option was void be-
cause it was "an unreasonable suspension of the power of aliena-
tion." It seemed to treat the rule against suspension of the power
of alienation and the rule against direct restraints as one and the
same, and it ignored the fact that the Rule against Perpetuities as
previously applied in Kentucky as well as in other jurisdictions
would invalidate the option. After reviewing the "unfortunate
confusion" in perpetuities law, largely caused by "the troublesome
statute", the court came to some strange conclusions. It noted
that KRS 881.220, while phrased as a rule prohibiting suspension
of the power of alienation, had been held by the court in many
cases to prohibit the remote vesting of interests. This view of the
statute, said the court,
perhaps caused us to indulge in the defective logic [in the
option cases], 9 while reaching a desirable conclusion. If
the court had based its decision on the theory that the
option created an unreasonable suspension of the power to
alienate, regardless of whether the estate was vested, it
would have had ample authority for its position [quaere].
S. . Perhaps the cases, which so carefully pointed out that
9 See cases cited p. 49, notes 125 and 128, supra. The cases were correctly
decided under the Rule against Perpetuities.
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KRS 381.220 had no bearing on direct restraints of vested
estates, may be disposed of or at least reconciled by the
acceptance and the recognition that the common law rule
against suspension of the power of alienation has existed in
the common law of this state regardless of the troublesome
statute.10
This choice of language was unfortunate, for it is apparent upon
close analysis that the court was not referring to the "common
law rule against suspension of the power of alienation" at all, but
to the rule against restraints on alienation. The case, carefully
examined, holds that an option, whether unlimited in time or
limited to the lifetime of the optionee, is an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. Why an option should be treated as a direct re-
straint on alienation (the heart of the matter under the court's
analysis) is not discussed.
The 1960 Perpetuities Act repealed the statute prohibiting
suspension of the power of alienation. It is hoped that this action
will rid the law of all the obfuscation of the rule against direct
restraints it has caused. The court will be able to base its decision
either on the Rule against Perpetuities or on the rule against
unreasonable direct restraints on alienation, which are easily dif-
ferentiated one from the other. The new act has no effect upon
the rule against restraints, except in the very minor way noted in
section 4 below.
2. REsTRAiNTs ON LEGAL LIFE ESTATES AND REMAINDERS
Direct restraints on alienation of legal interests may be broken
down into (a) restraints on a life estate and on a remainder and
(b) restraints on a possessory fee. The former types of restraints
are much easier to justify and will be dealt with first.
It is settled in Kentucky that a restraint prohibiting voluntary
alienation of a legal life estate for the entire duration of the estate
is valid." A fortiori a restraint on a life estate for a lesser period
10322 S.W. 2d at 481, 483 (1959). The case is criticized by Professor
Sparks in "Future Interests," 1959 Ann. Survey of Am. Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
401, 412 (1960).
11 Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945); Anderson v. Simpson,
214 Ky. 375, 283 S.W. 941 (1926); Robsion v. Gray, 29 Ky. L.R. 1296, 97 S.W.
347 (1906); Morton's Guardian v. Morton, 120 Ky. 251, 85 S.W. 1188 (1905);
cf. Howell v. Weisemuller, 299 S.W. 2d 118 (Ky. 1957). But see West v. Ashby,
217 Ky. 250, 289 S.W. 228 (1926), holding restraint on life estate of a person
not in being void.
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or permitting alienation only to a small number of persons is valid.
This rule is based on sound policy. The purpose of a restraint
upon a life estate is usually to protect the life tenant with an
assured means of support or to preserve the property for the
remainderman. The restraint may add materially to the remain-
derman's protection against waste, since it prevents the life tenant
from substituting an irresponsible person in possession. These
purposes are entirely legitimate and may require a restraint for
the whole life of the life tenant for their accomplishment. Hence
both the purposes of the restraint and the time necessary for
fulfillment are reasonable.
A restraint on a remainder for the duration of the life estate
does not add substantially to the practical inalienability which
results from the creation of such interests. There are few buyers
for a life estate or a remainder separately. The property cannot
be sold without joinder of the life tenant and the remainderman,
whose cooperation may be difficult to obtain. Because the re-
straint adds little practical inalienability, the Kentucky court has
in several cases upheld a restraint forbidding transfer of a vested
remainder during the life tenant's life.'2 In the relatively recent
case of Gray v. Gray,'3 however, the court cast doubt on these
cases. It struck down a restraint on contingent remainders in fee
measured by the lives of the life tenants. The life estates were
also restrained, which restraints were upheld. The rationalization
of this holding is not easy to come by inasmuch as the remainders
were contingent upon the remaindermen surviving the life ten-
ants. Such a remainder following an inalienable life estate is
surely not marketable; the restraint adds little inalienability to
what already exists. More perplexing is why the court would
strike down the restraint on a contingent remainder and uphold
a restraint on an indefeasibly vested remainder, which is the type
of remainder involved in the prior cases. Under the common law
exactly the contrary conclusions would probably be reached. 4
On this point the Gray case appears unsound.
While restraining transfer of the remainder during the period
12 Hale v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 206 Ky. 629, 268 S.W. 304 (1925); Polley v.
Adldns, 145 Ky. 370, 140 S.W. 551 (1911); Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 130
S.W. 812 (1910); Lawson v. Lightfoot, 27 Ky. L.R. 217, 84 S.W. 739 (1905).
13 Note 11 supra. Cf. Dills v. Deavors, 266 S.W. 2d 788 (Ky. 1953).
14 See 6 Am. L. Prop. § 26.54.
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it remains non-possessory may be reasonable, restraining it for a
period after it becomes possessory is a horse of another color.
The restraint then becomes a restraint on a fee in possession. The
court has held restraints on remainders that continue beyond the
time of possession are valid if they would be valid imposed on
a possessory fee.15 The rules respecting restraints on fees, dis-
cussed below, control.
3. RESTRAINTS ON A LEGAL FEE IN POSSESSION: THE DOCTaNE
OF REASONABLE RESTRAINTS
Contrary to the common law Kentucky has long permitted
reasonable restraints on a fee. 6 From more than six dozen cases
stretching over a century the court has developed what is known
as the Kentucky doctrine of reasonable restraints. Yet the court
has never, in all these cases, laid down any general test of
reasonableness; nor has it articulated any policy rationalization
for its doctrine. The analysis below attempts to fill these gaps
by providing an operational definition of reasonableness and a
policy base. It must be admitted, however, that supplying policy
rationalizations where the court has given none is like playing
Sancho Panza to the court's Don Quixote. And they should be
read with that in mind.
Importance of purpose. The cases indicate the court has been
primarily concerned with the duration of the restraint, but it is
believed this is not the sole test of reasonableness. The duration
of the restraint should be related to a reasonable purpose as well.
Restraints on life estates and leasehold interests were allowed at
common law because they served a reasonable purpose. It was
important for the remainderman or reversioner to have a responsi-
ble tenant in possession. If society's interest in the free alien-
ability of property is to give way to a grantor's desire to project
his control beyond the time of transfer, the grantor's purpose
15 Restraint on remainder for 15 years after death of life tenant is valid:
Speckman v. Meyer, 187 Ky. 687, 220 S.W. 529 (1920). Restraint for the
remainderman's whole life is void: Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268, 250 S.W.
963 (1923); Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922); Robsion v.
-Gray, note 11 supra; West v. Ashby, note 11 supra.




must be one that will benefit either himself during his life or the
grantee during a reasonable period of time. If the restraint is
capricious or merely to perpetuate the testator's memory, or if
it cannot possibly benefit the transferees, there is no reason for
society's interest in alienability to give way. Just as purpose was
important to the limited common law relaxation of the rule
against restraints, so it should be equally important to the more
extensive relaxation permitted in Kentucky.
In the first case allowing a restraint on a fee (until the devisee
reached the age of 35), the court carefully pointed out that the
restraint served a reasonable purpose. Said the court:
The land is on a turnpike near the growing city of Louis-
ville; and we presume that the principal motive for the
restriction was that the value would increase rapidly....
[T]he locality of the land and circumstances of this case
indicate [the testatrix's] prophetic wisdom in securing
from waste as safe and growing an investment as probably
could be made for her young daughter.17
The importance of reasonable purpose is also reflected in a few
later cases,18 but on the whole it has not been discussed. This
can be explained either on the ground that reasonableness of
purpose is unimportant or on the ground that such discussion is
unnecessary on the facts of the case. The first explanation ignores
the sound basis of the original judicial relaxation of the common
law-appraisal of purpose. The second seems more realistic.
Restraints upheld by the court have fallen into four fact patterns;
restraints limited to 21 years or less, to a specified age, to the
grantor's life, and to the life tenant's life. The purpose served by
restraints so limited are, as will be seen below, much the same.
Once it is established that a particular duration is reasonably
related to a legitimate purpose, it is usually unnecessary to discuss
the purpose of a restraint similarly limited. Thus, although the
court has set outside limits beyond which no restraint for any
purpose will be allowed, it does not necessarily follow that a
restraint within those limits would be valid. It still must be a
17 Stewart v. Brady, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 628, 625 (1868).
1SCooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W. 1084 (1926); Frazier v.




reasonable restraint under the particular circumstances of the
particular case.19
The importance of duration. The court has frequently stressed
the importance of duration in determining the validity of a
restraint. The following rules (a) through (h) state the permis-
sible duration of restraints, based on case holdings.
(a) An absolute restraint on the fee unlimited in duration is
unreasonable and void.20 The ordinary purpose of an unlimited
restraint is, like a fee tail, to keep the property in the family
perpetually. Courts early invented means of docking the entail,
principally by the fictitious lawsuit known as the common re-
covery. They subsequently dealt with unlimited restraints in a
simpler manner-invalidating the restraint ab initio.
(b) A partial restraint on the fee permitting alienation only
to members of a small group is void if unlimited in duration.2'
The effect of a restraint narrowly qualified as to alienees is sub-
stantially the same as an absolute restraint or as an unlimited
pre-emptive option at less-than-market price. The property is not
likely to be sold. The dynastic purpose of a perpetual absolute
restraint is usually also present in a restraint of this type.
(c) An absolute restraint on the fee measured by a period of
years more than 21 is unreasonable and void.22 The opinions
indicate the court was influenced by the perpetuities statute in
striking down restraints for more than 21 years, but the per-
petuity period is not the criterion of validity. That is made clear
by the invalidation of restraints limited to the life of the grantee,
a person in being. The 21 year period of the Rule was, however,
' 9 Chappell v. Frick Co., 166 Ky. 311, 314, 179 S.W. 203, 204 (1915):
"There has been no general rule laid down . .. by which it may be determined
what restraints are reasonable and which ones are unreasonable, and each par-
ticular case must be considered upon the particular circumstances of it."2 0 Winn v. Williams, 292 Ky. 44, 165 S.W. 2d 961 (1942); Robsion v. Gray,
29 Ky. L.R. 1296, 97 S.W. 347 (1906); Ernst v. Shinkle, 95 Ky. 608, 26 S.W.
813 (1894); Henning v. Harrison, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 723 (1878). Cf. Saffold v.
Wright, 228 Ky. 594, 15 S.W. 2d 456 (1929), voiding provision that bank stock
"shall not be sold or converted into money as long as said banks do business."
21 Courts v. Courts' Guardian, 230 Ky. 141, 18 S.W. 2d 957 (1929), not to
be sold "out of the name Courts". Cf. Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160
S.W. 2d 654 (1942).
22 Fox v. Burgher, 285 Ky. 470, 148 S.W. 2d 342 (1941), 50 years; Hite
v. Barber, 284 Ky. 718, 145 S.W. 2d 1058 (1940), 60 years; Perry v. Metcalf,
216 Ky. 755, 288 S.W. 694 (1926), 30 years; Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 140 Ky.
608, 131 S.W. 491 (1910), 54 years.
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a handy analogy by which to set a maximum limit on restraints
measured by years.
(d) An absolute restraint on the fee measured by a period of
years less than 21 is valid.23 Restraints limited for less than 21
years usually have the purpose of protecting the grantee from
improvidence until he reaches a more mature age, or of keeping
the family funds invested in property which the transferor regards
as a good "short-term" investment. They may also be used, where
alienation is allowed within the period with the grantor's consent,
to protect a subdivider against undesirable persons buying in the
subdivision prior to the sale of all the lots and recoupment of his
investment. These are legitimate objectives and 21 years is in
most cases more than adequate for their accomplishment.
(e) An absolute restraint on the fee until the grantee reaches
early middle age is valid.24 The purpose of imposing a restraint
of this type on a grantee is to protect him from indiscretion until
he reaches maturity. The cases might be explained on the ground
that the age specified would in fact be reached within 21 years
after transfer, and thus the restraint was measurable by a period
of years less than 21. The opinions do not state how old the
respective grantees were at time of transfer, however, so such
an explanation cannot be verified. It is believed the best explana-
tion is that the purpose was legitimate and the time of duration
reasonable.
(f) An absolute restraint on the fee measured by the life of
the grantor is valid.25 A person may wish to convey property to
his children inter vivos, retaining a veto power over sale. This is
the effect of a provision forbidding transfer during the grantor's
life, for the grantor can release the restraint and join with the
grantee in conveying the fee. Such a restraint may protect the
23 Auxier's Ex'x v. Theobald, 255 Ky. 583, 75 S.W. 2d 39 (1934), 5 years;
Johnson v. Dumeyer, 23 Ky. L.R. 2243, 66 S.W. 1025 (1902), 20 years. Cf. cases
cited note 31 infra.24 Howard's Adm'x v. Asher Coal Co., 215 Ky. 88, 284 S.W. 419 (1926),
age 21; Smith v. Isaacs, 25 Ky. L.R. 1727, 78 S.W. 434 (1904), age 35; Wallace
v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263 68 S.W. 131 (1902), age 35; Stewart v. Barrow, 70 Ky.
(7 Bush) 368 (1870), age 35; Stewart v. Brady, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 623 (1868),
age 35.
2r5 Hutchinson v. Loomis, 244 S.W. 2d 751 (Ky. 1951); Turner v. Lewis, 189
Ky. 8:37, 226 S.W. 367 (1920); Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836,




grantor if there is a charge for support on the transferred prop-
erty.26 The court has held restraints for the grantor's lifetime
reasonable.
(g) An absolute restraint on the fee measured by the life of
the grantee is unreasonable and void. The grantee may be
restrained from alienating the property for 21 years, until he
reaches middle-age, or during the life of the grantor, but he
cannot be expressly restrained for his whole life. It is difficult to
find any wholly satisfactory reasons for this rule in the cases. In
several cases the court has said such a restraint is repugnant to the
fee, but of course that explanation will not stand close inspection,
as Professors Gray and Schnebly long ago pointed out.28 Alien-
ability is not an inseparable incident of the fee. In upholding
restraints for a period shorter than the grantee's whole life the
court has necessarily conceded this. In two cases the court has
said to give effect to the restraint would turn the fee into a life
estate, which is simply a variation of the repugnancy argument.
No other reasons have been advanced in the cases.
The crux of the difficulty is this. Since the law does not forbid
an inalienable life estate, why should it forbid a fee inalienable for
life? If it is reasonable to restrain a life estate, why isn't it
reasonable to restrain a fee for the same period? Three reasons
for distinguishing between these two interests suggest themselves.
First, by creating a life estate and remainder the grantor makes
the interests inalienable in a practical way during the life tenant's
life. The life estate is not readily marketable by itself, and the
life tenant and remainderman are not likely to agree upon a
valuation of their respective interests. Unless both parties join,
the property cannot be sold. Hence the restraint on the life
estate does not cause much more practical inalienability of the
life estate or of the property than would be the case without it.
With respect to an absolute fee, which is readily marketable, the
restraint adds inalienability where none existed before. This
2 6 Hutchinson v. Loomis, note 25 supra; Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Runyon,
note 25 supra; Hale v. Elkhorn Coal Co., note 12 supra; Polley v. Adkins, note
12 supra; Frazier v. Combs, note 18 supra.2 7 Winn v. William, 292 Ky. 44, 165 S.W. 2d 961 (1942); Lindsay v. Wil-
liams, 279 Ky. 749, 132 S.W. 2d 65 (1939); Cammack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268, 250
S.W. 963 (1923); Brock v. Conkwright, 179 Ky. 555, 200 S.W. 962 (1918); Crop-
per v. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, 150 S.W. 380 (1912); Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767,
117 S.W. 264 (1909).
28 Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed. 1895) § 21; 6 Am. L. Prop. § 26.19.
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rationalization may explain Holes Executor v. Deshon,29 though it
was not referred to therein. In that case testator devised land to
two sisters in fee, defeasible upon death without issue, with a
restraint on alienation for their lives. (Neither sister at that time
had children, but being married and age 28 and 38 respectively
it was possible for them to have them.)30 The gift over in default
of issue made the fee as inalienable as it would be were they given
life estates, and the restraint added little practical inalienability.
The court-giving no reason except the sisters did not hold an
absolute fee-held the restraint valid. Under the analysis here
suggested, treating a fee defeasible upon death without issue like
a life estate is proper where under the facts the restraint does not
add much inalienability.
Secondly, a restraint on a life estate has another purpose in
addition to protecting the life tenant. It protects the remainder-
man by keeping a responsible person in possession. This purpose
cannot be carried out unless the restraint is for the whole duration
of the life estate. When the grantee is given the absolute fee,
however, there is no purpose to protect against waste whoever
may take the property at the grantee's death. The grantee can
waste the property if he sees fit, as there is no one else who has
an interest to be protected. Hence, the protection of the re-
mainderman is an additional reason for upholding a restraint on a
life estate which cannot be given for upholding a restraint on an
absolute fee.
Lastly, it is arguable that the type of persons whom the law
would favor protecting are the persons to whom a testator would
commonly give only a life estate if he desired to protect them.
Seldom would he give a fee to persons who are under some
practical disability. In all the cases in Kentucky dealing with
restraints on a fee limited for the life of the transferee, the
restraint has been imposed by a testator devising his property to
his issue. There is nothing to indicate the devisees were not (at
least in the court's eyes) perfectly competent to deal with the
property. The court has not been convinced that they needed
protection, and it is arguable that this is substantiated by the very
act of giving them a fee rather than a life estate.
29 126 Ky. 810, 103 S.W. 281 (1907); but cf. Cammack v. Allen, note 27
supra, voiding restraint on defeasible fee for devisees whole life.
30 Holt's Ex'r v. Deshon, record on appeal, p. 26; appellant's brief, p. 7.
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These reasons are not, of course, wholly satisfactory justifica-
tions for the rule forbidding restraints on a fee for the life of the
grantee. Contrary arguments may be made that the rule cannot
be sustained logically if restraints on life estates are permitted,
and that the rule is easily evaded by a skilled draftsman and thus
is of little social utility. The doctrine of reasonable restraints does
not purport to be logical, however. The test of reasonableness is
essentially pragmatic, and the limits drawn under it must be
appraised pragmatically. If it is easily evaded by a skilled drafts-
man, it at least has the virtue of forcing grantors to seek the
advice of lawyers who usually realize the importance of keeping
the property marketable and may advise a trust or a life estate
with power of sale.
(h) A partial restraint on the fee permitting alienation only
to members of a small group is valid if limited in duration to a
period which would be valid for an absolute restraint.31 If a
restraint forbidding alienation to anyone within a certain period
is reasonable, a fortiori a less restrictive restraint for the same
period-allowing alienation within a small group-is good. If the
partial restraint is for a longer period than an absolute restraint
is allowed, it should be void. Limiting alienation within a small
class is only slightly less objectionable than an absolute restraint.
The difference is too insubstantial to treat them differently.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF VIoLATING A VALID RESTRAINT
In many jurisdictions a distinction is drawn between a disabling
restraint and a forfeiture restraint. A disabling restraint simply
withholds the power to sell from the transferee. A forfeiture
restraint provides for forfeiture of the interest upon alienation;
there is a gift over upon alienation to a third party or a right of
entry retained in the transferor or his heirs. Disabling restraints
are more objectionable than forfeiture restraints, because there
is no possible way they can be released. If enforced as such, the
31 Restraint for 20 years limiting alienation to issue of grantor or grantee, held
valid: Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W. 1084 (1926); Price v. Virginia
Iron Co., 171 Ky. 523, 188 S.W. 658 (1916); Francis v. Big Sandy Co., 171 Ky.
209, 188 S.W. 345 (1916). Restraint for grantee's life limiting alienation to
grantor's issue, held void: Hutchison v. Loomis, 244 S.W. 2d 751 (Ky. 1951);
Carpenter v. Allen, 198 Ky. 252, 248 S.W. 523 (1928); Chappell v. Frick Co.,
166 Ky. 311, 179 S.W. 203 (1915); Chappell v. Chappell, 119 S.W. 218 (1909);
cf. Dills v. Deavors, 266 S.W. 2d 788 (Ky. 1953).
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property cannot be transferred during the period of restraint.
A forfeiture restraint, on the contrary, can be released and a fee
title can be conveyed during the period of restraint if the persons
who have the right to enforce forfeiture join in the conveyance.
In Kentucky all restraints against voluntary alienation, what-
ever the form, are treated as forfeiture restraints. If there is no
express provision for forfeiture in the instrument, the law implies
one and creates a right of entry in the transferor or his heirs. This
was early established in Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen32 and
has been adhered to since. 3 It is a sound position. It obviates the
difficulty of classifying ambiguous language as disabling or for-
feiture. More important, by allowing the restraint to be released,
it makes it possible for the property to be sold.3 4 Construing all
restraints as forfeiture restraints renders the doctrine of reasonable
restraints less objectionable than it would otherwise be.
Where a person transfers his interest in property in violation
of a valid restraint, the transfer is not void. It is only voidable
within the period of the restraint by the person entitled to enforce
forfeiture (either the transferor or his heirs,35 holding a right
of entry, or a third person designated in the instrument). If such
person acts within a reasonable time after breach and within
the period, he is entitled to the interest forfeited. 0 But he is
barred from enforcing forfeiture after the period of restraint has
run. 3 7
The 1960 Perpetuities Act may have some small effect upon
the time within which a forfeiture can be claimed. KRS 881.219
terminates rights of entry if the contingency upon which they are
32 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 246 (1916), overruling Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky.
77, 130 S.W. 812 (1910), and Pond Creek Coal Co. v. Runyon, 161 Ky. 64, 170
S.W. 501 (1914).33 Jrice v. Virginia Iron Co., 171 Ky. 523, 188 S.W. 658 (1916); Francis v.
Big Sandy Co., 171 Ky. 209, 188 S.W. 345 (1916); Hale v. Elkhom Coal Corp.,
206 Ky. 629, 268 S.W. 304 (1925); Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W.
1084 (1926); Howard's Adm'x v. Asher Coal Co., 215 Ky. 88, 284 S.W. 419
(1926); Auxier's Exx v. Theobald, 255 Ky. 583, 75 S.W. 2d 39 (1934).
34See Francis v. Big Sandy Co., note 33 supra.
35 On who can enforce restraint when restrained devisees are testator's heirs,
see Cooper v. Knuckles, note 33 supra; Auxier's Ex'x v. Theobald, note 33 supra.
30 Cases cited note 35 supra; Turner v. Lewis, 189 Ky. 837, 226 S.W. 367
(1920); Hale v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., note 33 supra (16 years after breach
unreasonable); Kenner v. American Contract Co., 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 202 (1872)
(3 years after breach unreasonable.)37 Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, note 32 supra; Price v. Virginia Iron
Co., note 33 supra; Francis v. Big Sandy Co., note 33 supra; Howard's Adm'x v.
Asber Coal Co., note 33 supra.
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limited does not happen within thirty years from date of creation.
This is applicable to rights of entry created or retained to enforce
restraints on alienation. Where the restraint is measured by a
period of years this section can have no application, since a
restraint for more than 21 years is void ab initio. Where, however,
the restraint is measured by the grantor's life, or by the grantee's
life, or is for some other reasonable period, KRS 381.219 will
apply if the period of restraint does in fact run beyond 30 years.
The right of entry will then be terminated. This section does not,
of course, have any effect upon the question of what restraints
are valid. That remains to be determined under the reasonable
restraints test. The section comes into play only after it has been
decided the restraint is reasonable, and then only after the
restraint has in fact run for more than 30 years.
5. BEsTRAmNs UPON EQUITABLE INTERESTS
Any restraint on alienation valid as to a legal interest is valid
as to its equitable counterpart. Restraints on equitable life
estates,38 and on equitable fees until the grantee reached a certain
age,39 have been upheld. Moreover, the court has upheld re-
straints on equitable fees for the entire life of the grantee,40
something it has declined to do with respect to legal interests.
This is justifiable on the ground that an equitable fee is less
alienable as a practical matter than a legal fee, where the trust
cannot be terminated and the trustee continues to keep control
of the property. The restraint adds little additional inalienability.
6. RESTRAmTS ON INVOLUNTARY ALmNATION; ClIDrrors' RIGHTs
The preceding discussion has been concerned with restraints
against voluntary alienation, which are valid if reasonable and
which are not distinguished by form. Restraints against voluntary
alienation have the purpose of preventing a voluntary transfer
(sale, gift or mortgage) by the transferee. Restraints against
38 Maher v. Maher, 207 Ky. 360, 269 S.W. (1924); cf. Lane v. Taylor, 287
Ky. 116, 152 S.W. 2d 271 (1941); Louisville v. Cooke, 135 Ky. 261, 122 S.W.
144 (1909).39 So. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ford's Adm'r, 151 Ky. 476, 152 S.W. 243 (1913),
age 25; Kean v. Kean, 13 Ky. L.R. 956, 18 S.W. 1032 (1892), age 28.40 Muir's Ex'rs v. Howard, 178 Ky. 51, 19 S.W. 551 (1917); Bull v. Ky. Nat'l
Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 14 S.W. 425 (1890).
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involuntary alienation have another purpose. They are designed
to prevent a sale under court order to satisfy a debt or judgment.
They are restraints against creditors reaching the interest of the
transferee.
Although Kentucky law is liberal in upholding restraints
against voluntary alienation, it is more strict than the law of other
jurisdictions in validating restraints against creditors. In Ken-
tucky all restraints against voluntary alienation and a disabling
restraint against involuntary alienation are void against creditors.
A spendthrift trust which would prevent creditors from reaching
a debtor's interest is not recognized, This result may be required
by some rather ambiguous statutes, 41 but whatever the meaning
of the statutes the cases are quite clear in holding that restraints
are void against creditors.4
There are two exceptions to the rule allowing creditors to
reach inalienable interests. The first is that an express forfeiture
restraint against involuntary alienation will be given effect. If
the transferor provides that the transferee's interest shall cease
and be forfeited if creditors attach, the interest will cease and
the gift over will take effect upon attachment.4 3 The creditors
are left out in the cold, with nothing to wann them but the doubt-
ful satisfaction of punishing the debtor. The rationalization for
this result is that as soon as the creditors take legal action against
the debtor, his interest ceases under the dispositive instrument
and there is nothing thereafter for them to reach.
The same rationalization underlies the second exception-the
discretionary trust. If the trustee has discretion to pay the bene-
ficiary, the court has held creditors cannot reach the beneficial
interest and have no claim against the trustee if he disregards
their lien and subsequently pays something to the beneficiary
41 KRS 381.180; KRS 426.190.4 2 Anderson v. Blackburn, 297 S.W. 2d 919 (Ky. 1956); Meade v. Rowe's
Ex'r, 298 Ky. 111, 182 S.W. 2d 30 (1944); Awuder's Exx v. Theobald, 255 Ky.
583, 75 S.W. 2d 39 (1934); Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S.W. 2d 859 (1929);
Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S.W. 213 (1916); Smith v. Smith, 115 Ky.
329, 73 S.W. 1028 (1903); Marshalls Trustee v. Rash, 87 Ky. 116 (1888).
43 Lane v. Taylor, 287 Ky. 116, 152 S.W. 2d 271 (1941); Scott v. Ratliff,
179 Ky. 267, 200 S.W. 462 (1918); Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 98 S.W. 1037
(1907); Bull v. Ky. Nat'l Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 14 S.W. 425 (1890). But cf. Louis-
ville v. Cooke, 135 Ky. 261, 122 S.W. 144 (1909), enforcing tax lien against life
estate in spite of forfeiture restraint against involuntary alienation; Bland's Ad r
v. Bland, 90 Ky. 400, 14 S.W. 423 (1890), enforcing creditors' rights because
debtor did not forfeit his entire interest in the property.
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directly.4" The reason is that the beneficiary has no interest
capable of assignment until the trustee actually exercises his
discretion and pays something over to the beneficiary. If, how-
ever, the beneficiary has an interest that equity will enforce,
such as in a trust for his support, this exception does not apply
and the creditors may reach the equitable interest.45
The reasoning of the court that the beneficiary has no interest
in a discretionary trust is not wholly convincing, either on tech-
nical or policy grounds. Technically, the beneficiary's interest
could be treated as an interest contingent upon exercise of
discretion by a trustee. Barring a restraint, it would be assignable
and the assignee would take whatever funds the trustee decides
to pay out. It is possible, even probable in many cases, that the
trustee would not choose to pay out any funds if the interest were
assigned or attached, but the original beneficiary is prevented
from receiving anything. In truth, however, to put the decision
on the ground that the beneficiary has or has not an "interest"
begs the question. For it is just another way of asking whether
as a matter of public policy a creditor should be allowed to cut
the debtor off from the fruits Of the trust even though the creditor
himself will not receive them. Precisely the same question
underlies the enforcement of a forfeiture provision upon involun-
tary alienation. Since the law allows a creditor to penalize a
debtor, while not profiting himself, in case of a forfeiture
provision, the same policy should allow a creditor to penalize a
debtor in case of a discretionary trust. He should not be able to
reach the trust fund, but he should be able to require that if the
trustee decides to pay anything out he should pay the creditor
before he pays the beneficiary. This is the position of the Restate-
ment of Trusts.4" Nonetheless, the Kentucky cases hold that the
trustee of a discretionary trust may continue to support the in-
solvent beneficiary with immunity from creditors.
44 Calloway v. Smith, 300 Ky. 55, 186 S.W. 2d 642 (1945); Todd's Ex'rs v.
Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86 S.W. 2d 168 (1935); Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co.
v. Thompson, 172 Ky. 350, 189 S.W. 245 (1916); Davidson's Exrs v. Kemper,
79 Ky. 5 (1880).45 Department of Public Welfare v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 95 S.W. 2d 599
(1936); Ratliffs Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 139 Ky. 533, 101 S.W. 978 (1907);
Cecil' Trustee v. Robertson, 32 Ky. L.R. 357, 105 S.W. 926 (1907); cf. Huffman
v. Chasteen, 307 Ky. 1, 209 S.W. 2d 705 (1948). But see Hackett v. Hackett,
146 Ky. 408, 142 S.W. 673 (1912).
46 Restatement of Trusts 2d § 155(2). Professor Scott concurs. See 2 Scott,
Trusts (2d ed. 1956) § 155.1.
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7. SALE FOr REIwVESTMENT UNDER COURT ORDER
A direction to a trustee not to sell certain property going into
the corpus of a trust is a restraint upon the legal, not the equitable,
title. Such a direction is valid even though the trustee is directed
to hold it for the entire duration of the trust. However, upon
proof of circumstances arising which would defeat the purpose
of the trust not contemplated by the settlor, a court may order
the property sold and the proceeds reinvested even though sale
is expressly prohibited.47 The Kentucky court has been quite
liberal in approving sale of trust assets. Satisfactory proof of
change of circumstances frequently has consisted only of evidence
that a change in investments would benefit the beneficiaries. 48
(A sale for reinvestment must be distinguished from a sale for
distribution, which a court will not order if prohibited by the
instrument.)
The only real restriction on the court's wide discretion to
order sale is a statutory one. If the trustee is not prohibited from
selling the property, but on the contrary is expressly given a
power of sale, a court cannot order the property sold without the
trustee's consent.4 9 In sum, the settlor cannot prevent a court
from ordering a sale of trust assets unless he gives the power of
sale to the trustee. Some living person-either the trustee or the
chancellor-must have power to sell the property to protect the
beneficiaries of the trust.
May a court order sale and reinvestment of non-trust property
where sale is expressly prohibited? Prior to 1942, section 492 of
the Civil Code of Practice provided that no sale could be ordered
by a court for twenty years where forbidden by the deed or will.
After twenty years the court could order a sale where a change of
circumstances made a sale beneficial to the grantees or devisees.
The Court of Appeals, interpreting this statute narrowly, held the
47 Adams v. Security Trust Co., 802 Ky. 287, 194 S.W. 2d 521 (1946);
Kelly v. Marr, 299 Ky. 447, 185 S.W. 2d 945 (1945), noted 35 Ky. L.J. 147
(1947), approving the rule laid down in Restatement of Trusts § 167. See 2
Scott, Trusts §§ 167, 190.4. Cf. Security Trust Co. v. Mahoney, 307 Ky. 661, 212
S.W. 2d 115 (1948).48 See Adams v. Security Trust Co., note 47 supra; Kelly v. Mart, note 47
supra; Consolidated Realty Co. v. Norton's Trustees, 214 Ky. 586, 283 S.W. 969(1926). Cf. Gillespie v. Winston's Trustees, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S.W. 517 (1916);
Latta v. Louisville Trust Co., 198 Ky. 45, 247 S.W. 1103 (1923), interpreting
instrument as not prohibiting sale for reinvestment.
40 KRS § 889.045 (8).
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court's hand was stayed for twenty years only if sale by a court as
well as by the grantees or devisees was expressly forbidden by the
instrument. In several cases the court interpreted instruments
prohibiting sale by the grantee or devisee as not prohibiting a
court sale for reinvestment and approved the sale,50 while in
others it interpreted similar instruments as forbidding a sale by
the court as well as by the grantees.5' These cases are hard to
reconcile, but inasmuch as section 492 was repealed in 1942, it
is not necessary to attempt it. The purpose of repeal was to re-
move the twenty year stay of the court's hand and allow court sale
for reinvestment at any time even though it was expressly pro-
hibited in the instrument.52 In the recent case of Groger v.
Long,53 the testator expressly prohibited sale of non-trust property
by a court for reinvestment.54 The circuit court ordered sale on
the ground that it would prove advantageous to the beneficiaries.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It seems to be now settled that
no restraint on alienation (except possibly an express forfeiture
restraint on court sale with a gift over to a third party) can
prevent a court sale for reinvestment.
8. CETIQUE OF THE KNTucKY DocTrmE OF
REASONABLE RESTFANTs
The Kentucky doctrine permitting reasonable restraints on
legal absolute interests has never found favor with the com-
mentators or with courts in other jurisdictions. Does this mean it
is an undesirable doctrine? In the author's opinion, there is no
proof that it is. 5 Its rejection has largely been on theoretical
grounds. There is no evidence that any significant social evil
has resulted from it or that Kentucky has more unmarketable
property than, say, Tennessee or Massachusetts. While doubtless
a few pieces of property have been rendered less marketable, the
50 Gillespie v. Winston's Trustees, note 48 supra; Latta v. Louisville Trust
Co., note 48 supra; Sparrow v. Sparrow, 171 Ky. 101, 186 S.W. 904 (1916);
Rousseau v. Page's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 812, 150 S.W. 983 (1912). Cf. Vittitow v. Keene,
265 Ky. 66, 95 S.W. 2d 1083 (1936).
51Highfill v. Konnerman, 241 Ky. 282, 43 S.W. 2d 657 (1931); Chenault v.
Burgess, 29 Ky. L. R. 569, 93 S.W. 664 (1906); Mortons Guardian v. Morton,
120 Ky. 251, 85 S.W. 1188 (1905).
52 See Kelly v. Marr, 299 Ky. 447, 185 S.W. 2d 945 (1945).
53269 S.W. 2d 291 (Ky. 1954).
541d., Appellee's brief, p. 5.5 5 See Barnhard, "The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on
Alienation," 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1173 (1959), reaching the same conclusion.
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restraints have often served quite useful purposes. It must also
be remembered that the court has held every restraint can be
released by someone, almost every restraint can be overridden by
a court sale for reinvestment, and all restraints are void against
creditors except one providing for forfeiture upon attachment.
From society's viewpoint, the doctrine seems on balance rather
innocuous.
The most forceful criticism that can be directed at the doctrine
is its vague and uncertain nature. No case involving the validity
of a restraint can reasonably be regarded as closed until the Court
of Appeals has ruled upon it. There is probably no cure for this
except a rule voiding all restraints or a rule validating them for a
certain fixed period and voiding them thereafter. Whether that
cure would not be worse than the disease is questionable.
Although the test of reasonableness bred much litigation in
past years, the number of reported cases is definitely decreasing.
There were only six in the last decade, compared to nineteen in
the 1920's. This may be because inflated land values have made
restraints less desirable, or because the broad court sale statute
passed in 1942 makes even restrained land saleable, or because
of the increased use of trusts, or because cases are being settled
out of court or not appealed. Whatever the cause, it appears that
effective restraints on alienation are declining in number. Unless
that trend sharply reverses itself toleration of a few restraints is
not a significant social evil, and the present doctrine of reasonable
restraints may be regarded as satisfactory.
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APPENDIX
ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY PERPETUITIES CASES
Table I
CASES CONSISTENT WITH ORTHODOX FERPETUITES DOCTRINE IN RESULT
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 269 (1853)
Atty. Gen. v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 611 (1847)
Barren County Bd. of Ed. v. Jordan, 249 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1952)
Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W. 2d 943 (1950).
Beall v. Wilson, 146 Ky. 646, 143 S.W. 55 (1912)
Board of Natl Missions v. Harrel's Trustee, 286 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1956)
Bowling v. Grace, 219 Ky. 498, 293 S.W. 964 (1927)
Cambron v. Pottinger, 301 Ky. 768, 193 S.W. 2d 412 (1946)
Campbell v. Campbell, 813 Ky. 249, 230 S.W. 2d 918 (1950)
Carter's Trustee v. Gettys, 138 Ky. 842, 129 S.W. 30S (1910)
Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 693, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928)
Clay v. Anderson, 203 Ky. 384, 262 S.W. 604 (1924)
Commonwealth v. Pollitt, 25 Ky. L.R. 790, 76 S.W. 412 (1903)
County Bd. of Ed. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S.W. 465 (1917)
DeCharette v. DeCharette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S.W. 2d 1018, 104 A.L.R.
1455 (1936)
Egner v. Livingston County Bd. of Ed., 313 Ky. 168, 230 S.W. 2d 448
(1950)
Emler v. Emler's Trustee, 269 Ky. 27, 106 S.W. 2d 79 (1937)
Epperson v. Clintonville Cemetery Co., 303 Ky. 852, 199 S.W. 2d 628
(1947)
Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W. 2d 953 (1940)
Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936)
First Nat'l Bank v. Purcell, 244 S.W. 2d 458 (Ky. 1951)
Ford v. Yost, 300 Ky. 764, 190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945)
Gillespie v. Winston's Trustee, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S.W. 517 (1916)
Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440, 160 A.L.R. 633 (1945)
Goodloe's Trustee v. Goodloe, 292 Ky. 494, 166 S.W. 2d 836 (1942)
Haydon v. Layton, 128 S.W. 90 (Ky. 1910)
Johnson v. Pittsburgh Cons. Coal Co., 311 S.W. 2d 537 (Ky. 1958)
Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S.W. 739 (1909)
Kenner v. American Contract Co., 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 202 (1872)
Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. 2d 568, 162 A.L.R. 578 (1944),
noted 33 Ky. L.J. 118 (1945)
Miller v. Miller, 151 Ky. 563, 152 S.W. 542 (1913)
Mitchell v. Deegan, 301 Ky. 587, 192 S.W. 2d 715 (1946)
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Moore's Trustees v. Howe's Heirs, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 199 (1827)
Page v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 205 (1878)
Pullins v. Bd. of Ed. of Methodist Church, 25 Ky. L.R. 1715, 78 S.W.
457 (1904)
Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 377 (1924)
Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W. 2d 654 (1942)
Sorrell v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 314 S.W. 2d 193 (Ky. 1958)
Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1597)
Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v. Carman, 314 S.W. 2d 684 (Ky. 1958)
Vokins v. McGaughey, 206 Ky. 42, 266 S.W. 907 (1924)
Table 2
CASES HOLDING CONTRARY TO ORTHODOX PERPETuSiT DOCTINE*
Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1957)
Deed of land to W for life, remainder in fee to grandchildren of
grantor. Grantor had grandchildren living at date of deed (Rec-
ord, Exhibit A). Held: remainder to grandchildren void. Contra:
6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.25; Gray § 379; Simes & Smith, § 1270, example
5, also n. 69, 1959 pocket part. Orthodox view: class closing at
W's death saves gift.
Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901)
Devise in trust to pay income to W for life, then to T's children;
at end of 25 years to distribute corpus to T's children then living,
with the heirs of any deceased child taking his share. Held: entire
devise void. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.19, case 22a (1958
supp.); Carey & Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests § 480
(1941); 5 Powell 772; 4 Restatement of Property § 378; 1 Scott,
Trusts § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956); Simes & Smith § 1391; cf.
Gray §§ 410-410.5. Orthodox view: gifts of income vest im-
mediately; all interests in corpus will vest in interest with posses-
sion postponed at or before the death of T's children. Interests
not invalid because trust may last beyond perpetuity period.
Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958)
Devise in trust to pay income to A, B, and C (T's children) and
distribute to each one-third of his share of the corpus at age 40,
one-third at 45, one-third at 50. If any child dies before distribu-
tion, "his issue to take equally his share per stirpes" at time he
would have taken it had he lived. Held: entire trust void. Contra:
* In some of these cases the holdings could be made consistent with orthodox
doctrine if an unusual construction were given the dispositive language.
1960]
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6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.19; Carey & Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future
Interests § 480 (1941); 5 Powell 784, fns. 81, 92; 4 Restatement
of Property § 386, ill. 7, also § 389, ill. 2. Orthodox view: all gifts
will vest in interest with possession postponed within the period.
If gift to T's grandchildren void because subject to condition pre-
cedent of surviving, striking down gift to T's children is very harsh
application of infectious invalidity. Case criticized by Sparks,
35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 410 (1960).
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 857
(1924)
Devise in trust of $10 a month to invest and accumulate income
for each of T's grandchildren living at his death or born within
10 years thereafter. As each grandchild arrived at age 22, trustee
directed to pay him the amount invested and accumulated for his
benefit; "if one or more of my said grandchildren shall die before
attaining age 22, then" his share to be divided among the other
grandchildren who have not attained 22. Held: all gifts to grand-
children void. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.28, case 44; 5 Powell
784; 4 Restatement of Property § 385; Simes & Smith § 1266.
Per capita gift to living grandchildren will vest in possession, if at
all, within their own lives. Per capita gift to afterborn grand-
children should vest in interest on birth with possession postponed.
See authorities cited under Curtis v. Citizens Bank (p. 103
supra). See also authorities cited under Holoway v. Crumbaugh
(p. 105 infra).
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 25 Ky. L.R. 1827, 78 S.W. 896 (1904)
Devise in trust to pay income to T's children, with share of income
of any child dying to go to his children; at end of 40 years to
distribute corpus among "those who shall then be the heirs of my
body." Held: entire trust void. Under orthodox doctrine the gift
of corpus is void, but the gift of income to T's children and
grandchildren is valid. See authorities cited under Coleman v.
Coleman (p. 103 supra); cf. Gray §§ 410-410.5. There is no
reason to apply doctrine of infectious invalidity in this case. 6 Am.
L. Prop. § 24.48; 5 Powell 789; Simes & Smith, §§ 1262, 1263.
Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1945)
Devise in trust to pay income to A and his children, and at end
of 30 years to turn over property to A for life, remainder to A's
children in fee. Held: there could be no "vesting" [in possession?]
for 30 years. "The provisions of the trust offend the rule ... and
are void." Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.67; 5 Powell 773; 4
Restatement of Property § 378; 1 Scott, Trusts § 62.10 (2) (2d
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ed. 1956); Simes & Smith §§ 1891, 1393. Orthodox view: the gift
to A's children vests in interest at A's death with possession post-
poned. Interests not void because trust may last beyond per-
petuity period. (On a second appeal, Ford v. Yost, 800 Ky. 764,
190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945), the Court eliminated the provision for
holding in trust and upheld the beneficial interests.)
Holoway v. Crumbaugh, 275 Ky. 377, 121 S.W. 2d 924 (1938)
Devise to A's children whenever born; if any child dies without
issue him surviving his share to X. A had 8 children, all born
before T's death. None were born subsequently. Held: gift over
to X void. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.47, case 72; 4 Restatement
of Property § 884, ill. 2, com. g. The gifts over on death of each
child are on separate divesting contingencies. Therefore, under
orthodox view, the gifts over on death of each of these 3 children
living at T's death are valid.
Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903)
Devise in trust to pay income to A in amount necessary to support
his children, accumulate excess, and pay over accumulated income
and corpus to A's children when his daughter Emily reaches 35,
or if dead when she would have reached 35 had she lived. Held:
gift to A's children violates Rule; contingencies not separated.
Contra: authorities cited under Coleman v. Coleman and Curtis
v. Citizens Bank (p. 103 supra). Gift to A's children vests in
interest with possession postponed at A's death under orthodox
view; in any event the gift on the first contingency is valid.
Laughlin v. Elliott, 202 Ky. 433, 259 S.W. 1031 (1924)
Deed to A for life, then to B for life, then to grandchildren of A
in fee. A had grandchild living at date of deed. Held: remainder
in fee void. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.25; Gray § 379; Simes &
Smith § 1270, example 5, also n. 69, 1959 pocket part. Orthodox
view: class closing at death of A and B saves gift.
Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946)
Devise to A for life, then in trust to the children of B, then to
Church forever, but if Church ceases to maintain church house,
to Synod. Held: gifts to children of B, to Church and to Synod
all void. Contra as to children of B and Church: 6 Am. L. Prop.
§§ 24.3, 24.19 (case 16); Gray § 205; 5 Powell 772; 4 Restate-
ment of Property § 378, ill. 1, § 370, com. o; Simes & Smith § 1283.
Orthodox view: gift to Church immediately vests in interest with
possession postponed; gift to children of B vests at death of A and
B, if not before. Trust not invalid because might last beyond
perpetuity period. Contra as to gift to Synod: 6 Am. L. Prop.
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§ 24.40; 5 Powell 770; 4 Restatement of Property § 897; Simes &
Smith § 1280.
Lindner v. Ehrich, 147 Ky. 85, 148 S.W. 778 (1912)
Devise in trust to A for life, then to As children for their lives,
remainder in fee to A's grandchildren. Held: gift to A's grand-
children void (orthodox); preceding life estate increased to a fee
(unorthodox). Contra on latter point: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.47;
Gray § 248; 5 Powell 790; 4 Restatement of Property §408.
Invalid interest passes to T's heirs under orthodox view.
Ludwig v. Combs, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 128 (1858)
Deed providing that children of slave Martha should be free
when they reached 25. Held: deed of freedom void under Rule
against Perpetuities. Application of the Rule to grants of freedom,
keeping property in fetters, violates the fundamental reason for
the Rule.
Maher v. Maher 139 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ky. 1956), noted 9 Okla.
L. Rev. 440 (1956); further litigation dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, Maher v. Maher, 154 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ky. 1957.)
Devise to A for life, then to A's children for their lives, remainder
in fee to A's grandchildren per stirpes. Held: gift to A's grand-
children void (but see 4 Restatement of Property § 389, com. c);
A's children take a fee. Contra: authorities cited under Lindner v.
Ehrich (p. 106 supra).
Patterson v. Patterson, 185 Ky. 839, 122 S.W. 169 (1909)
Deed in fee from G to turnpike company, providing that when
land ceased to be used for a toll house it would "revert back to"
X, Y, and Z (not the grantor). Held: executory interest in X, Y,
and Z valid. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.62, cases 94, 95, 96; 5
Powell 767; Simes & Smith § 1241.
Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 885 (1900)
Devise in trust for 40 years, to pay income to T's minor children
in such amounts necessary for their support, maintenance, and
education. As each child reached 21 his share of any accumulated
income to be paid to him; thereafter his share of income to be
paid to him annually. At expiration of 40 years, corpus "is to be
divided equally between my living children or issue of my said
children"; if all children die without surviving issue corpus is to
be divided among T's heirs. (Facts from record, p. 2; appellee's
brief, p. 1.) Held: entire devise void. Contra: authorities cited
under Coleman v. Coleman and Curtis v. Citizens Bank (p. 108
supra). Orthodox view: income gift to children vests immedi-
[Vol. 49,
KNrucKY PE rU-Erms LAw
ately. All interests in corpus will vest in interest with possession
postponed at or before the death of T's children (lives in being).
Street v. Cave Hill Investment Co., 191 Ky. 422, 230 S.W. 536 (1921)
Devise of land to 4 churches for 99 years, then land to be sold
and proceeds divided among the churches then in existence.
Held: 99-year term violated mortmain statute; term passed to T's
heirs. Gift at end of 99-year term to churches then in existence
held valid. Contra as to gift at end of 99-year term: Gray §§ 320.1,
210, 201; 5 Powell 767; 4 Restatement of Property § 374, ill. 7,
also § 370, com. h. Gift is contingent on churches being in
existence after 99 years-too remote.
Thornton v. Kirtley, 249 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky. 1952)
Devise in trust for 50 years to pay income to T's 3 children, or if
dead to their issue per stirpes; at end of 50 years in fee to those
persons receiving the income, with 5 shares of stock to be held in
further trust in perpetuity to maintain cemetery lots. Held: all
gifts invalid. Contra as to 5-share trust to begin after 50 years;
6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.20; 4 Restatement of Property § 370, com. h,
ill. 2; Simes & Smith § 1236. Contra as to income gifts to children:
6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.19, case 22a (1958 supp.); 5 Powell 772; 1
Scott, Trusts § 62.10 (2) (2d ed. 1956); Simes & Smith, §§ 1391,
1393; cf. Gray §§ 410-410.5.
Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W. 2d 176 (1950)
Deed to A in fee, providing that if A, his heirs or assigns failed
to buy oil and gas from grantor, his heirs and assigns, then
grantor had right of entry upon repayment of purchase price of
$3000. Held: grantor retained valid right of entry, not void
option. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.56; 4 Restatement of Property
§ 894, com. c; Simes & Smith § 1245.
Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939
(1914)
Devise in trust for A for life, then to B for life, then to A's
children for their lives, remainder in fee to A's grandchildren per
capita. Held: remainder in fee void; preceding life tenants take a
fee. Contra: authorities cited under Lindner v. Ehrich (p. 106
supra ).
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 120
S.W. 328 (1909)
Devise in trust to A for life, then in equal shares for each child of
A for life, and upon death of any child to pay the share of corpus
on which he had been receiving the income to his issue per stirpes.
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Held: devise to A's grandchildren void. Contra: 6 Am. L. Prop.
§ 24.29; Gray §§ 391, 392, 395, fra. 3; 4 Restatement of Property
§ 389; Simes & Smith § 1267. Doctrine of severed shares saves the
gift to issue of any child of A in being at T's death. All children
of A were in being at T's death, so under orthodox view entire
gift is valid.
Table 3
DoUBTUL CASES UNDER ORTHODOX PERPETUITIES DOCTINE
Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co., 123 Ky. 775, 97 S.W. 421
(1906)-correct on ground donee could appoint only in fee; in-
correct if ground is nonapplication of "second look" doctrine.
See Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky. 180, 82 S.W. 2d 297 (1935).
Brumley v. Brumley, 28 Ky. L.R. 231, 89 S.W. 182 (1905)-incorrect
insofar as it holds void a right of entry in grantor upon failure of
issue.
Curd's Trustee v. Curd, 163 Ky. 472, 173 S.W. 1148 (1915)-incorrect
if instrument construed to give Mary's children a life estate, in-
creased into a fee by invalid gift over. Opinion unclear as to
construction.
Duncan v. Webster County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.W. 489
(1924)-incorrect if grant was of a determinable fee or if grantor
held a possibility of reverter. See Brown v. Independent Baptist
Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. 2d 922 (1950).
Fanner's National Bank v. McKenney, 264 S.W. 2d 881 (Ky. 1954)-
compare 4 Restatement of Property § 370, com. n., ill. 4.
Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 25 Ky. L.R. 2119, 79 S.W. 293 (1904)-
age limitation struck from will (semble).
Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W. 2d 720
(1938)-gift to A's grandchildren per stirpes held void; but see
4 Restatement of Property § 389, com. c.
McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Ed., 285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W. 2d
519, 133 A.L.R. 1474 (1941) -incorrect if instrument reserves a
"contingent reversion," as Court calls it, or if grant is of a
determinable fee. 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.62; 5 Powell 769;
Simes & Smith § 1239.
Renaker v. Tanner, 260 Ky. 281, 83 S.W. 2d 54 (1935)-gift to heirs
of living persons held void for perpetuity; no explanation given.
Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1959)-option in gross
held not subject to Rule against Perpetuities, but subject to rule
against unreasonable restraints on alienation. Criticized by Sparks,
35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 412 (1960).
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Sandford's Adm'r v. Sandford, 230 Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d 83 (1929)-
liberal severance of invalid measuring lives for a trust.
Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96, 190 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945)-compare Gray
§§ 410-410.5; Simes & Smith § 1261.
Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954), noted 43 Ky. L.J.
559 (1955)-gift to A's grandchildren per stirpes held void; but see
4 Restatement of Property § 389, com. c.
Tillman v. Blackburn, 276 Ky. 550, 124 S.W. 2d 755 (1939)-liberal
construction to avoid Rule.
Tuttle v. Steele, 281 Ky. 218, 135 S.W. 2d 436 (1939)-liberal con-
struction to avoid Rule. Criticized by Gray § 395, n. 3; see 6 Am.
L. Prop. § 24.29, n. 4; 5 Powell 816, n. 26.
West v. Ashby, 217 Ky. 250, 289 S.W. 228 (1926)-punitive application
of doctrine of infectious invalidity.
Table 4
CASES HOLDING INTERESTS VALID UNDER THE REMOTE POSSMILITIES TEST.
THE RESULTS ABE NOT AFFECTED By THE 1960 PEPuE'urrms Act, SINCE
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO WAlT AND SEE TO SAVE THE GIFTS.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 269 (1853)
Atty. Gen. v. Wallace's Devisees, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 611 (1847)
Board of Nat'l Missions v. Harrers Trustee, 286 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1956)
Cambron v. Pottinger, 301 Ky. 768, 193 S.W. 2d 412 (1946)
Clay v. Anderson, 203 Ky. 384, 262 S.W. 604 (1924)
Com. v. Pollitt, 25 Ky. L.R. 790, 76 S.W. 412 (1903)
DeCbarette v. DeCharette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S.W. 2d 1018, 104 A.L.R.
1455 (1936)
Egner v. Livingston County Bd. of Ed., 313 Ky. 168, 230 S.W. 2d 448
(1950)
Emler v. Emler's Trustee, 269 Ky. 27, 106 S.W. 2d 79 (1937)
Epperson v. Clintonville Cemetery Co., 303 Ky. 852, 199 S.W. 2d
628 (1947)
First Natl Bank v. Purcell, 244 S.W. 2d 458 (Ky. 1951)
Gillespie v. Winston's Trustee, 170 Ky. 667, 186 S.W. 517 (1916)
Goodloe's Trustee v. Goodloe, 292 Ky. 494, 166 S.W. 2d 836 (1942)
Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440, 160 A.L.R. 633 (1945)
Haydon v. Layton, 128 S.W. 90 (Ky. 1910)
Johnson v. Pittsburgh Cons. Coal Co., 311 S.W. 2d 537 (Ky. 1958)
Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S.W. 739 (1909)
Miller v. Miller, 151 Ky. 563, 152 S.W. 542 (1913)
Mitchell v. Deegan, 301 Ky. 587, 192 S.W. 2d 715 (1946)
Moore's Trustees v. Howe's Heirs, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 199 (1827)
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Page v. Frazier's Executors, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 205 (1878)
Russell v. Meyers, 202 Ky. 593, 260 S.W. 377 (1924)
Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Trans. Co., 314 S.W. 2d 193 (Ky. 1958)
Texas Eastern Trans. Corp. v. Carman, 314 S.W. 2d 684 (Ky. 1958)
Tillman v. Blackburn, 276 Ky. 550, 124 S.W. 2d 755 (1939)
Vokins v. McGaughey, 206 Ky. 42, 266 S.W. 907 (1924)
Table 5
CASES HOLDING INTERESTS VOID WICH ACTUALLY DID, OR VERY PROBABLY
WOULD, VEST IN Tnm; HOW KRS 381.216 WOULD HAVE SAVED THEM
(1) Fact pattern: T devises property to A for life, then to A's children
for their lives, remainder in fee to A's grandchildren. Either
opinion or record discloses that A died without having any more
children born after T's death. Remainder in fee would be valid
under wait-an-see. See text, pp. 66-67 supra.
Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1957)
Holoway v. Crumbaugh, 275 Ky. 377, 121 S.W. 2d 924 (1938)
Laughlin v. Elliott, 202 Ky. 433, 259 S.W. 1031 (1924)
Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946)
Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S.W. 939
(1914)
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374, 120 S.W.
328 (1909)
(2) Same fact pattern as (1) above. Instrument litigated before A's
death. Either opinion or record discloses that A had no more
children after I's death and at the time of litigation was at an age
where further children are highly improbable. Remainder in fee
would almost certainly be valid under wait-and-see. For applica-
tion of KRS 381.216, see text, pp. 66-67 supra.
Beall v. Wilson, 146 Ky. 646, 143 S.W. 55 (1912), woman age 57 at
time of decision.
Lindner v. Ehrich, 147 Ky. 85, 148 S.W. 778 (1912), woman age 66
at time of decision.
Maher v. Maher, 139 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Ky. 1956), man (widower)
age 70 at time of decision.
Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1957), woman age 59 at time
of decision.
Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954), male age 66 and
females age 75 and 78 at time of decision.
Tuttle v. Steele, 281 Ky. 218, 135 S.W. 2d 436 (1939), facts unclear
but briefs imply T had no brother or sister (A) surviving.
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(3) Fact pattern: T devises property to A for life, remainder in fee to
A's children who reach 25. Opinion or record discloses that at
A's death all his children were over 4 years of age. Thus under
wait-and-see the gift would be valid. See text, p. 65 supra.
Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 25 Ky. L.R. 2119, 79 S.W. 293 (1904)
Ludwig v. Combs, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 128 (1858).
(4) Fact pattern same as (8) above. Opinion or record discloses facts
which make it highly probable that A's children will reach 25
within 21 years of A's death. Thus the gift probably would be
valid under wait-and-see. See text, p. 65 supra.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357
(1924)
(5) Fact pattern: T devises property to pay income to A for life, then
to A's children, and 25 years from T's death to distribute the
property to A's issue then living per stirpes. Opinion or record
discloses distribution date would definitely occur within 21 years
of A's death. Therefore gift of corpus would be valid under wait-
and-see. See text, p. 68 supra.
Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L.R. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901)
Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 186 S.W. 2d 896 (1945); Ford v. Yost, 300
Ky. 764, 190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945)
Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903)
(6) Fact Pattern: T devises property to A for life, then to A's surviving
widow for life, then in fee to A's issue then living. The opinion
discloses A's surviving widow was in fact alive at T's death and
the gift to issue would be valid under wait-and-see. See text,
p. 66 supra.
Chenowith v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928)
Table 6
CASES HOLDING INTERESTS VOID WHICH DID NOT OR IGHT NOT VEST IN
DUE TinE; HOW KRS 381.216 wouLD HAVE APPLIED
(1) Fact pattern: T devises property in trust for 40 years to pay
income to T's issue per stirpes from time to time living, and at
the end of 40 years to distribute the corpus to T's issue per stirpes
then living. For application of KRS 381.216, see text, p. 68 supra.
Curtis v. Citizens Bank, 318 S.W. 2d 33 (Ky. 1958)
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 25 Ky. L.R. 1827, 78 S.W. 896 (1904)
Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L.R. 1315, 54 S.W. 835 (1900)
Thornton v. Kirtley, 249 S.W. 2d 803 (Ky. 1952)
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(2) Fact pattern: T devises property in trust to pay the income to
his issue per stirpes forever (no termination date). Under wait-
and-see the trust may continue for the lives of T's issue living at
his death plus 21 years. See text, p. 68 supra.
Renaker v. Tanner, 260 Ky. 281, 83 S.W. 2d 54 (1935)
Sandford's Adm'r v. Sandford, 230 Ky. 429, 20 S.W. 2d 83 (1929),
similar result without wait-and-see.
Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96, 190 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945)
Farmers Natl Bank v. McKenney, 264 S.W. 2d 881 (Ky. 1954)
(3) Fact pattern: T devises property to A for life, then to A's children
for their lives, then to A's grandchildren in fee. A has a child
born after T's death. For application of KRS 881.216, see text,
p. 67 supra.
Brumley v. Brumley, 28 Ky. L.R. 281, 89 S.W. 182 (1905)
Curd's Trustee v. Curd, 163 Ky. 472, 173 S.W. 1148 (1915)
West v. Ashby, 217 Ky. 250, 289 S.W. 228 (1926)
(4) Fact pattern: T devises property to A for life, remainder as A by
will appoints. A appoints to B for life, remainder to B's children
in fee. B was not in being at T's death. For application of KRS
381.216, see text, p. 68 supra.
Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co., 128 Ky. 775, 97 S.W. 421
(1906)
Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 887, 118 S.W. 2d 720
(1938)
Table 7
CASES INVOLVING OPTIONS; APPLICATION OF KRS 881.216
(1) Options unlimited in time, held void, which would be valid for 21
years and void thereafter under KRS 381.216. See text, p. 64 supra.
Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. 2d 568, 162 A.L.R. 578 (1944)
Robertson v. Simmons, 322 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. 1959)
Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W. 2d 654 (1942)
Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 227 S.W. 2d 176 (1950)
(2) Options held personal to optionee and not affected by 1960
Perpetuities Act
Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 286 S.W. 2d 948 (1950)
Campbell v. Campbell, 813 Ky. 249, 280 S.W. 2d 918 (1950)
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Table 8
CASES ON RIGHTS OF ENTRY, POSSIBILITIES OF BEVERTER, AND EXECUTORY
INTERESTS AFTER DETERM(NABLE FEES; APPLICATION OF KRS 381.219
(1) Rights of entry and possibilities of reverter held valid. Under
KRS 381.219, interest is void after thirty years if contingency has
not happened. See text, pp. 75-76 supra.
Barren County Bd. of Ed. v. Jordan, 249 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1952)
Bowling v. Grace, 219 Ky. 496, 293 S.W. 964 (1927)
County Bd. of Ed. v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S.W. 465 (1917)
Egner v. Livingston County Bd. of Ed., 313 Ky. 168, 230 S.W. 2d 448
(1950)
Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W. 2d 953 (1940)
Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. Bryan, 263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936)
Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S.W. 739 (1909)
Pullins v. Bd. of Ed. of Methodist Church, 25 Ky. L.R. 1715, 78 S.W.
457 (1904)
(2) Executory interests held void. Under KRS 381.219, interest is
treated as a right of entry; void after thirty years if contingency
has not happened. See text, p. 77 supra.
Duncan v. Webster County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.W. 489 (1924)
McGaughey v. Spencer County Bd. of Ed., 285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W. 2d
519 (1941)
(3) Executory interest held valid. Under KRS 381. 219, interest is
treated as a right of entry; void after thirty years if contingency
has not happened. See text, p. 77 supra.
Patterson v. Patterson, 135 Ky. 339, 122 S.W. 169 (1909)
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